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This thesis analyzes the possible threats to global maritime interests posed by the 
growing international proliferation of advanced sea mines, and examines the role of NATO's 
mine countermeasures (MCM) forces in countering these threats in the post-Cold War 
security environment. It is argued that, given the Iraqi mining success during the Gulf War, 
the current global proliferation of sophisticated sea mines, and deficiencies in the 
international laws which govern their use, mine warfare will present a growing threat to 
vulnerable Western nations into the next century. Consequently, NATO's mine 
countermeasure forces will have a prominent role in future Alliance or UN-mandated out-of- 
area naval contingencies, ranging from counter-terrorism operations to major regional 
conflicts, and will be called upon to provide a credible MCM capability to protect Alliance 
and coalition naval forces, secure vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and ensure 
unimpeded maritime freedom of the seas prescribed under international law. NATO's 
capability to meet these challenges will depend largely on its ability to reorient its focus 
toward the requirements necessary to train and maintain a first-rate MCM rapid deployment 
force. As a leader within NATO, the United States Navy must assume the lead in forging 
multinational transatlantic MCM forces capable of dealing with any global mining 
contingency. 
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The collapse of the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization and the demise of the Soviet 
Union have resulted in a fundamental shift in the defense perspectives of NATO away from 
large scale conventional and nuclear warfare toward participation in crisis management 
operations, low intensity regional conflicts, and peace-keeping/enforcing missions. This new 
international security setting will likely mean an even greater role for NATO's naval forces 
in out-of-area contingency operations in littoral waters. In such an environment, the sea 
mine will always pose a potential threat as an anonymous and cost-effective means of 
neutralizing a superior naval force, or as an instrument of international terror. 
B. THESIS STATEMENT 
This thesis analyzes the possible threats to global maritime interests posed by the 
growing international proliferation of advanced sea mines, and examines the role of NATO's 
mine countermeasures (MCM) forces in countering these threats in the post-Cold War 
security environment. It is argued that, given the Iraqi mining success during the Gulf War, 
the current global proliferation of sophisticated sea mines, and deficiencies in the 
international laws which govern their use, mine warfare will present a growing threat to 
vulnerable Western nations into the next century. Consequently, NATO's mine 
countermeasure forces will have a prominent role in future Alliance or UN-mandated out-of- 
area naval contingencies, ranging from counter-terrorism operations to major regional 
conflicts, and will be called upon to provide a credible MCM capability to protect Alliance 
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and coalition naval forces, secure vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and ensure 
unimpeded maritime freedom of the seas prescribed under international law. 
C. KEY FINDINGS 
1. Mine Warfare Strategic Culture 
Historically, the United States has failed to maintain an adequate capability in naval 
mine countermeasures, particularly in comparison to its European allies. The divergence 
between the two sides of the Atlantic in their perceptions of mine warfare's relative 
importance in national security affairs can be traced to each region's differing interpretation 
of its historical, strategic, and economic vulnerability to mining. Europe's focus on their 
perceived mine warfare vulnerability has resulted in continued emphasis on MCM programs 
to adequately protect their national interests. Conversely, America's Cold War maritime 
strategy centered primarily on open ocean confrontation with the Soviet Union. As a 
result, the Navy sharply limited the development of MCM in order to support other warfare 
areas more fully. Little attention was given to the growing need for a rapidly deployable 
integrated MCM force capable of conducting sustained MCM operations in emerging 
regional "hotspots" around the globe. This requirement went largely unnoticed until events 
in the Arabian Gulf exposed the US Navy's unpreparedness for unilateral out-of-area MCM 
operations in the littorals, first, during the Iran-Iraq Tanker War, and again in Operation 
Desert Storm. 
2. Current Mine Warfare Realities 
As a result of the Gulf War experience, mine countermeasures have assumed greater 
visibility within the United States Navy. Yet despite improving US MCM capabilities, the 
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inherently complex and time-consuming nature of mine clearance operations are often beyond 
the capability or jurisdiction of individual states, thus requiring the cooperative efforts of 
multinational coalitions. Collectively, NATO's alliance members maintain the world's premier 
MCM capability and technical establishments. Moreover, NATO is the only institution 
capable of conducting extensive MCM operations globally. When analyzing the likely 
occurrence of maritime mining on the global stage, it is important to consider the enormous 
disparity between those nations possessing the capability to plant offensive, defensive, or 
protective minefields and those nations with the ability or inclination of clearing them either 
during or following the cessation of hostilities. The events of the Gulf War clearly reinforce 
the presumption that many states lacking a credible MCM capability are nevertheless 
undeterred from employing mine warfare as integral components of their military posture. 
3. Mine Warfare and International Law 
Current deficiencies in the various internationally recognized treaties and conventions 
which codify customary international laws of the sea governing the use of sea mines continue 
to challenge even noted scholars of maritime law, and have created notable "gray areas" 
which can be exploited by states seeking justification for potentially destablizing mining 
activities. The best known and nearly universally accepted regime governing the use of 
mines during armed hostilities is the 1907 Hague Convention No. VIII. Yet key provisions 
contained in this agreement are incomplete, outdated, or ambiguous, and thus do not always 
provide clear guidelines as to the geographical limits on the employment of mines, the 
conditions under which they may be legally used, and the specific responsibilities of the 
mining entity following their emplacement. These inconsistencies will continue to lead to 
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a wide range of differing legal interpretations with respect to the uses of sea mines among 
the world's maritime community until a more comprehensive convention is developed. 
Moreover, the recent ratification of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS III) opens new and potentially destablizing avenues for the employment of 
mines in the expanded and often contentious Territorial Seas, archipelagic waters, and 
Economic Enterprise Zones (EEZs), within the strategic maritime regions of the world. 
4. Mine Warfare Proliferation 
The ongoing proliferation of advanced mines to the developing Third World, and 
indirectly, to subnational organizations, increases the potential threat to continued freedom 
of the seas and the national security of NATO's maritime nations. The dynamics of the Cold 
War balance of power which served to curb the proliferation of sophisticated mine technology 
and hardware from the advanced military powers have given way to post-Cold War economic 
realities. As a result, previously unavailable state-of-the-art "smart mines" from Russian, 
Asian, and Western European sources are now available on the international arms market at 
affordable prices. Moreover, the increasingly transnational European defense technology and 
industrial base also raises the possibility of increased diffusion of advanced mine technology 
to the developing nations of the Third World. Compounding the problem is the concurrent 
proliferation of modern SSK diesel-electric submarines world-wide. These silent platforms 
offer the ultimate means of covertly delivering mines capable of sinking the largest ships and 
submarines in constricted geographical environments. Finally, at the subnational level, the 
growth of black and gray arms markets has created an avenue for further proliferation of 
advanced mines to stateless actors such as terrorist groups and insurgent movements. 
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5. The Role of MCM in NATO's Post-Cold War Navies 
The lack of a credible near term threat to Western Europe has resulted in a 
reevaluation of NATO's core missions in the post-Cold War international setting. NATO's 
new Strategic Concept has embraced expeditionary littoral warfare as the most likely type 
of naval conflict in this new security environment. Moreover, all 16 member states have 
accepted a de facto Alliance mandate to support peace-keeping activities of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the United Nations. 
Against this backdrop, NATO's MCM forces can perform five primary missions: 
ensure North Atlantic waters are free from the threat of sporadic terrorist or insurgent mining 
activities; defend against Europe's economic vulnerability to mining from latent regional 
hegemons-including Russia; support NATO's Immediate Reaction standing naval forces; 
contribute to Alliance, or UN-mandated peace-keeping/enforcing missions or expeditionary 
operations world-wide; and finally, reduce the potential threat posed by mines to NATO's 
nuclear submarine forces. Common to many of these duties will be the requirement to 
provide an effective shallow water MCM capability during NATO or ad-hoc coalition 
operations in the littoral regions of the world 
E.   CONCLUSION 
The abysmal MCM capabilities of most Third World navies, and their inability to 
counter even rudimentary mine threats highlights the potential problems associated with the 
advent of advanced sea mine proliferation. With the possible exception of Japan, only 
NATO possesses effective MCM forces both in terms of assets and expertise to effectively 
counter the growing menace presented by the global proliferation of sophisticated mines. 
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Bearing this in mind, it is but a matter of time before NATO's MCM forces will again be called 
upon to counter a more lethal variety of mines challenging naval expeditionary forces or 
threatening maritime freedom of the seas. NATO's capability to meet these challenges will 
depend largely on its ability to reorient its focus toward the requirements necessary to train 
and maintain a first-rate MCM rapid deployment force. As a leader within NATO, the US 
Navy must assume the lead in forging multinational transatlantic MCM forces capable of 
dealing with any global mining contingency. 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The twofold purpose of this thesis is to analyze the possible implications to maritime 
interests posed by the global proliferation of advanced sea mines, and to examine the role of 
NATO's mine countermeasures (MCM) forces in countering this growing threat in the post- 
Cold War security environment. The events of the Gulf War clearly reinforce the 
presumption that many countries lacking a credible MCM capability are nevertheless 
undeterred from employing mine warfare as integral components of their military posture. 
Consequently, NATO's maritime nations will undoubtedly be called upon to provide a 
credible mine countermeasures capability in order to protect Alliance and coalition naval 
forces, secure vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and to ensure unimpeded flow of 
maritime traffic through potentially vulnerable international and territorial waters. NATO's 
capability to meet this challenge will depend largely on its ability to reorient its focus toward 
the requirements necessary to train and maintain a first-rate MCM rapid deployment force. 
As a leader within NATO, the US Navy must assume the lead in forging multinational 
transatlantic MCM forces capable of dealing with any global mining contingency. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization and the demise of the Soviet 
Union have resulted in a fundamental shift in the defense perspectives of both American and 
Western European navies away from large-scale open ocean warfare toward regional crisis 
management and  peace-keeping/enforcing missions.   This new security environment will 
likely mean an even greater role for naval forces in out-of-area contingency operations in 
littoral waters.1 In such an environment, the mine will always pose a potential threat as both 
a cost-effective means of defense, and as an easily deployed means of neutralizing a superior 
naval force. Throughout its history, the mine has proven to be a weapon that evokes 
psychological uncertainty, causes physical damage, and requires a countermeasures effort 
far out of proportion to the cost of the mining effort. Moreover, mines are covert and 
anonymous, making them an ideal weapon for terrorist groups or adventurous rogue states. 
The ongoing proliferation of advanced mines to potential Third World adversaries and, 
indirectly, to subnational organizations, only increases the potential threat to continued 
freedom of the seas and the national security of NATO's maritime nations. 
Historically, the United States Navy has failed to sustain an adequate capability in 
naval mine countermeasures, particularly in comparison to its European allies. Yet of the 13 
major US Navy vessels damaged since 1945, nine - including the USS Princeton, USS 
Tripoli, and the USS Samuel B. Roberts - have been the victims of mines. Recent events in 
the Arabian Gulf have highlighted Western economic and military vulnerability to even 
haphazard mining operations, and the inability of the US Navy alone to provide an adequate 
MCM capability. 
As a result of the Gulf War experience, mine countermeasures have assumed 
greater visibility within the US Navy. The new emphasis toward rectifying acknowledged 
shortfalls in this warfare area is outlined in the Navy's Mine Warfare Plan, and portends 
1
 For the purposes of this thesis, the term "out-of-area operations" reflects those 
operations involving NATO's military forces and integrated command structure that lie outside 
the scope of Article 5 to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. 
increased funding levels for MCM development programs, the complete reorganization and 
consolidation of US MCM forces under the cognizance of a component commander, 
Commander Mine Warfare Command (COMINEWARCOM), and the collocation of all US 
MCM forces at the Navy's "Center for Mine Warfare Excellence" at Naval Station Ingleside 
in Texas.2 Yet despite improving US MCM capabilities, the inherently complex and time- 
consuming nature of most mine-clearance operations are often beyond the capability or 
jurisdiction of individual states, thus requiring the collective efforts of multinational 
coalitions. Moreover, the growing role of naval forces in regional crisis response operations 
and maritime peace-keeping/enforcement missions, and their vulnerability in the littoral 
environment are two current areas of concern relative to mine warfare. In such 
circumstances, the US Navy must rely increasingly on overseas allies to share the burden of 
maintaining global MCM commitments in today's unstable international climate. 
Since 1980, all but two of the 16 crisis deployments involving the US military have 
included naval forces. Moreover, forces from NATO member nations have collaborated with 
the US in eight of these.3 One of the key lessons of Operations Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm is that our nation must be prepared with little warning to project significant US forces 
overseas to areas of the world processing little or no infrastructure. This lesson becomes 
even more apparent as the United States reduces its overseas base structure in response to 
post-Cold War realities. In these scenarios, the presence of a mine threat may interrupt the 
2
 US Department of the Navy, Mine Warfare Plan, second ed., February 1994, p. 5. 
3
 Mike Wells, "Seapower Conference Examines Next Decade," Navy International, 
May/June 1994, p. 151. 
flow of maritime logistics and resupply critical to the successful conduct of joint or coalition 
military operations in littoral regions. Furthermore, recent history has demonstrated that any 
actual or potential threat to the harmony of the global economy presented by the closure of 
a strategic maritime region will result in the deployment of multinational naval forces as 
instruments of coercive diplomacy, or if necessary, forceful intervention. Most, if not all 
these regions encompass maritime shipping lanes and strategic chokepoints, not to mention 
crucial ports of origin and termination for the majority of the world's seaborne commerce and 
raw materials. These shallow and constricted waters are readily mined and subject to 
indefinite closure by even a modest mining campaign, particularly in areas where the adjacent 
nations lack a MCM capability. 
Mines may also pose a significant obstacle to future naval peace-keeping/enforcing 
operations in support of UN-mandated resolutions. Given public intolerance of even limited 
casualties and the West's hesitancy of becoming involved in areas where its national 
interests are not perceived to be directly threatened, an opponent may conclude that it only 
has to"get lucky" once to deter NATO from intervention or intimidate it into withdrawing. 
The recent experiences of the United States in Beirut and Somalia serve to highlight this 
premise to potential adversaries. In future peace-keeping operations, it may be difficult for 
political and military leaders to justify the loss of a single naval asset in a crisis which has little 
significance to American or Western European national interests. Under these conditions, 
the presence of a definitive littoral mine threat may severely constrain the naval options of 
the on-scene military commanders. 
Based on these considerations, the availability of capable, ready MCM assets on 
station with the naval task force is of paramount importance. Collectively, NATO's alliance 
members maintain the world's premier MCM capabilities and technical establishments. 
Accordingly, multinational cooperation and interoperability must be achieved between 
respective transatlantic MCM forces in order to provide NATO a formidable rapid response 
MCM capability to meet such a challenge should the need arise. 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze NATO's role in countering the growing 
global mine threat in today's post-Cold War environment. It is hypothesized that, given the 
Iraqi mining success during the Gulf war, the current global proliferation of advanced mines, 
and current deficiencies in international laws regulating the use of sea mines in peacetime and 
during armed conflict, mine warfare will emerge as a growing threat to vulnerable Western 
states into the next century. Consequently, NATO's MCM forces will have a prominent role 
in Alliance or ad-hoc coalition out-of-area naval operations in the future, ranging from 
counter-terrorism to major regional conflicts (MRCs). 
D. RESEARCH LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY 
Research data for this thesis was obtained from a large body of available literature 
in the area of mine warfare including official government directives, US Department of 
Defense and Navy regulations and manuals, professional journals, military and political 
documents, NATO publications, and historical publications. Further research was conducted 
via interviews with American and European naval officers and government officials 
knowledgeable in this field. Most of the latter were conducted with professional colleagues 
to acquire pertinent information not readily available from printed sources in order to provide 
a full spectrum of research material. Finally, the author has drawn from personal MCM 
expertise and experience acquired during nine years of service in the US Navy's MCM forces 
and participation in various NATO and UN MCM operations, including Desert Storm 
mine clearance operations. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter II provides an overview of the art of mine warfare and examines the strategic, 
operational, and tactical advantages and disadvantages of various mine warfare and mine 
countermeasure strategies. 
Chapter III examines possible explanations for the historical divergence in the 
perceived importance of MCM within the US Navy and its European alliance partners, and 
addresses the question, why have European navies taken mine warfare more seriously than 
the US Navy. An argument is presented that the US Navy's historical indifference to mine 
warfare is not simply the result of dereliction or ignorance but derived from the absence of 
three significant elements of mine warfare vulnerability-historical, strategic, and economic- 
specific to Europe. 
Chapter IV addresses legal considerations pertaining to the use of sea mines in 
peacetime and during periods of armed conflict. Current international agreements which 
codify the customary international laws governing the use of sea mines are examined and 
specific weaknesses contained therein are identified. The implications of the recently ratified 
Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) and its potential 
impact on the current use of sea mines is also analyzed. 
Chapter V focuses on the current proliferation of highly advanced Russian, Asian, 
and European mine warfare hardware and technology to developing Third World states and 
subnational organizations, and examines the implications of this emerging threat to maritime 
security. 
Chapter VI analyzes the present and future roles of MCM within NATO's evolving 
post-Cold War maritime strategy, its prospects under the Alliance's new Strategic Concept, 
and its future in the evolution of the Western European Union (WEU) and the development 
of a genuine European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Current strengths and 
weaknesses in NATO's current ability to support expeditionary MCM operations are 
examined as well as possible peacekeeping/enforcing missions involving NATO's MCM 
forces. 
Chapter VII presents specific findings and conclusions and offers recommendations 
toward improving transatlantic MCM cooperation and interoperability in the face of a 
growing international mine threat. 

II. MINE WARFARE OVERVIEW 
A war in which enemies seldom meet and battle is rarely joined, but death and 
destruction always mark the field. Where the big ships fight their battles, and 
the little mine craft have already been to do their dull and dirty duty, in which 
there is no glory. Where the fighting fleets sail to victory, there are the seas 
of glory. But where the little ships go, there is the most dangerous sea. This 
is mine warfare.4 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Mine warfare comprises the strategic and tactical use of sea mines and their 
countermeasures. It includes both the laying of mines with the aim of sinking or damaging 
the opponents shipping, or at the very least, hinder his use of the seas, and countermeasures, 
which includes all measures for countering the mine by reducing or preventing danger or 
damage to ships and personnel.5 The ancestry of the naval mine reportedly dates back to 
1585, when the Dutch floated explosives down the Scheldt River in an effort to blow up 
Spanish fortifications blocking Antwerp from access to the sea.5 An American inventer, 
David Bushnell, is generally credited with the development and employment of the first 
modern underwater contact mine during the American Revolution. These primitive efforts 
and other initial experiments with underwater explosives ushered in a new form of naval 
combat: mine warfare. 
4
 LCDR Arnold S. Lott, USN, Most Dangerous Sea, 1959, p. 3. 
5
 Jan J. Van Waning, "Naval Mine Warfare," International Military and Defense 
Encyclopedia, Volume 4, 1993, pp. 1759-1760. 
6
 Howard S. Levie, Mine Warfare at Sea, 1992, P. 9. 
9 
This chapter provides a basic overview of naval mines and analyzes some of the 
lesser known intricacies relating to the art of mine warfare. In order to appreciate the diverse 
applicability of mine warfare in today's strategic environment, one must first understand the 
capabilities the naval mine affords in terms of effectiveness and flexibility. 
B. THE ART OF MINE WARFARE 
Through its history to the modern day, the mine has proved to be a most cost- 
effective weapon that causes physical damage, creates psychological uncertainty, and requires 
a countermeasure effort far out of proportion to the cost of the mining effort. As a force 
multiplier, mines serve as 24 hour-a-day sentries that continuously threaten enemy ships 
without the requirement of logistical or maintenance support. Historically, the mine has 
provided smaller naval powers with a means of countering the superior navies of their 
enemies. They are comparatively inexpensive, abundant, and relatively easy to deploy. Cash 
strapped Third World states can build a formidable mine inventory in lieu of the cost of a 
single warship. Larger naval powers have employed mines to effectively blockade and 
interdict the home waters and vital sea lanes of communications (SLOC) of their adversaries. 
However, while the mine provides the means to achieve a specific military or national aim, 
it is the minefield that must be considered as the fundamental component in mine warfare. 
Only in this capacity can the potential force of the mine be effectively brought to bear. 
1. Mine Warfare Strategies 
Mines can be employed under a variety of strategic, operational, or tactical scenarios. 
For example, at the strategic level, mining campaigns have a long-term capability to deny 
adversaries free access to or use of sea areas considered vital to the prosecution of their war 
effort or economic viability. Furthermore, using delayed arming, mines can be laid before 
hostilities and enhance deterrence without posing an immediate threat.7 Defensively, mines 
can be deployed in conjunction with other coastal defense systems to form a formidable 
barrier against enemy invasion forces or maritime blockade. 
Operationally, mines can be employed to restrict enemy maneuver options or enhance 
friendly maneuver options. For example, the constraining nature of mines enables the 
channelization of enemy forces into favorable "fields of fire" for waiting air, surface, and 
sub-surface assets. Furthermore, the use of mines to bottle up enemy forces in port removes 
potential threats to maritime operations without the need to engage in direct hostilities. 
Tactically, mines can be employed to support military objectives limited in time and 
scope. Historically, mines have not been well suited to such usage because their deployment 
required extensive preparation time for immediate use.8 However, modern modular mines 
are better suited for short-notice deployment in support of dynamic battlespace 
contingencies. For example aircraft can rapidly plant mine lines across the path of an 
oncoming amphibious assault force were earlier none may have existed. 
The flexibility of today's advanced mines also allow the planner to tailor minefields 
to the specific aim envisioned by the command authority directing its use. For example, if 
the objective is strictly harassment of enemy shipping, mine sensitivities can be adjusted to 
7
 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOINT PUB 3-15, Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and 
Mine Warfare, 1993, p. 1-2. 
8
 Nevertheless, tactical employment of mines has occurred in previous conflicts. For 
instance, during World War I retreating naval units sometimes dropped mines over the side to 
deter or damage pursuing fleets. This was a main consideration in Admiral Jellicoe's decision not 
to pursue the German High Sea Fleet following the Battle of Jutland. 
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detonate at a greater distance from the target and therefore outside of the damage radius of 
most vessels. Moreover, mines can be programmed to self-destruct at varied time settings, 
thus raising the levels of anxiety and uncertainty for enemy forces. However, if the 
objective of the minefield is attrition of enemy forces, mine sensitivities can be set to inflict 
maximum material damage to intended targets. 
2. Psychological Aspects of Mine Warfare 
Although examples such as the USS Samuel B. Roberts highlight the physical 
effectiveness of sea mines, perhaps the greatest advantage of maritime mining is its 
psychological impact on enemy forces.9 The psychological threat of the mine emanates from 
the uncertainty it creates and the inability of most vessels to effectively counter the weapon. 
Throughout its history, the impersonal nature of the mine has eroded the morale even of 
battle-hardened seamen. During the Civil War, ". . [S]ailors hardened to the smoke, noise 
and pandemonium of close range cannonading were stunned and demoralized by the sudden 
and unexpected mine blasts."10 In both World Wars, German submarine crews feared mines 
more than any other weapon. The sinister aspect of mines in general was summed up by a 
British officer in World War II who stated, "I don't mind a fighting chance, but I dread the 
mines."11 
9
 The USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) was nearly sunk by an Iranian-laid moored mine 
in the Arabian Gulf in 1988 during Earnest Will escort operations. 
10
 A. Patterson, "Mining: A Naval Strategy," Naval War College Review, May 1971 p. 
63. 
11
 LCDR Alan Hinge RAN, "Planting a War Garden," Journal of the Australian Naval 
Institute, August/October 1994, p. 41. 
12 
The perception of vulnerability to the "unknown," and the fear created by the 
detonation of a single mine often generates an inflexible and exaggerated evaluation of the 
potential threat posed by the minefield. This proposition is supported by a major study on 
the psychological effects of minefields which concluded that given a choice under conditions 
of extreme uncertainty, combatants will exaggerate the likelihood of the more extreme 
consequences and act accordingly.12 The psychology of fear and the constraining influence 
this has on enemy plans and movements, rather than the number of ships actually sunk or 
damaged as the result of mine strikes, may be the best measure of the effectiveness of mine 
warfare operations. The events of the Gulf War substantiate the fact that this proposition 
remains as valid today as it was during the American Civil War, particularly in view of the 
growing unwillingness of Western nations to suffer even relatively few casualties in combat 
operations. 
The art of mine warfare requires both imagination and skill to achieve the optimal 
effectiveness of a particular minefield vis-a-vis the desired strategic and operational aims. 
Nevertheless, absent great mining skills, history has shown that there have been many 
blockade runners but preciously few minefield runners. In fact, an adversary is more likely 
to try to run a naval blockade comprised of surface ships than run the risk of passing through 
a minefield. Success in the first instance depends on the "battle of wits" between two human 
opponents who may make mistakes; the minefield does not make mistakes and its potential 
hazard is difficult to estimate.13   In the final analysis, the physical and psychological impact 
12
 Ibid, p. 41. 
13
 Ibid, p. 41. 
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of minefields, regardless of the actual threat, tends to be viewed as a serious danger and often 
results in a reluctance on the part of naval combatants and merchant vessels to challenge 
them. 
C. TYPES OF NAVAL MINES 
Today's navies may expect to counter all types of mines, ranging from relatively 
unsophisticated and indiscriminate contact mines, to state-of-the-art influence devices 
incorporating stealth technology and target-selective sensor packages. Mine types can be 
classified according to the position they assume in the water, method of delivery, or method 
of actuation. 
1. Position 
When classified according to the position they assume in the water, mines fall into 
three categories: bottom or ground mines, moored or buoyant mines, and drifting mines.14 
Ground mines are normally found in relatively shallow water; nominally, their effectiveness 
diminishes significantly in water depths exceeding 70 meters. Moored mines may be 
encountered in water depths as shallow as 3 meters but are normally designed for placement 
in deeper waters. Anti-submarine moored rising vertical mines (RVMs) incorporate rocket- 
propelled homing torpedoes and may be found in water depths exceeding 1,000 meters.15 
Drifting mines have no anchoring mechanism and float freely near the surface of the water. 
14
 The 1907 Hague Convention No. VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine 
Contact Mines limited the use of drifting mines to those armed with a sterilizer that disarms them 
within one hour of release. 
15
 David Foxwell, "Naval Mine Warfare: Unfunded and Underappreciated," International 
Defense Review, 2/1993, p. 12. 
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As a practical matter, moored mines which break free from their anchor become drifting 
mines. Other mines are designed to maintain neutral buoyancy and are deployed specifically 
as drifting mines. 
2. Method of Actuation 
Mine types can be further subdivided according to their sensor mechanism or the 
manner in which the mine is detonated. The three primary methods of mine detonation are 
(1) physical contact with the target, (2) influence signature actuation , and (3) remote 
actuation. Until recently, moored mines were traditional contact types. These mines 
detonated either by direct contact with a ship's hull or by the ferrous hull touching a copper 
or brass antenna attached to the mine (antenna mine). Current generation moored mines, 
however, are designed for use in deeper waters out to the edge of the continental shelf. These 
mines primarily target submarines or deep draft surface vessels and may incorporate advanced 
rocket-propelled homing torpedoes. 
The most common type of mine likely to be encountered in the shallow waters of the 
littoral seas is the ground influence mine. Older influence mines are primarily designed to 
react to either the acoustic or magnetic signature or a combination of both. Later generation 
pressure influence mines incorporate a fuse which reacts to the variations in water pressure 
generated by passing ships. Among the latest developments are seismic mines designed to 
react to the vibrations from transiting ships being transmitted through the seabed, and 
Underwater Electric Potential (UEP) mines, which are actuated by the small electric currents 
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in the water created when a metal hull passes close by. The most lethal mines are the 
advanced multi- influence mines which incorporate a combination of two or more sensor 
types in their firing circuits. 
Remote controlled mines have no destructive capability until affirmatively activated 
by some form of arming order. Unlike"independent" mines,16 remotely controlled minefields 
can be activated or de-activated by the user after they have been laid.17 Cable-controlled 
mines may contain detecting mechanisms that signal the presence of a ship or submarine to 
a remote shore station, or they may be operated in conjunction with some separate means of 
detection. Unlike their predecessors, modern controlled mines no longer rely on hard wiring 
to a nearby shore station. Their activation depends instead on the receipt of coded Very Low 
Frequency (VLF) signals. The most attractive advantage of VLF-activated controlled 
minefields is that they may be emplaced in international waters beyond the territorial sea 
subject to a requirement that they do not materially disrupt or interfere with other lawful uses 
of the ocean.18 Unlike independent mines, controlled minefields do not constitute a direct 
hazard to maritime navigation, and thus international notification of their emplacement is not 
required.19 Controlled mines have typically been employed in protective or defensive 
minefields as a means of countering potential invasion forces.  For example, Sweden and 
16 Independent mines are mines that rely on their own sensors for firing. 
17
 Mike Cashman, Sweeping (Changes for Mine Warfare: Controlling the Threat, Naval 
Postgraduate School thesis, December 1994, p.  13. 
18 Ibid, p. 38. 
19
 Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 9, Commander's Handbook of the Law of Naval 
Operations, Conventional Weapons and Weapons Systems, Chapter 9, Paragraph 9.2.2, p. 9-5. 
Norway have traditionally employed controlled minefields as a cornerstone in their coastal 
defense schemes. 
3. Method of Delivery 
Mines may be further classified according to their methods of delivery - aircraft, 
submarine or surface ship. Aircraft-delivered mines are normally employed in offensive 
operations, though helicopters may also be used to deploy defensive minefields. The speed 
and range of aircraft offer a variety of advantages in the conduct of offensive mine warfare. 
First, aircraft are versatile; any aircraft capable of dropping a bomb can lay mines. Second, 
aircraft provide the ability to quickly replenish minefields without exposure to existing mines. 
Third, aircraft are capable of laying mines in enemy held territorial or inland waters at great 
distances from friendly forces.20 The disadvantages of air-laid mine delivery are diminished 
accuracy when compared to surface or subsurface assets, and vulnerability to enemy anti-air 
defenses.21 Submarine delivered mines are configured for launch from torpedo tubes or 
specially designed mine-belt "girdles" attached to the submarine's outer hull. Although 
submarines are limited in the number of mines they can carry, they have the advantage of 
covert, high-accuracy placement. However, the enormous value of submarines coupled with 
their vulnerability to enemy mines and other submarines in relatively shallow water may 
preclude their use as mine delivery platforms in all but the most benign environments. 
20
 For example, B-52s operating from CONUS airbases can deliver mines to virtually any 
global location. 
21
 This vulnerability was highlighted during the Gulf War when a US Navy A-6 Intruder 
was lost to enemy fire while conducting a mining sortie against Iraqi port facilities at the mouth of 
the Khawr Az Zubayr River near the Iraq-Kuwait border. Admiral Kelso, " Building Blocks of 
Naval Power," US Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1992, p. 41. 
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Finally, surface delivered mines can be deployed from almost any type or size of 
surface vessel. Surface mine delivery is the most economical method for deploying large 
minefields. Furthermore, surface-laid minefields are normally the most accurate method of 
delivery and, depending on the circumstances, may be accomplished clandestinely prior to 
the commencement of hostilities.22 
4. Counter-countermeasures 
Modern mines, and even many older generation mines that have been upgraded, 
employ a variety of sophisticated countermeasures designed to defeat MCM mine hunting 
and sweeping systems. Among the most common are delayed arming, ship counts, interlook 
dormant period, and self burial capability. Many of these mines possess onboard computer 
software that can be programmed to react only to influences within certain frequency or 
amplitude ranges. This characteristic enables the mine to discriminate between types of target 
and thus to react only to specific classes of ships or even in some cases specific ships. 
Furthermore, some mines can discriminate between actual targets and apparent targets which 
have been simulated by MCM influence sweeps. Still other mines incorporate doppler shift 
detonations so as to deliver the maximum damage on the target. 
Stealth technology has been incorporated into some of the latest generation mines 
to impede detection by mine hunting sonars or TV cameras. These mines are constructed 
of Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP) or coated with sound absorbent paints, anechoic coatings 
22
 For example, the Libyan merchant vessel Ghat is widely believed to have covertly laid 
the "Mines of August" in the Red Sea in 1984. Robert Levie, Mine Warfare at Sea. 
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and other materials to reduce sonar reflecting properties. Stealth mines may also incorporate 
innovative geometric designs rendering them nearly invisible to current sonar technology. 
D. TYPES OF MINING OPERATIONS 
Mine warfare operations employ diverse systems to achieve a common aim: sea and 
battlespace control or denial. Minefields, particularly when backed by coastal missile 
batteries, as in Desert Storm, can pose a formidable, if not impenetrable, barrier to a 
transiting maritime force or as a counter to an amphibious assault. Mines, whether used 
offensively or defensively, may be employed by military forces to achieve a variety of 
objectives and goals. For instance, mines provide the capability to inflict significant 
psychological and material damage and personnel casualties on an adversary without exposing 
friendly forces to significant risk. Moreover, mines can be used as a force multiplier to 
immobilize enemy forces or blockade enemy ports and narrow sea lines of communication 
(SLOCs), while freeing friendly forces for other employment. Defensively, mines can form 
the cornerstone of coastal defense networks or provide flank protection for friendly forces 
against hostile platforms. 
Minefields can be classified according to their particular strategic, operational, or 
tactical objective or aim of employment. Commonly, the three basic types of minefields are 
characterized as offensive, defensive, and protective.23 Offensive minefields are planted in 
enemy-controlled waters. The mining of Haiphong Harbor by US Navy aircraft during the 
Joint Pub 3-15, p. Ill-14. 
Vietnam War is a classic example.24 Defensive minefields are deployed in contested waters 
to intercept or deny transit of enemy forces. These minefields are often planted in 
international waters or straits. Iraq employed defensive mining of the Northern Arabian Gulf 
to stymie coalition naval operations during Operation Desert Storm. Finally, protective 
minefields are placed in friendly or territorial waters to protect coastal ports, harbors, 
beaches, and SLOCs from hostile forces. The coastal mine barriers in place along the coasts 
of Sweden and Norway are examples of protective minefields. Each of these types of 
minefields raise complex legal implications with respect to recognized international law of 
the seas. Chapter IV addresses these and other legal issues pertaining to mine warfare in 
peacetime and during periods of armed conflict. 
E. TYPES OF MINE COUNTERMEASURE OPERATIONS 
MCM has been traditionally viewed as a defensive measure aimed at maintaining the 
integrity of internal waters and territorial seas. This assumption, however, is no longer valid 
in today's strategic climate. Since the Gallipoli campaign in World War I, MCM craft have 
often been at the forefront of offensive operations, clearing strike force assault channels in 
24
 On May 8th, 1972, US Navy and Marine aircraft from the USS Coral Sea commenced 
the mining of Haiphong, North Vietnam's principle resupply port, and other   key targets in its 
territorial waters. Although detailed attention was paid toward compliance with customary and 
conventional laws of blockade, the explicit use of the word was shunned in favor of the term 
interdiction.   Nonetheless, during the ensuing ten month period, not a single merchant ship 
challenged the mine blockade while 27 merchant vessels were confined inside the harbor at a cost 
to North Vietnam and its backers of over one billion dollars. Most importantly, over two million 
tons of war materials could not be brought into the country by sea and was only partially 
compensated for by alternate land/river transport.   President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger- 
the key decision-makers regarding the Haiphong mining operation- had no doubt that the mining 
of Vietnamese harbors in May and December of 1972 had a decisive effect on the willingness of 
the Vietnamese to negotiate the peace treaty of January 1973. See Richard Nixon, The Memoirs 
of Richard Nixon, 1979, p. 689. 
20 
advance of the fleet, and following the MCM force motto, "where the fleet goes, we've 
been."25 As regional conflicts continue to proliferate, alliance MCM forces will be increasingly 
called upon to serve as a key enabling factor for the projection of naval power from the sea. 
According to current US joint doctrine, naval mine countermeasures include all 
actions undertaken to prevent enemy mines from altering the plans or operations of friendly 
forces.26 Four major techniques or tactics are employed toward that aim. They are: prevent 
enemy mining through offensive or proactive MCM operations; avoid the mines through 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; employ defensive MCM operations to sweep 
or hunt the mine threat; and finally, diminish the threat by employing passive MCM operations 
to reduce the threat posed by unsweepable mines. These actions are classified according to 
the force that accomplishes them, the degree to which the effort directly acts against a given 
mine threat, the methods used to do so, and the specific objective of the effort. MCM is 
fundamentally broken down into two broad categories: offensive or proactive MCM, and 
defensive or enabling MCM.27 
1. Offensive (proactive) MCM 
Offensive MCM is designed to counter the mine threat through the active targeting 
of enemy mine production, storage facilities or delivery  platforms.   This type of MCM 
25Melia, p. 4. 
26
   JOINT PUB 3-15, p. IV-10. 
27
 For the purposes of this thesis, the terms offensive or proactive MCM and defensive or 
enabling MCM are interchangeable. Current Joint Publications favor the use of proactive and 
enabling MCM terminology while US Naval Publications favor the use of offensive and defensive 
MCM 
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operation involves assets not specifically oriented to or designed for mine warfare operations, 
such as a Navy A-6 or Army OH-6, and may require the assistance of joint component 
forces from the Army and Air Force. Of critical importance to the successful execution of 
offensive MCM operations is the availability of accurate intelligence about, and dedicated 
surveillance of enemy mine warfare capabilities. Although offensive MCM offers the most 
effective means of countering potential enemy mining, it suffers from a severely limited 
"window of opportunity." These specific disadvantages are discussed later in the chapter. 
2. Defensive (enabling) MCM 
Defensive or enabling MCM operations are designed to counter mines once they have 
been laid. Defensive MCM can be further broken down into two subcategories: passive 
MCM and active MCM. Passive MCM involves all measures taken to minimize the mine 
threat without physically attacking the mines. Examples include: localization and avoidance 
of threat minefields, and risk reduction by controlling the magnetic, acoustic and pressure 
signatures of target vessels. 
Active MCM involves maritime operations designed to physically neutralize or 
remove the mine threat. Before certain mines can be effectively swept or hunted, however, 
they must first be classified and exploited for their intelligence value in order to determine 
how best to neutralize them. The two primary techniques involved in active MCM are mine 
hunting and minesweeping. Mine hunting operations involve the use of high resolution sonars 
and TV cameras to detect and classify mines. If necessary, Explosive Ordnance Divers 
(EOD) or remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) can be employed to neutralize threat mines. 
Minesweeping operations involve the deployment of specific systems which sever moored 
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mine cables, or produce magnetic and/or acoustic signatures that trigger influence-type 
mines. These MCM systems are primarily deployed from specially designed mine 
countermeasures vessels (MCMVs). The United States and Japanese navies also possess 
airborne MCM helicopters (AMCM) capable of conducting mine hunting and sweeping 
operations. 
F. PROACTIVE OFFENSIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES: NOT A PANACEA 
Following the events in the Gulf War, US MCM doctrine has addressed the 
importance of offensive "proactive" MCM.28 According to the US Navy's current Mine 
Warfare Plan, offensive MCM ". . .entails preventing an adversary from laying mines in the 
first place. ..." by destroying the mines at points of manufacture, storage facilities, depots 
or during transport.29 Although the concept of offensive MCM is not rffiw, the re- 
emergence of this tactic within the Navy's MCM doctrine has coincided with renewed interest 
in mine warfare in general within the US Navy following Desert Storm. The concept of 
offensive MCM operations has been embraced by the majority of US Navy's senior leadership 
and has been incorporated into the Navy's Mine Warfare Doctrine publication.31 Former CNO, 
Admiral Frank Kelso, addressed the importance offensive MCM doctrine in 1992 stating: 
28
 The US Navy's Mine Warfare Plan lists offensive (proactive) MCM as a primary 
objective in the Navy's evolving MCM doctrine. Mine Warfare Plan (1994) p. 32. 
29
 Mine Warfare Plan, p. 32. 
30
 US Naval forces actively sought out and attacked enemy minelayers in both World War 
II and the Korean War. Gregory K. Hartmann, Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. 
Navy, 1979, p. 26. 
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 Department of the Navy, Naval Warfare Publication 3-15, Mine Warfare, August 1995. 
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I believe there are some fundamentals about mine warfare that we should not 
forget. Once mines are laid, they are quite difficult to get rid of. That is not 
likely to change. It is probably going to get worse, because mines are going 
to become more sophisticated. . . . [TJhere is a premium on comprehensive 
offensive mine countermeasures-the most effective of which is to prevent 
mines from being put into the water in the first place.32 
1 . Advantages 
Offensive MCM operations are the preferred tactic to counter the mine warfare 
capabilities of potential adversaries. The ability to defeat enemy mines before they are ever 
deployed significantly reduces the requirement for time-consuming and inherently dangerous 
MCM operations and negates a potential "show stopper" to naval operations in the littoral 
environment. Furthermore, the destruction of the enemy's capability to produce and deploy 
mines reduces the threat of re-seed mining at a later time or in a different location. The best 
known example of recent offensive MCM occurred in 1987 during Operation Earnest Will 
(US protection of re-flagged tankers during the Iraq-Iran War) when US forces intercepted 
and captured the mine-laden Iranian vessel Iran Ajr. The negative publicity surrounding this 
event effectively ended Iranian mining operations for six months. Moreover, the boarding 
party also recovered detailed charts which outlined the locations of earlier minefields, 
allowing MCM forces to clear the fields.33 The success of this operation highlights the 
benefits of employing offensive MCM tactics against potential or actual adversaries. 
Nevertheless, offensive MCM is not the panacea for current mine warfare deficiencies that 
many of its advocates propose.   In fact, the belligerent nature of proactive MCM may 
32
 Kelso, "Building Blocks of Naval Power," p. 41. 
33
 James Giusti, "Sweeping the Gulf," Surface Warrior, March/April 1988, p.87. 
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severely limit the types of scenarios under which it can be employed. Moreover, other 
criteria must be analyzed before considering the effectiveness of offensive MCM tactics. 
2. Shortcomings 
Several factors severely limit the potential use of proactive MCM measures in regional 
contingencies. First, potential adversaries may plant protective or defensive mine fields long 
before the arrival of US or coalition naval forces on scene. Second, they may develop 
intricate mine barrier fields, including remote control mines (RECO),34 inside internationally 
recognized territorial waters. Third, covert mining operations conducted by diesel-electric 
submarines may be difficult, if not impossible to detect, therefore limiting the number of 
interdiction opportunities. Finally, and most important, political or military considerations 
often make it impossible to conduct preemptive strikes against enemy mine storage and/or 
production facilities and delivery platforms. Such was the case during Operation Desert 
Shield. Although the coalition was aware of Iraqi mining operations in the international 
waters of the northern Arabian Gulf, a conscious decision was made by the National 
Command Authority (NCA) not to interfere despite repeated authorization requests from 
Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, the commander of US naval forces in the Persian Gulf, to 
sink the Iraqi minelayers.35 This decision was based on fears that Iraq might use the strikes 
as an excuse to launch a broader offensive which the coalition was not yet prepared to 
34
 RECO minefields are currently employed by several nations, most notably Sweden, as 
part of their coastal defense networks. RECO minefields remain dormant unless activated from a 
remote site. Thus, friendly vessels may pass over the mined area in question while enemy ships 
are kept at bay. 
35
 Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, USN, "Fleet Commander Recommended Hits on Iraqi 
Minelayers," Navy Times, 27 May 1992, p. 4. 
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counter.    A disgruntled Admiral Arthur commented on his interpretation of the decision 
following the Gulf War, stating: 
International law makes clear that persons engaged in laying mines in 
international waters are involved in an act of war. We all understood that. 
We all say we honor that. But in fact, to my knowledge, in my professional 
Navy career, we've never gone out and sunk a guy laying mines the first shot 
out of the gun . . . .[W]e always sort of pace around the campfire. So we 
sometimes buy ourselves into a problem by not exercising our right.36 
Vice Admiral Arthur's comments reflected the Navy's frustration over the NCA's 
refusal to allow combat operations against known Iraqi minelayers and underscored the 
complex dynamics of joint and coalition warfare in the post-Cold War environment. Despite 
the justifiable concerns of coalition naval commanders over the Iraqi mining operations, 
overriding political and combined military considerations prevented the execution of 
offensive MCM operations. It is not unreasonable to expect that similar conditions could 
appear in any future conflict involving joint or coalition military operations. In such a 
scenario, naval and joint commanders will have to rely on conventional MCM forces to 
counter the threat posed by known and unknown enemy mining. Thus, the continued 
relevance of effective conventional MCM capabilities within the respective Alliance navies 
is paramount. 
G. SUMMARY 
Modern naval history is replete with cogent reminders of the destructive capability 
and psychologically demoralizing effect that mines project within the arena of maritime 
warfare.     This chapter has provided an overview of the art of mine warfare, and it has 
36
 Ibid, p. 4. 
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examined the strategic and operational advantages and disadvantages of various mine warfare 
and mine countermeasure strategies. It has also highlighted the enormous strategic, 
operational and even tactical flexibility and effectiveness the mine affords military and civilian 
leaders in the pursuit of national security objectives. For many, it has simply been a refresher 
on mine-related subject matter. Perhaps for others, it has opened a new realm of possibilities 
and provided a foundation toward a better understanding of the enormous problems 
associated with an adversarial employment of sea mines against Alliance naval forces in 
today's evolving strategic environment. More so than any other naval weapon, the mine's 
longevity and continued relevance as a weapon of choice among naval forces is unmatched 
in modern naval history. It is truly a weapon for all seasons. 
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III.   MINE WARFARE:   DIVERGENT EUROPEAN AND U.S.   INTEREST 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Navy has a history of failing to provide for an adequate capability 
in naval mine countermeasures (MCM), particularly in comparison to its European allies. This 
chapter analyzes possible reasons for this divergence in the perceived importance of mine 
countermeasures within the NATO alliance. In other words, why have European navies 
taken mine warfare more seriously than the United States Navy? To answer the question, 
one must look beyond basic budgetary or "warfare specialization" arguments to the central 
issue, perceived vulnerability. The US Navy's relative indifference towards mine warfare is 
not simply the result of dereliction or ignorance but can be traced to the perceived absence 
of three significant elements of mine warfare vulnerability- historical, strategic, and 
economic - specific to Europe. The presence of these elements among Europe's maritime 
nations has resulted in an appreciation of and emphasis on mine warfare in general and MCM 
in particular, and has fostered European leadership and expertise in this warfare specialty. 
Conversely, the relative absence of these elements in North America has resulted in an 
American naval emphasis on other warfare specialties, particularly anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW), at the cost of a general neglect of mine warfare. This chapter provides a 
comparative analysis of each of these elements, highlighting their significance primarily from 
a Western European perspective. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of recent 
coalition MCM operations in the Arabian Gulf and their impact on US MCM cooperation 
with its European Alliance partners in future out-of-area operations. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
On Monday, 18 February 1991, two US warships involved in UN coalition operations 
against Iraq, the amphibious carrier USS Tripoli, the flagship of US mine countermeasures 
operations, and the guided missile cruiser USS Princeton, were mined in separate instances 
in the northern Persian Gulf. Both ships sustained heavy damage and were lost from combat 
operations for the remainder of the "hot war."37 The total cost to repair both ships exceeded 
$23 million, of which $ 19 million went to repairing the extensive damage to Princeton's 
superstructure. The total financial cost of the Iraqi investment in the two mines was a mere 
$21,500.38 The success of the Iraqi mining campaign represented the only military victory 
scored against coalition forces during operation Desert Storm. Most important, the mining 
of two important US warships in waters believed to be mine-free, and the inability of coalition 
MCM forces to quickly clear the fields frustrated coalition plans for an amphibious assault in 
the liberation of Kuwait. Forty years after Wonson in Korea, an amphibious force was again 
kept at bay by sea mines; again, the "weapon that waits" had succeeded in stifling a world 
maritime superpower and prevented it from exercising command of the seas.39 
37
 Tripoli did return to her role as MCM command ship following a two week repair 
period in Bahrain. 
38
 $1,500 for the World War I vintage LUGM contact mine that blew a 16-by-25 foot 
hole in Tripoli's hull, and$20,000 for the Italian built MANTA influence mine that detonated 
under Princeton's keel, according to Mr. Bob Backus at the Naval Coastal System Center, 
Panama City, Florida. 
39
 During the Korean War, a planned amphibious landing by US Marines involving 250 
ships and 50,000 men was delayed by a week due to unforeseen Korean mining of Wonson 
harbor. 
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The events of Desert Storm emphasized the US Navy's inadequate regard for the 
destructive capabilities of sea mines, and its failure to maintain an adequate combat MCM 
capability. Congressional inquiries into this recognized weakness in US naval capability 
following the Gulf War prompted a complete reorganization of the US Navy's MCM forces, 
and has resulted in an increased focus toward improving US MCM force structure and 
readiness levels. 
C. WESTERN EUROPEAN MCM: SOME GENERAL COMPARISONS 
The impact of the Iraqi minefields during Desert Storm was not lost on the European 
members of the coalition. Their appreciation of the role of mines in naval warfare dates 
from the Crimean War. During the past century, every European maritime nation has 
experienced the physically and psychologically destructive potential of mine warfare. 
Consequently, European nations like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, have 
placed more value on training and retaining their MCM forces and personnel. Moreover, 
even the smallest European nations maintain capable, well-trained MCM forces to help ensure 
uninhibited maritime access to the economic arteries of international commerce. For example, 
MCM vessels accounted for 80 percent of Belgium's naval forces and over 70 percent of the 
total naval budget in 1993.40 Even larger European nations dedicate large percentages of 
assets and funding toward the maintenance of an MCM capability. In 1993, MCM ships 
comprised 33 percent and 24 percent of total British and French surface combatants 
40
 Richard Sharpe, "Very Real Dangers to the Security of Europe Still Not Acknowledged 
or Even Defined, "Russian and European Navies, 1993, p. 50. 
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respectively.41 Comparatively, MCM assets comprise only 4 percent of US surface 
combatants. Furthermore, MCM funding accounted for only one half of one percent of the 
US Navy's total budget in 1993.42 
European emphasis on MCM training and readiness is demonstrated in the 
commitment to annual multilateral and bilateral MCM exercises, including exercise BLUE 
HARRIER, the largest and most comprehensive exercise of its kind in the world. 
Furthermore, Europe boasts the world's premier mine warfare training center, Eguermin, 
located in Ostende, Belgium. There, MCM officers from all NATO and WEU nations 
develop, study, and train in the latest mine warfare tactics and procedures. The United States 
Navy, in comparison, has neither a MCM exercise comparable to BLUE HARRIER nor a 
mine warfare school that remotely resembles Eguermin. To the contrary, funding constraints 
and extended transit distances often preclude US MCM forces from participating in Fleet 
training exercises. Furthermore, US MCM officers have often traveled to Europe for 
training in the latest NATO MCM procedures and tactics due to the lack of adequate stateside 
training facilities. Moreover, unlike their counterparts in the US Navy, most European 
MCM officers and senior enlisted remain in the mine warfare community for most if not all 
their careers. As a result, MCM experience and expertise is cultivated and maintained within 
the respective navies. Finally, the European MCM community is perhaps the most closely 
integrated of warfare specialties within the NATO alliance. MCM flotillas from the various 
nations train and exercise together on such a routine basis, that most of the officers are on 
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first name basis, and more importantly, well versed in the tactics, strengths, and limitations 
of their fellow European allies. 
Post-Desert Storm mine clearance operations highlighted this variance between US 
and European MCM expertise and preparedness. While US MCM forces suffered from 
inadequate equipment, training, and organization, six European nations under the cognizance 
of the WEU successfully cleared 83 percent of the approximately 1300 Iraqi mines laid in the 
northern Persian Gulf43 Clearly, European navies have placed greater emphasis in developing 
and maintaining highly professional MCM forces. The question is, why? An analysis of the 
three "elements of vulnerability" can provide an insight toward a plausible explanation. 
D. HISTORICAL COMPARISONS44 
Historically, the mine has provided smaller naval powers with the capability of 
countering the superior navies of their enemies. Through its history to the modern day, the 
mine has proved to be a most cost-effective weapon that causes physical damage, creates 
psychological effects, and requires a countermeasure effort far out of proportion to the cost 
of the mining effort. As a force multiplier, mines have played a significant role in naval 
warfare since they were first employed by the Russians during the Crimean War. Moreover, 
mines have decisively altered the outcomes of naval engagements in every war since the 
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Russo-Japanese War. Nevertheless, the historical lessons learned by European navies have 
proven to be strikingly different from those learned by the US Navy. The greater degree of 
European development of and reliance on specialized MCM naval forces is directly 
attributable to the painful lessons learned vis-a-vis mine warfare during their naval history. 
Consequently, these lessons have been remembered and corrective action taken. Conversely, 
while mines have played a large role in US naval history, they have neither caused the same 
magnitude of capital losses nor significantly hindered American sea control.45 Most often the 
lessons ,t arned by the operational MCM experiences of the US Navy have been "forgotten, 
misinterpreted, or simply misapplied."46 This lack of mine warfare consciousness and adequate 
historical perspective has resulted in a traditional neglect of MCM in US naval doctrine. The 
following selections of historical case studies support this argument. From the European 
perspective, the significant role of mines in the Crimean War, Russo-Japanese War, World 
War I, and World War II, perpetuated the importance of MCM naval forces. From the US 
perspective, the relative ease with which the threat posed from mines was overcome in the 
American Civil War, Spanish American War, and World Wars I and II help account for the 
US ambivalence toward mine warfare. 
1. Crimean War 
Russian production and use of contact-fused mines during the Crimean War, 1854- 
1856, led to the first systematic defensive employment of mines to counter a superior naval 
45
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force. The Russians laid a series of minefields, mixing contact and controlled observation 
mines in likely British anchorages at Sevastopol and Kronstadt. The simple but effective 
contact mines severely damaged British ships and forced the Royal Navy to construct 
rudimentary countermeasures systems to counter this unforeseen threat. Lacking a more 
systematic approach to the problem presented by the mined harbors, the British could do little 
to counter mines in massive numbers. Two British vessels reconnoitered the Russian 
minefields near Kronstadt and brought back enough information on the threat posed by the 
mines to cause the British to cancel a planned attack.47 Following this setback at Kronstadt, 
the British began development of mine countermeasures systems and embarked on their own 
mine development program. Other European nations, noting the success of the Russians, 
commenced mine warfare programs as well. 
The United States viewed mine warfare solely as a defensive tool of inferior European 
navies and therefore of no concern to its national security in the Western Hemisphere. 
Consequently, little emphasis was placed in the development of MCM systems until after the 
Civil War. 
2. American Civil War 
The American Civil War offers perhaps the classic example of the divergent interests 
in mine warfare between European and American navies. During the war, the Confederacy 
actively pursued mine warfare as an inexpensive alternative to traditional sea-going naval 
defense against the numerically superior Union fleet. Throughout the war, the Confederacy 
successfully employed mines (or torpedoes as they were then commonly called), to thwart 
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Union naval blockades and riverine operations. By the end of the war, over fifty Union 
vessels had been crippled or sunk by Confederate underwater mines.48 
World observation of the success of defensive mining by the Confederacy made mine 
warfare appealing to weaker European navies seeking economical national defenses. Europe's 
natural geography and shallow coastal seas were well-suited for mining; therefore, the 
employment of defensive and protective mining schemes became central to naval doctrine 
in most countries. For example, the Danes and Austrians defended their harbors with 
minefields in the 1860s, and in 1870, the Prussians advertised defensive mining of all their 
harbors to keep the superior French fleet at bay.49 
In stark contrast, press accounts of Rear Admiral Farragut's dramatic entrance into 
Mobile Bay and his apparent disregard of the dangers of the Confederate mine lines shaped 
US naval impressions towards the significance of mine warfare. This perception though was 
historically inaccurate. In actuality, Farragut was deeply concerned about the potential threat 
posed by the mine fields. Detailed scouting missions were undertaken before entering the bay 
to discover the scope and dimensions of the Confederate fields and disable as many mines as 
possible. Armed with the exact positions of the enemy mines, Farragut made a measured 
decision to go forward with the attack. Farragut did not, as many assert, merely "damn the 
torpedoes" at Mobile Bay, but rather hunted, examined and disabled them before steaming 
into the bay. In terms of both Farragut and the mine threat, however, the US Navy 
remembered the wrong lessons. 
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3. Spanish American War 
A better known incident in mine warfare occurred in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, on 
February 15, 1898. There, the battleship Maine was sunk by what the United States charged 
was, and the Spanish insisted was not, a mine. Ironically, despite the popular belief that the 
Maine had been destroyed by a mine, there was little interest in developing new methods to 
counter mines or in developing an MCM force to meet the threat that had supposedly 
devastated a prime example of the "New Navy." 
This apparent American disinterest in MCM derived, in part, from the successful 
exploits of Rear Admiral Dewey against the Spanish at Manila Bay. Although he had reliable 
reports that Manila Bay had been mined, Dewey pressed on with his attack to ultimate 
victory. He would later explain that he dismissed the mine threat as a "spacious bluff' based 
on Spain's unfamiliarity with minelaying.50 Dewey was both lucky and a sound judge of 
Spanish incompetence in this domain. Spanish mines directly under the keels of passing 
American ships had been incorrectly set and failed to deploy properly. Nonetheless, American 
journalists touted Dewey's passing of an extensive and supposedly potent minefield at Manila 
Bay, thereby "adding Dewey to the folklore of American naval history as another successful 
'damner' of mines."51 
4. Russo-Japanese War 
In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, mines for the first time played a decisive 
role in offensive naval warfare. Both the Russians, who were seeking to expand into the Far 
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East, and the Japanese, who opposed them, used moored contact mines planted in the open 
sea for the first time. Hoping to dislodge the Russians from their stronghold at Port Arthur, 
the Japanese mined the waters off the port and then lured the Russian fleet out of the harbor. 
Ignoring the danger, Russian Admiral Makarov, in his battleship Petropavlovsk, led his ships 
right through the Japanese minefield. The admiral and his ship were lost, and four other ships 
were sunk or severely damaged. The Russians also laid defensive minefields around Port 
Arthur and caused the sinking of six major Japanese warships, nearly changing the naval 
balance in Russia's favor. These defensive minefields ultimately proved equally lethal to the 
Russian fleet during their forced retreat from Port Arthur. Primitive Russian minesweeping 
proved ineffective against their own mines, and the fleet sustained many casualties. 
After closely observing the progress of the war, most European navies began to 
explore the possibilities of mining the open sea, thus reviving international interest in MCM.52 
The Germans especially noted the effectiveness and economy of mine warfare and by 1914 
had collected a large supply of mines and were ready to use them. The uncontrolled use of 
mines in the Russo-Japanese War also resulted in the signing of the "Convention Relative 
to the Laying of Mines," drafted at the Hague Conference of 1907. The principal article 
required nations laying mines in international waters to remove them after hostilities ended. 
This requirement spurred further research in MCM among European nations possessing 
offensive mines. The US Navy did little to emulate the European navies. It had suffered few 
"perceived" operational losses due to mines during the Civil and Spanish American Wars, 
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and had found them relatively easy to avoid. Consequently, other developments in naval 
warfare continued to have higher priority. 
5. World War I 
The advent of World War I marked the first global use of both offensive and defensive 
mining. During the war, nearly 300,000 mines were laid in European waters, and all the 
belligerents were forced to contend with some aspect of enemy mining. With the outbreak 
of hostilities in 1914, the Germans swiftly mined the coast of Britain. The British in turn laid 
mines in the English Channel to oppose German U-boats. The Austrian and Italian navies 
contended with each others mines in the Adriatic. Russia's war strategy relied heavily on the 
placement of offensive and defensive mine barriers across the Gulf of Finland and in the Baltic 
and Black Seas. These mine barrages proved to be highly effective in thwarting German naval 
advances, particularly in the Gulfs of Finland and Riga, where 11 German ships succumbed 
to Russian mines.53 Later in the war, the British and the Americans commenced mining the 
North Sea to stop the submarines that were preying on Allied shipping in the Atlantic. By 
1918, the North Sea Barrage contained over 70,000 British and American mines, by far the 
largest minefield ever laid. Although this mine barrier was not particularly successful, others 
such as the Dover Barrage proved to be the most effective Allied weapon against German 
submarines, accounting for more than 30 percent of the German losses during the war.54 
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Of particular interest was the role played by mines in preventing a decisive follow- 
on naval engagement between the German and British battle fleets following the Battle of 
Jutland. The presence of extensive German defensive minefields was a major reason for the 
British decision not to proceed into the Heligoland Bight in pursuit of the retiring High Sea 
Fleet. According to Hartmann (p. 43), the British decision not to follow the German fleet was 
strongly related to the fear of mines. He quotes Admiral Jellicoe as having said that "If, for 
instance, the enemy battle-fleet were to turn away from an advancing fleet, I should assume 
that the intention was to lead us over mines and submarines, and should decline to be so 
drawn." Yet naval historians in gene;..l have been unkind in their assessment of Admiral 
Jellicoe's prudent decision against pursuing the High Seas fleet into a "most dangerous sea," 
thereby demonstrating that unfamiliarity of the lethal potential of sea mines is not strictly the 
domain of naval officers. 
Perhaps the greatest impact of mining during the war occurred in the Near East. 
Hoping to attack Germany from the south and open crucial lines of communications to 
Russian allies, a combined British and French fleet attempted to force the heavily mined 
Dardanelles. The inability of the combined fleets to effectively sweep the Turkish mines 
eventually forced the British to abandon the attempt to take Constantinople by water, leading 
to the equally ill-fated Gallipoli campaign. The force's failure to pass the straits, with four 
battleships lost or damaged in the minefield, was a humiliating defeat for the Royal Navy. 
Smarting over their embarrassment, the British and French navies made considerable efforts 
to develop effective MCM vessels for such assaults in the future. 
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The US Navy escaped serious losses attributable to German mines due to its late entry 
into the war. US MCM vessels did assist the British in sweeping the North Sea mines for six 
months following the war, but long after the victory parades had ended. Thus, the American 
and European navies learned markedly different lessons from their experiences in mine 
warfare and MCM. While US interest quickly waned, the war taught America's European 
counterparts an enduring lesson: to operate offensively in mined waters and to defend home 
waters, a navy must have adequate forces to counter the mine threat. The British , Germans, 
and Russians learned this lesson best. 
6. World War II 
British and German innovations in mine technology during the interwar years brought 
mine warfare into the modern era with the development of influence mines. Disarmed by the 
Treaty of Versailles, Germany secretly began improving its mine warfare capability with 
Soviet assistance.55 During this period, British, French, Belgian and Dutch navies carried out 
extensive MCM training exercises against real mines. Conversely, US naval exercises rarely 
included MCM scenarios and when they did, both the mines and the countermeasures were 
simulated (a tradition that has endured to this day). Such simulation reaffirmed the image of 
MCM as a problem easily solved.56 
When war broke out in Europe in 1939, Germany quickly mined the coast of England 
with new magnetically activated influence mines, and later, more sophisticated acoustically 
activated mines. Each new German mine variant required British MCM technicians to develop 
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appropriate countermeasure systems. These German offensive mine warfare operations were 
directed primarily against the Allies' civilian merchant shipping and accounted for nearly nine 
percent of Allied and neutral shipping losses and over 576 British vessels alone during the 
World War II.57 Germany also actively mined waters in the Gulf of Finland, having learned 
their lesson from the Russians during the First World War. These extensive mine barriers 
took a high toll on Russian submarines attempting to exit into the Baltic. The inability of the 
Russian Fleet to mount a credible MCM operation to counter the German mine fields 
effectively bottled up large portions of their submarine fleet - which at the outbreak of war, 
was the worlds' largest - until the latter half of 1944. 
Britain again mined the English Channel and also laid extensive minefields in the Baltic 
Approaches. As in World War I, the primary objectives of these mine fields was to restrict 
the access of German submarines into the North Atlantic. Their overall effectiveness, 
however, was marginal at best, due primarily to the fact that German occupation of France 
and Norway prevented the successful employment of complementary assets (i.e., submarines 
and shore fortifications) required to enhance the effectiveness of a mine field barrier. 
Nevertheless, the evolution of military air warfare offered new methods of mine delivery, 
and enhanced the effectiveness of offensive mine warfare. For example, British aerial 
minelaying sorties against German shipping along the Mediterranean coast and the inland 
waterways accounting for 762 Axis ships sunk.58 
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Mines also played a pivotal if little known role in the Allied landings at Normandy. 
Hitler's hesitancy to employ Germany's most sophisticated pressure actuated mines prior to 
the Allied landings is generally acknowledged as a major tactical error that contributed to 
the successful Allied penetration into Europe.59 Nevertheless, over 300 Allied MCM vessels 
were still required to clear routes to the invasion beaches before the D-day landings. Of 
these, only 32 were from the US Navy with the remainder coming from other Allied nations, 
primarily Britain.60 Thus, the US Navy established a tradition of dependence on European 
MCM support in wartime- a tradition that would return to haunt it during the Tanker Wars 
and in Desert Storm. Furthermore, the successful landings at Normandy reinforced American 
perceptions that mines were a threat that could easily be overcome. Fortunately for the 
Allies, most of the anti-invasion minefields had either passed their timed life-cycles and 
become inert by 1944, or were simply missed.61 Again, US naval forces had successfully 
played "Russian Roulette" with mines and escaped with relatively few losses. The French, 
however, took away a far different appreciation for the difficulties associated with MCM. 
Following the war, the French Navy was forced to develop and operate an MCM fleet 
capable of clearing French coastal waters infested with German mines. 
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From the US perspective, the mine threat was strictly a European problem. With the 
exception of occasional German harassment mining of America's Atlantic ports and coastal 
waterways, the United States was virtually immune to any significant mine threat directed 
against the homeland. The total of 338 mines laid off the U.S. east-coast by German 
submarines during the course of the war was infinitesimally small, when compared to the 
nearly 600,000 mines that were laid in European waters. Interestingly, the United States 
implemented perhaps the most successful employment of offensive mine warfare during its 
1945 aerial mining campaign against Japan's home islands, codenamed Operation Starvation. 
This mining campaign accounted for the sinking of 670 Japanese ships and, in conjunction 
with the concurrent submarine offensive, succeeded in decimating Japan's entire economic 
lifeline. To this day, there is an ongoing debate among scholars as to whether the mining 
campaign if allowed to remain in force, would have brought about the surrender of Japan 
without the use of the atomic bomb. What is undeniable, is that by the end of the war, the US 
mining offensive proved to be the most effective component of the Allied blockade of Japan, 
and ten times as economical as submarine anti-shipping operations.62 Surprisingly, the 
American success in conducting crippling offensive mining operations did not translate into 
increased emphasis in developing a credible MCM capability within the US Navy.   This 
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shortsightedness was highlighted during the ensuing Korean conflict in the early fifties, when 
US naval forces were woefully unprepared to counter rudimentary mine fields sown by the 
North Koreans and their Soviet agents. 
7. The Lessons of Historical Experience 
The preceding historical case studies have offered poignant examples of the decisive 
role mine warfare has played in naval operations dating to the mid-nineteenth century. 
Limitations in space and time preclude further analysis of the role of mines in numerous 
smaller regional conflicts which have occurred in the interceding periods. What is apparent 
from the foregoing analysis, however, is that the divergent perceptions of past, and to a 
lessor extent, present vulnerability to sea mines among Western European and American 
navies is derived from historical experiences that have colored respective viewpoints 
concerning the relative importance of MCM vis-a-vis other warfare areas. The events of the 
Cold War era further amplified these differing doctrinal approaches between the transatlantic 
allies. 
E. STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY 
During the Cold War, Europe's location as the probable battle ground in any 
superpower confrontation resulted in renewed Western European interest in mine warfare. 
Western Europe's proximity to the Soviet Union and its favorable mining environment left it 
highly susceptible to Soviet mining. Aware that Soviet mines could delay, if not stop in their 
entirety, seaborne reinforcements from North America, Britain, Norway, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands- countries most likely to be at the receiving end of early reinforcement convoys 
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from the United States- stepped up MCM readiness levels with a new sense of urgency.63 In 
the Baltic, Germany and Denmark, the "Harbormasters" of the Baltic, also emphasized MCM 
in addition to their mining requirements as a critical component of their navies. In the 
Mediterranean, Italy and Turkey placed key attention on mine warfare in view of their geo- 
strategic positions relative to the Adriatic and Black Seas respectively. Finally, France, 
though not participating in NATO's integrated military structure, developed an impressive 
MCM naval force to ensure the safety of its strategic submarine force and maintain an 
autonomous naval capability.64 
The United States, far removed from the threat of serious Soviet mining of its own 
ports, and dependent on NATO MCM cooperation in the European theater, downgraded 
the requirement for serious investment in American MCM force structure. This is not to say 
that the U.S. discounted the Soviet mine threat, but rather in the overall scheme of the US- 
Soviet naval confrontation, mine warfare played a relatively minor role- a role that could be 
adequately filled by European allies Not until the US found itself "going it alone" in extra- 
European regional conflicts, such as the Tanker Wars in the late 1980's, did its MCM 
inadequacies finally surface. This divergence in the perceived Soviet/Russian mine threat 
between European navies and US Navy during the Cold War period is integral to an 
understanding of the differing emphasis placed on MCM within the respective navies. 
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Therefore, this perception of "strategic vulnerability" bears further examination from both 
perspectives. 
1. Europe 
During the Cold War, Soviet military planners were well aware of NATO's 
dependence on shipping from North America to support military operations in Europe, 
regardless of whether the war would be conventional or nuclear. They also recognized 
NATO's dependence on Middle Eastern and North Sea oil. Therefore, Soviet maritime 
strategy toward Western Europe was predicated on the denial or destruction of this oil and 
logistical support pipeline.65 To achieve this aim, Soviet doctrine called for the establishment 
of a "naval blockade" around key European ports. Mines would play a pivotal role in the 
execution of this strategy, blockading key areas of the oceans and inland seas, thereby 
isolating these areas from resupply.66 The shallow seas along the whole of the west coast 
of Europe and around the United Kingdom are readily mineable; mines could be covertly laid 
by submarines or merchant/fishing vessels in a period of tension well before hostilities 
occurred and later re-seeded by aircraft. European navies, faced with a Soviet mine threat 
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that included a stockpile exceeding 350,000 sea mines,67 a formidable minelaying capability, 
and a naval doctrine advocating its aggressive employment, were compelled to develop 
credible MCM capabilities to ensure their own survival. Additionally, with their abdication 
of the defenses of Europe's global maritime interests to the United States, smaller European 
navies viewed MCM as a cost-effective contribution to NATO's maritime alliance. 
The Soviet mine threat affected all European navies to some extent. The United 
Kingdom, Western Europe's premier naval power, relied heavily on its MCM forces to 
support and protect the three "pillars" of Prime Minister Thatcher's defense policy: strategic 
nuclear deterrence; home defense; and the amphibious reinforcement of Europe's Northern 
Flank.68 Wartime conditions required British MCM forces to clear mines from the approaches 
to the Royal Navy's SSBN base at Faslane and key reinforcement ports, while concurrently 
supporting amphibious operations in Norway. France maintained a sizable MCM force to 
protect the approaches to the strategic submarine base at Brest and maintain her traditional 
naval independence and national autonomy. The Germans and the Danes required both 
mining and MCM forces to block Soviet access to the vital Baltic approaches and later clear 
them of enemy and allied mines. The Dutch and the Belgians required a relatively large MCM 
force to clear the great receiving ports vital to the reinforcement of Europe. The immense 
traffic, exceeding over 570 million tons of trade per year and over 500 ships per day, calling 
on these Northwestern European ports emphasized their importance to any successful NATO 
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war effort. It was no accident that Admiral Gorshkov could declare in 1983 that the primary 
characteristic of the Soviet Navy was its ability to deny access to these receiving ports.69 The 
renowned MCM reputations of the Dutch and Belgian navies are owed in part to the 
awesome responsibility of maintaining these ports free of mines. 
European vulnerability to potential Soviet mining led to the establishment of a 
standing multinational MCM alert force: Standing Naval Force Channel, composed solely of 
MCM vessels from various NATO nations. Recently redesignated Standing Naval MCM 
Force (STANAVMINFOR), this flotilla serves as NATO's MCM "fire brigade." Its units 
conduct year-round training and exercises throughout the European maritime theater of 
operations under alternating WEU national commands. The high levels of interoperability and 
tactical commonality cultivated between the various European MCM forces participating in 
this multinational MCM task force paid handsome dividends during WEU Desert Storm 
MCM operations. 
The end of the Cold War has nullified the danger of large scale offensive mining of 
Western European waters. Nevertheless, Russia's great-power ideology and expansionist 
rhetoric is now openly espoused by some part of official state policy.70 Since Russia's mine 
warfare capabilities remain formidable, they must still considered a threat to European 
security, particularly in view of the uncertain political situation in Moscow.71 Consequently, 
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European MCM considerations discussed above should continue to figure prominently in 
NATO's current maritime planning. 
2. United States 
The United States did not have to contend with the severe threat of Soviet mining that 
faced its European allies for three reasons. First, it seems unlikely that a Soviet large-scale 
mining campaign aimed at interrupting the transatlantic flow of supplies would have been 
directed against US ports. The European terminals of the Atlantic SLOCs were a much more 
attractive and economical targets. Their relative proximity made the Soviet submarine fleet 
a viable mine-laying capability.72 Moreover, Soviet aircraft could re-seed minefields in the 
European theater quickly following the commencement of overt hostilities. Finally, the 
abundance of Soviet bloc merchant ships and fishing vessels in European waters would have 
facilitated their use in covert mining operations. Second, the relative abundance of large, 
modern port facilities along the eastern seaboard and Gulf coast of the United States would 
have required the Soviets to expend an inordinate amount of time and resources to generate 
effective minefields against even a fraction of the larger ones. Conversely, Europe possesses 
few port facilities capable of off-loading large-capacity Roll on-Roll off (RO-RO) ships 
favored for landing the US Army's heavy mechanized equipment. Most inbound shipping 
from North America was to be directed through Dutch and Belgian ports, since only these 
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ports could adequately satisfy the demands in time and space of the Central Front.73 Third, 
the lack of geographic choke points and relative open access to the Atlantic Ocean would 
have made effective mining of US ports extremely difficult for Soviet minefield planners. 
Based on these assumptions, US MCM force levels were solely predicated on the 
possible need for a short-term port breakout of warships and submarines from key naval 
bases without the threat of re-seed mining. From the US perspective, the threat from Soviet 
hunter-killer and ballistic submarines posed a far greater threat to national security and the 
reinforcement of Europe than did minefields. From the Soviet perspective, the choice of 
which side of the Atlantic to conduct the majority of its mining operations was obvious. 
F. ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY 
The final element of Europe's "mine vulnerability triangle" vis-a-vis the United States 
is its greater economic dependence on seaborne trade in peace as well as in war. In 1987, 
the ports of the European Community loaded 458,221 million tons of goods and offloaded 
1,576,568 million tons, 23 percent of world tonnage. North America's percentage was only 
12 percent.74 The port of Rotterdam is arguably the busiest commercial sea terminal in the 
world and accounts for as much tonnage as the top two US commercial ports combined.75 
As far as exports are concerned, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, and the United Kingdom 
all export over 20 percent of their GNP by sea. France, Germany, and Italy export between 
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15 and 20 percent while the United States exports less than 10 percent.76 
European and American divergence in terms of economic dependence on imports is 
even more pronounced. Europe imports most of its supplies of non-fuel materials required 
for industrial production. The US also imports large quantities of seaborne supplies to 
maintain its economic well-being, but the requirement for these products is more a matter of 
convenience than a necessity. Moreover, Europe's clearest and most crucial import 
dependence is energy supplies. Europe either extracts oil from the seabed or imports it from 
abroad. Western Europe is the world's largest regional importer of oil and oil products, 303 
million tons of crude in 1992 plus another 84 million tons of oil products.77 Moreover, 55 
percent of Western Europe's oil comes from the Middle East compared with less than five 
percent for the United States. Certain European countries are more dependent on overseas 
fuel imports than others. For example, the United Kingdom produces far more oil than it 
consumes whereas Germany, France, and the Netherlands all rely on imports for 44 percent 
of their total fuel demands and Italy as high as 61 percent.78 Most important, Europe's food 
self-sufficiency is dependent on imported oil and phosphates for continued production.79 
Given Europe's economic dependence on maritime commerce, one can see the 
magnified economic impact of mining on the national level. In contrast to the United States, 
most European nations possess only one or two major commercial ports. The closure of any 
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major European ports would be disastrous on a purely national basis. One can imagine the 
economic consequences presented by a real or threatened mining of Rotterdam for the 
Dutch, Antwerp for the Belgians, or the Baltic Approaches for Germans and Danes. 
Conversely, the mining of a single US port might have an economic impact over a relatively 
small geographic region but would be rather insignificant to the economic well-being of the 
country as a whole. Therefore, MCM continues to play a pivotal role in European naval 
posture. 
The breakup of the Soviet Union and the apparent end of the Cold War has not 
entirely diminished the threat of mining to Western Europe. To the contrary, the proliferation 
of former Soviet mines to Third World and terrorist organizations is a major concern for 
European (and American) navies. Mines, even those from Western sources, can be easily 
bought on the international arms market. They are economical and anonymous, making them 
an attractive weapon for radical Third World countries or terrorist organizations. Libya's 
suspected mining of the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez in 1984 is an example of state-sponsored 
terrorism that cannot be discounted in today's unstable political climate. Moreover, history 
has shown that the mere threat of mining can be sufficient to close an important domestic 
port or waterway, and requires an extensive MCM effort before safe passage could be 
assured.80 Finally, on a national level, economic blackmail is always a possibility for "high 
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tech" extortionists with a few thousand dollars to spare.81 
Europe's greater dependence on maritime commerce vis-a-vis the United States and 
its vulnerability to various potential mine threats even in today's peacetime environment have 
resulted in the continued commitment to high MCM force levels in most European navies 
despite defense cutbacks in other areas. Furthermore, recent European willingness to deploy 
MCM forces outside European waters to the Persian Gulf (1987-1988 & 1990-1991) in 
support of national interests further supports an argument of European economic vulnerability 
to mining. Chapter VI provides a more detailed analysis of the role of MCM in NATO's 
post-Cold War navies. 
G. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TRANSATLANTIC MCM COOPERATION 
The breakup of the Soviet Union and the apparent end to the Cold War have caused 
dramatic reductions in defense spending in almost all Western navies. Nevertheless, mine 
warfare has maintained a prominent position in European navies and is enjoying a renaissance 
in the US Navy following the lessons re-learned during Desert Storm. Indeed, both the Navy- 
Marine Corps white paper, ...From the Sea and the Secretary of Defense's Bottom-Up 
Review, acknowledge the "...grave threat that mines present to sea control in the open ocean 
and power projection in joint littoral operations."82 Moreover, since the Gulf War, the US 
Navy has put in place a well-structured and comprehensive Mine Warfare Plan designed to 
be a hoax, the threat of mining closed the Sacramento waterway for three days until exploratory 
MCM operations were completed. Brian Paritt, Violence at Sea, 1986, p. 79. 
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improve its mine warfare posture.*3 A major initiative of the Navy's Mine Warfare Plan has 
been directed toward developing renewed ties with allied MCM forces, especially those in 
Europe. 
These ties were strained during the Tanker War in 1987-1988, when European 
NATO allies balked at requests from the United States to provide MCM ships under 
American command in support of escort operations for re-flagged Kuwaiti tankers. 
Western Europe's hesitancy to commit its MCM forces to operations in the Arabian Gulf 
following the mining of the Bridge ton and USS Samuel B. Roberts left the United States to 
fend for itself against the Iranian mine threat. Unfortunately, decades of reliance on the 
Europeans to "handle" the mine problem left the United States Navy woefully unprepared to 
conduct unilateral MCM operations in the Gulf. 
The event which led to an eventual European MCM presence in the Gulf was the 
Iranian decision to move its mining offensive beyond the straits of Hormuz to the busy waters 
off Al Fujairah.84 Following a special meeting of the WEU foreign ministers, France, 
Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands agreed to send MCM flotillas in concert with other WEU 
member nations. For the most part, the European MCM forces operated in conjunction with 
but independently of US MCM forces. Furthermore, joint operations involving European and 
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American MCM forces were problematic due to the differing nuances of the respective 
operating, communicating and reporting procedures. While the WEU had succeeded in 
uniting European MCM forces in a common purpose, years of non-interaction with American 
MCM forces created problems with coordination and efficiency, and often led to duplicated 
effort. 
Desert Storm MCM operations further strained relations between the United States 
and her European allies, at least initially. Except for the United Kingdom, European MCM 
forces were prohibited by national authority from entering the Persian Gulf until after the 
cessation of hostilities.85 As a result, American and British MCM forces were left 
shorthanded to clear Battleship Fire Support Areas through Iraqi minefields in support of 
coalition naval operations in the northern Arabian Gulf. For the second time in five years, 
dedicated European MCM support was not guaranteed outside the European theater of 
operation. This revelation forced American naval commanders to rethink their informal 
abdication of MCM responsibility to European navies. Future American naval operations 
outside European waters would now have to be predicated on unilateral American MCM 
support and US MCM force levels planned accordingly. 
Post-Desert Storm mine clearance operations accounted for over 1300 Iraqi mines, 
and involved MCM flotillas from France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
The Netherlands, the United States, and Japan. Germany's participation in the MCM 
operation was significant in that it represented the Bundeswehr's first participation in an "out- 
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of-area" role. For legal reasons, this was advertised by the German government as a 
contribution to a coordinated "humanitarian mission" that was at the same time aimed at 
restoring peace in the Gulf in accordance with Security Council Resolution 678. The 
"surprisingly uncontroversial decision, supported by the opposition, came closer than any 
previous one to committing Bundeswehr forces to out-of-area coalition operations."86 
Armed with captured Iraqi minefield plans, the international MCM armada still 
required over four months of intense operations to clear the Gulf waters of mines. Again, 
American and WEU MCM forces experienced coordination difficulties stemming from 
dissimilar tactical procedures and conflicting national policies regarding "risk directives" to 
MCM forces.87 For example, MCM forces from two European states were prohibited from 
operating in mine danger areas (MDA) containing known sensitive acoustic mines without 
precursor sweeping by US Airborne MCM (AMCM) helicopters.88 This limitation handcuffed 
coalition options in prosecuting specific mines in the northernmost MDA, which fell in 
waters claimed by Iran and thus, was not accessible to US MCM assets. Ultimately, 
Japanese MCM units agreed to clear the area after European forces declined citing political 
reasons.89 The restrictive "risk directives" were a source of frustration and underscored, from 
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the US perspective, the strict control exercised by European national authority over their 
military MCM commanders in the field.90 
On the positive side, the coordination problems between American and WEU MCM 
commands spurred renewed interest in reviving US participation in European MCM exercises. 
Ultimately this led to the first-ever integration of US AMCM forces with European MCM 
ships during exercise BLUE HARRIER 93 in the Baltic Approaches. Furthermore, the 
demonstrated success of E -ropean-designed unmanned remote control influence sweeps such 
as the German "Troika" and the Swedish "SAM" systems resulted in the establishment of 
an active Euro-American data-exchange program.91 Several formal international mine warfare 
collaborative developments were also announced, including one for a closed loop degaussing 
system with France and another for a MCM tactical simulator development effort with Italy, 
the Netherlands and Belgium. Current operational plans call for a series of biennial US mine 
countermeasure force deployments to Europe and extended participation of US Avenger-cX&ss 
MCM ships in STANAVMINFOR operations on an annual basis. While the US military 
presence in Europe may be on the decline, America's integration and cooperation with its 
European allies in the area of mine warfare appears to be growing. 
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented a comparative analysis of the differing priorities given to 
mine warfare in general and mine countermeasures in particular in certain Western European 
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navies and in the US Navy. The historical divergence between the two sides of the Atlantic 
in their perceptions of mine warfare's relative importance in national security affairs is traced 
to each region's differing interpretations of its historical, strategic, and economic vulnerability 
to mining. 
In 1989, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost observed: 
. . .[Ujntil recently, the United States has not given enough sustained 
attention to maintaining a superior capability in mine warfare, particularly 
mine countermeasures. . . I intend to keep attention focused on our 
vulnerability, and continue to press for resources to put us in a position where 
we can adequately protect our interests and deter potential adversaries.92 
Admiral Trost's statement touches on the central themes of this chapter. First, Europe's 
focus on their perceived mine warfare "elements of vulnerability" has resulted in continued 
emphasis on mine countermeasures programs to adequately protect their national interests. 
Second, the United States Navy's lack of overall mine warfare consciousness has resulted in 
a false sense of immunity from enemy mining operations directed at American commerce 
ports. 
Modern US naval doctrine developed from the classic sea power theories of Captain 
Alfred Thayer Mahan. His writings during the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
emphasized a strategy that focused on the clash of great battle fleets fighting for sea control 
and naval supremacy. During the Cold War, America's maritime strategy centered primarily 
on a Mahanian open ocean confrontation with the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Navy's 
program decisions were often based on perceptions of the magnitude of risk solely in that 
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arena. Under these conditions, the Navy assessed the development of only minimal MCM 
capability as less risky than limiting other warfare areas. If NATO's Western European 
navies had abdicated the security of their global maritime interests to the United States Navy, 
the reverse could be implied of American responsibilities in MCM. 
Admiral Trost's statement or one quite like it was probably made by British admirals 
following the Crimean War; Russian admirals following the Russo-Japanese War; and German 
admirals following World War I. These and other European nations remembered the hard 
lessons meted out by the "weapons that wait" and dedicated the funds and resources required 
to produce capable MCM forces to counter the threat. Perhaps the mine warfare lessons of 
the Arabian Gulf and the recent increased emphasis in upgrading American MCM capabilities 
signal an end to the institutionalized neglect of MCM within the US Navy. 
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IV. MINE WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses legal considerations pertaining to the use of sea mines in times 
of peace and war. Specifically, it discusses existing international agreements which codify the 
customary international laws governing the use of sea mines, and highlights some of the 
weaknesses contained therein. Finally, the chapter analyzes the implications of the recently 
ratified Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) and its 
potential impact on the current use of sea mines. 
In today's international climate, NATO's maritime nations must be careful to have 
a legal mandate before undertaking actions at sea, including mine warfare operations. 
However as experience in the two recent Arabian Gulf conflicts has demonstrated, there 
is no assurance that potential adversaries that may challenge NATO's naval forces in the 
future - including various substate actors - will hold to the same principles regarding 
international law. Nevertheless, an analysis of the customary laws of the sea and the 
various internationally recognized treaties and conventions which govern the use of sea mines 
provides some guidance as to the legally acceptable employment options for sea mines in 
times of peace and during periods of armed conflict. 
Unfortunately, many of the international provisions pertaining to mine warfare are 
incomplete or ambiguous, and thus do not always provide clear guidelines as to the 
geographical limits on the employment of mines or the specific responsibilities of the mining 
entity following their emplacement. This problem has often led to a wide range of differing 
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interpretations of these laws among various nations, particularly in wartime. Without clearly 
articulated laws governing the use of sea mines, NATO's naval forces can expect to face 
widely divergent uses of offensive, defensive and protective minefields in future operations. 
Some of these mine threats will be clearly illicit, as was the case during Iran's clandestine 
mining campaign against neutral maritime shipping in the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman 
in 1987-1988. Most, however, will probably fall into one of the many "gray areas" that 
currently exist within the various international agreements that govern the use of sea mines. 
Within this context, many adversaries will likely conclude that the adage, "it is easier to ask 
forgiveness than permission," applies to the field of mine warfare. 
B. BACKGROUND: CUSTOMARY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law and practice regulate the use of the sea, each nation's rights 
regarding its national territory and waters, the initiation and conduct of armed conflict, and 
limitations regarding the employment and types of weapons.93 Fundamental to international 
law of armed conflict is the requirement to mitigate the potential risk to noncombatants posed 
by weapons, such as armed sea mines, which by their nature are incapable of being directed 
specifically against military targets. 
The best-known and nearly universally accepted regime governing the use of sea 
mines during war is the 1907 Hague Convention No. VIII. Yet, scrutiny of this convention 
reveals language sufficiently vague as to render many of the convention's provisions 
virtually meaningless. Furthermore, recent international agreements regarding such issues 
as conventional arms limitation and maritime territorial jurisdiction have complicated the 
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legal aspects of the peacetime employment of sea mines in both international and territorial 
waters.    Since these conventions and treaties form the foundation of commonly accepted 
international law regarding the use of sea mines, analysis of their impact on current mine- 
warfare-related issues confronting NATO's naval forces is warranted. 
C INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELATING TO MINE WARFARE 
Naval mines are lawful weapons, but their indiscriminate nature and potential to 
inflict uncontrolled damage and casualties on noncombatants has resulted in a variety of 
measures designed to regulate the conditions and locations under which these weapons may 
be used. Principal among the international agreements that bear either directly or indirectly 
on maritime mine warfare are: Article 51 of the UN Charter, the 1907 Hague Conventions 
Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Mines (Hague VIII) and Concerning the 
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (Hague XIII), the 1971 Seabed Arms 
Control Treaty, Protocol II to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Treaty, and finally, the 1982 
Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS III). The significance, complexity, and applicability 
of these treaties vary as they relate to mine warfare. Bearing this in mind, the following 
discussion highlights the key provisions contained within the more basic agreements (Art. 51, 
Seabed Treaty, Protocol II), and their implications for the deployment and employment of 
sea mines in peace as well as war. Hague Convention (VIII) and the UNCLOS III require 
a more detailed analysis owing to their greater impact on current maritime-related mine 
warfare issues and are examined in separate sections. 
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1. Article 51 of the UN Charter 
Under Article 51 of the UN charter, the use of force, and by extension, the use of sea 
mines in armed conflict is prohibited except in two situations. The first is an internationally 
(UN) sanctioned coalition operation against an identified aggressor. The second, is the use 
of force for collective or unilateral self-defense against imminent or ongoing attack.94 A 
strict interpretation of Article 51 forbids the offensive emplacement of armed sea mines prior 
to the commencement of hostilities.95 However, the employment of protective and, in 
extreme cases, defensive minefields in peacetime is largely dependent in practice on the 
severity of the "imminent threat" which a particular country or coalition faces and may 
therefore be legally justified under certain circumstances. Consequently, Article 51 does not 
offer clear guidance relative to the employment of mines except in the most clear cut cases 
of international conflict. 
2. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971 
The 1971 Seabed Treaty, developed jointly by the United States and the Soviet 
Union, prohibits the employment of any nuclear or other weapon of mass destruction on the 
seabed or subsoil thereof beyond a 12-mile coastal zone.96 Although mines are not specifically 
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mentioned in the treaty text, nuclear mines are unquestionably one of the major objects of 
the treaty's prohibitions.97 During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union 
feared the employment of nuclear mines within the high seas which were designed to counter 
the threat posed by each nation's respective submarine fleets. Nonetheless, while the 
motivation of this treaty was obviously to restrict the use of nuclear weapons attached to the 
ocean floor, it does not prohibit the emplacement of nuclear mines within a coastal state's own 
internal waters and territorial seas. 
The end of the Cold War has diminished the significance of this treaty to some extent, 
and Russia is currently the only country still believed to possess nuclear mines in its 
arsenals.98 However, the ongoing proliferation of nuclear technology to the developing Third 
World could result in the emergence of a nuclear mine capability among the growing litany 
of emerging regional naval powers. 
3. Protocol II to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Treaty 
The 1980 Conventional Weapons Treaty places restrictions and prohibitions on the 
use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed excessively injurious or to have 
indiscriminate effects. The convention has three protocols that place restrictions on the 
employment of specific types of weapon systems. Article 1 of Protocol II relates to the use 
of landmines, booby traps, and other devices laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings, 
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or river crossing" However the Protocol does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea 
or in inland waterways, stating: 
This Protocol relates to the use on land of the mines, booby traps and 
other devices defined herein, including mines laid to interdict beaches, 
waterway crossings, or river crossings, but does not apply to the use of anti- 
ship mines at sea or in inland waterways.100 
The omission of any rules governing the use of mines in maritime operations by the 
treaty's drafters highlights international ambivalence toward the regulation of mine warfare 
at sea and effectively sanctions the right of sovereign nations to employ sea mines in pursuit 
of legitimate national security objectives. Nevertheless, some legal scholars have mistakenly 
attempted to apply the provisions of this treaty to naval warfare in general and naval mine 
warfare in particular despite specific language to the contrary within the provisions of the 
Protocol.101 
D. 1907 HAGUE CONVENTION   NO. VIII 
The extensive and uncontrolled use of sea mines by Russian and Japanese naval 
forces during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 inflicted great damage on innocent 
shipping both during and after the termination of the conflict. The outgrowth of 
international concern over the threat to neutral shipping posed by the indiscriminate use of 
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sea mines led to the inclusion, in the proposed agenda for the Second Peace Conference at 
The Hague, of laws and customs of maritime warfare, including the "laying of torpedoes."102 
The resulting Convention No. VIII "Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine 
Contact Mines" which emerged from the often tumultuous debate was arguably one of the 
Conference's   least successful efforts, primarily because of the "mutually exclusive and 
irreconcilable positions taken by various participants," most notably Great Britain and 
Germany.103 The compromises necessary to achieve eventual passage of the Convention 
eliminated provisions on many important matters, such as geographical limitations on mining 
and   restrictions on the  mining of international straits, and resulted in an   ambiguous 
convention of little practical value. The nonspecific nature of the Convention No. VIII was 
highlighted in the preamble which stated: 
[Although the existing position of affairs makes it impossible to forbid the 
employment of automatic submarine contact mines, it is nevertheless 
desirable to restrict and regulate their employment in order to mitigate the 
severity of war and to ensure, as far as possible, to peaceful navigation the 
security to which it is entitled, despite the existence of war.104 
The foregoing statement highlights the basic polarization of interests at the time 
between continental powers like Germany, which favored liberal rules relating to mine 
warfare, and maritime powers like Britain, which favored strict regulation on the use of sea 
mines.  According to Professor Howard S. Levie, a noted authority on maritime law, the 
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differing perceptions ofmine warfare among maritime and non-maritime nations continues 
to be a primary impediment to the establishment of a modern day convention on sea mines.105 
Curiously, the major provision regulating the use of sea mines in war did not arise from 
Hague Convention No. VIII, but rather from the Hague Convention No. XIII, " Concerning 
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War," which emerged from the same 
Conference. Convention (XIII) codified the long standing principle that hostile operations, 
including mining, could not be conducted in the internal waters or territorial seas of a neutral 
state.106 
1. Hague Convention (VIII) Articles and Shortcomings 
Articles 1,2, 3, and 5, represent the key provisions of the 13 Articles which comprise 
Hague Convention (VIII). Article 1 attempted to restrict the lethality of drifting mines. It 
required naval mines to be so constructed as to become harmless within one hour should they 
break loose from their mooring cable and become drifting mines. This article represents the 
only provision of the Convention that actually placed any real restrictions on the use of mines 
during wartime. 
Article 2 forbids the laying of mines off the coasts and ports of an enemy with the 
sole object of intercepting commercial shipping. Whether by design or neglect, this Article 
is so nebulous that insurmountable difficulties in its interpretation and application have 
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resulted in many abuses and recriminations between belligerents since its inception. For 
instance, during World Wars I and II, both the United Kingdom and Germany laid extensive 
mine barriers specifically to interdict commercial shipping, and later accused each other of 
violating Article 2. Furthermore, The United State's aerial mining campaign (Operation 
Starvation) against the Japanese home waters during the latter stages of World War II clearly 
violated the spirit of Article 2 in that it specifically targeted commercial shipping in order to 
starve both Japan's industry and population.107 Finally, the international acceptance of what 
the US originally claimed was not-and later conceded was-a mine blockade of Haiphong 
harbor during the Vietnam conflict has set a legal precedent for blockades established by 
mines alone, not withstanding Article 2.108 
Article 3 requires that mine field danger areas be identified to all maritime shipping 
interests "as soon as military exigencies permit." Again, the wording of the Article is 
fundamentally flawed. The phrase "military exigencies permit" cannot be quantitatively 
measured or qualitatively defined and therefore is enforceable only under the most grievous 
violations of the article's requirements.109 
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Finally, Paragraph 1 of Article 5 requires belligerents to "undertake to their utmost" 
the removal of mines which they have laid in international waters.110 Once again, the 
nonspecific wording of the article does not make the requirement absolute, and its 
provisions have rarely been adhered to or even enforced, as evidenced by Iraq's inability to 
clear its own minefields following the Gulf War, or Germany's failure to clear its mines 
following World War II. 
Clearly,  the 1907 Hague Convention (VIII) suffers from serious inadequacies in 
terms of applicability and enforceability.     Furthermore, two central issues - geographic 
limitations on mining in international waters, and the prohibition on mining in international 
straits - were omitted   entirely. With respect to the latter, a Dutch proposal restricting the 
use of mines in international straits faced strong opposition from Turkey, which was 
concerned with its right to control passage through the Dardanelles, and ambivalence on the 
part of Russia, Germany, Spain and the United States. As a result, Conference attendees 
voted to omit all mention of straits in the Draft Regulations and issued   the following 
statement that was adopted into the provisions of the Convention: 
[A]t the same time the committee has decided unanimously to 
suppress all provisions relating to straits, which should be left out of the 
discussion in the present Conference. It was clearly understood that under the 
stipulations of the Convention to be concluded nothing whatever has been 
changed as regards the actual status of straits. in 
1,0
 Paragraph two of this article requires each belligerent to remove mines in its territorial 
waters even if they are laid by enemy forces. According to the Committee report, this wording 
was necessary to prevent new conflicts which might ensue if former adversaries were required to 
clear the coasts of the other. Levie, p. 51. 
111
 Levie, p. 44. 
70 
What the Convention fails to provide, however, is some definite indication of what the "actual 
status of the straits" was deemed to be in 1907. Failing this, the provision quoted above 
offered little, if any, guidance relative to the use of mines in international straits. Although 
there have been attempts to preserve peacetime freedom of navigation through international 
straits,112 and current NATO policy restricts the use of mines to impede the transit passage 
of neutral shipping through straits, Professor Levie's comprehensive study on the legal 
implications of mine warfare at sea concludes that passage of international straits "has been 
barred by mines in past conflicts and undoubtedly will be again in the future."113 
Finally, and perhaps more excusably, the drafters of the Hague Convention failed to 
anticipate future improvements in mine technology that now render many tenets open to 
challenge. At the time of the Hague Conference only two types of mines had been 
developed: controlled mines that were fired electrically, and contact mines that required 
physical contact with the target to detonate. The subsequent development of highly advanced 
influence mines has created potential problems regarding strict compliance with the 
wording of   Hague    Convention (VIII).    This is particularly evident concerning the 
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emplacement of unsupervised self propelled homing mines, which some legal scholars 
contend violate the provisions set forth in Article 1 of the Convention.114 Moreover, 
according to Professor Levie, no legal writings have adequately answered the question raised 
by the fact that many of today's modern mines are no longer moored and even fewer are 
under the positive control of the mining forces. Therefore, "a strict application of Article 1 
of the Convention would require that [modern ground mines] disarm themselves one hour 
after control over them ends."115 Obviously, these types of mines have been employed with 
impunity by virtually all belligerents in the armed conflicts that have followed the 1907 
Hague Conference, further signifying the growing obsolescence of the original Convention 
if nothing more than in strictly legal terms. 
2. New International Mine Warfare Convention Overdue 
More than four decades ago James M. Spaight, a British expert on the law of war, 
stated that the 1907 Hague Convention No. VIII "... was never a very satisfactory 
convention and is now badly in need of overhaul."116 Yet since the drafting and adoption of 
this Convention in 1907, little if any action has been taken to update or improve upon the 
original document. Today, Hague Convention (VIII) still serves as the basis on which the 
United States and various Western states formulate their policies regarding the employment 
of mines during periods of armed conflict. Moreover, Hague Convention No. (VIII) remains 
114
 Thomas W. Mallison, "A Survey of the International Law of Naval Blockade," US 
Naval Institute Proceedings 102, February 1976, p. 46. 
115
 Levie, p. 106. 
116
 Levie, p. 53. 
72 
to this day the only internationally accepted regime codifying rules specifically addressing the 
emplacement of conventional naval sea mines.117 
Although several members of NATO, including the United States, have never 
ratified the 1907 Hague Convention (VIII), NATO continues to abide by its restrictions and 
principles.118 Unfortunately, the same cannot be assumed for NATO's potential adversaries. 
Of particular concern is the growing use of novel approaches or suspect interpretations of 
international law to circumvent the original intent of Hague Convention (VIII) and the 
apparent willingness of the international community to tolerate these transgressions. 
Professor Levie's study concludes that "despite the obvious need for regulation, the 
existing provisions regulating mine warfare at sea, which were inadequate over eighty years 
ago, have become increasingly so. "119 A new convention regulating today's advanced mine 
technology is long overdue. 
E. THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 
The recent ratification of the Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III) has had a direct impact on international restrictions regarding the peacetime 
employment of mines at sea.120 Moreover, although essentially concerned with peacetime use 
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of the sea, UNCLOS III also contains provisions that have an impact on wartime operations, 
particularly as it applies to mine warfare. 
The feature of the UNCLOS III that has had the greatest impact on the maritime 
practice of states is the establishment of the new expanded jurisdictional zones. These include 
an expansion of the three-mile territorial sea to twelve nautical miles, the establishment of a 
24 nautical mile contiguous zone, and finally, the creation of a 200 nautical mile exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ). These revisions to the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention have greatly 
expanded territorial sovereignty rights over the continental shelf and archipelagic waters while 
reducing the areas in which high seas freedoms may be exercised.121 
Naval mines are arguably the weapon system most seriously affected by the 
expanded jurisdictional zones outlined in UNCLOS III. Since mines are usually planted in 
shallow water, they are most likely to impinge on the territorial waters subject to the 
jurisdiction of the coastal state. As discussed previously, the Hague Convention No. VIII 
contains no geographical limitations on where mines may be employed other than the vague 
term "off the coast and ports of the enemy" in Article 2, and this deals primarily with the 
targeting of commercial shipping. As a result, current international law allows belligerents 
to place mines in their own waters for self defense, in the waters of the enemy as a means of 
attack, or within the high seas as a means of sea denial during periods of armed conflict. In 
fact, the only generally accepted geographical restriction regarding mining in wartime is that 
on 16 November 1994. As of 25 September 1995, the United States has not yet ratified the 
Treaty but has accepted its substantive provisions other than those relating to deep sea-bed 
mining. 
121
 Robertson, p. 3. 
74 
established by Hague XIII: that they may not be placed in the territorial seas or inland 
waterways of neutrals.122 During peacetime, nations may place mines within their own 
territorial waters subject to certain notification requirements, and under certain situations 
may even emplace them in international waters. Consequently, the expanded EEZ's and 
territorial seas have created additional ramifications relating to the use of mines in times of 
peace and war, particularly as it applies to the wartime relationships between belligerents 
and neutral states, and the peacetime protective mining of territorial seas and overlapping 
archipelagic waters. Therefore, a closer examination of peacetime mining in the expanded 
EEZs, archipelagic waters, and territorial seas is warranted. 
1. Exclusive Economic Zones 
The first area of discussion concerns the debate regarding the sovereignty of neutral 
states over their EEZ's. Several states have indicated that they regard the 1982 UNCLOS III 
regime as encompassing the right of the coastal state to control military operations of 
belligerents within the EEZ.123 Nevertheless, there is no basis for concluding that the 
sovereignty rights equated to territorial seas as outlined in the LOS Convention extend to the 
EEZ insofar as the application of the rules of neutrality is concerned. Consequently, there 
is no prohibition preventing the use of mines on the seabed or in the waters within the EEZ 
of a neutral state in time of war unless they interfere with the sovereign state's exploitation 
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of resources within the EEZ or continental shelf.124 By the same measure, many states may 
view their EEZ's as a first line of defense in times of potential hostilities and therefore open 
to defensive mining operations under the provisions outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
Consequently, possible scenarios can be envisioned whereby neutral EEZs are mined by 
belligerents during time of war, or an EEZ is mined by the nation exercising sovereignty 
therein during periods of "imminent threat." 
2. Archipelagic Waters 
The situation relative to archipelagic waters is more complex. According to Horace 
B. Robertson, these waters are subject to the full sovereignty of the archipelagic state and 
thus legally equivalent to the territorial sea. Technically, the "same principles that govern 
mining in territorial seas whether of a belligerent or neutral should govern archipelagic 
waters, and by the same rationale, principles applicable to international straits should apply 
to archipelagic sea lanes.125 This interpretation of international law severely restricts 
belligerent options regarding mining operations within the immense archipelagic waters 
claimed by many nations throughout the world. Conversely, the same provisions greatly 
enhance the territorial waters open to protective mining by the same archipelagic states. 
3. Territorial Seas 
The implications for peacetime mining of the expanded territorial seas present 
potential hazards for naval forces. UNCLOS III allows protective mining of the territorial 
seas, and even the temporary restriction of the right of innocent passage given the presence 
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of a credible threat to national security and the issuance of a published notice to mariners. 
The ramifications of this vague provision present an opportunity for any coastal state, 
including potentially hostile nations, to legally extend the waters open to protective mining 
from the previous three miles out to twelve miles and, in some instances, beyond. 
For example, State X may view State Y as an imminent threat and emplace 
"protective minefields" in its territorial waters which also constitute a threat to international 
shipping. Neighboring states, however, may not view the situation in the same light and 
demand that State X remove its minefields. In this case, State X is simply exercising its 
rights guaranteed under UN Article 51 and UNCLOS III. Nevertheless, international 
consensus may not support State X thereby creating a circumstance requiring international 
intervention to clear the mine threat. In this example, neither State X nor its neighbors have 
acted outside international law in the strict sense of the term. Yet the differing interpretation 
among the respective states over what constitutes a national security threat has resulted in 
an international dispute affecting numerous other maritime states. 
4. Mine Warfare and UNCLOS III 
The foregoing example only serves to illustrate the potential problems which may 
arise from well-intentioned international agreements concerning the use of mines, and 
highlights the type of situation under which NATO's MCM forces may be called upon to act 
in the near future. Furthermore, naval forces involved in blockade or other forms of maritime 
interdiction may encounter enemy "protective minefields" as far out as twelve miles from 
shore and possibly extending into the 24 nautical mile contiguous zone. Although the 
preamble of the 1982 UNCLOS III envisions the treaty   as a vehicle toward the ". . . 
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strengthening of peace, security, cooperation, and friendly relations among all nations. . .," 
many key provisions may indeed serve to facilitate the opposite.    With respect to mine 
warfare, this may certainly be the case. 
F. NATO AND U.S. POLICY CONCERNING THE USE OF MINE WARFARE 
Current NATO policy regarding peace and wartime mining generally conforms with 
provisions set forth in UNCLOS III and Hague Convention (VIII).126   Current US policy 
sgarding the legal aspects of mine warfare is addressed in Chapter Nine of the Commanders 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 9).   As with NATO mine warfare 
publications, NWP 9 closely adheres to internationally accepted principles outlined in the 
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning the peacetime employment of mines 
stating: 
9.2.2 Peacetime Mining. Consistent with the safety of its own citizenry, a 
nation may emplace both armed and controlled mines in its own internal 
waters at any time with or without notification. A nation may also mine its 
own archipelagic waters and territorial sea during peacetime when deemed 
necessary for national security purposes. If armed mines are emplaced in 
archipelagic waters or the territorial sea, appropriate international notification 
of the existence and location of such mines is required. 
Because the right of innocent passage can be suspended only 
temporarily, armed mines must be removed or rendered harmless as soon as 
the security threat that prompted their emplacement has terminated. 
Emplacement of controlled mines in a nation's own archipelagic waters or 
territorial sea is not subject to such notification or removal requirements. 
Naval mines may not be emplaced in the internal, territorial, or 
archipelagic waters of another nation in peacetime without that nation's 
consent. Controlled mines , however, may be emplaced in international 
waters beyond the territorial sea subject to only the requirement that they do 
not unreasonably interfere with other lawful uses of the oceans. 
126 See ATP 6 (B) Volume I, Mine Warfare Principles, 1991, p. V-17, para. 0523. 
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Like  Hague Convention (VIII), the language contained in paragraph 9.2.2 of NWP 9 is 
highly    ambiguous in many respects, and leaves open the possibility of   differing 
interpretations among various nations as to   what constitutes "national security purposes." 
Moreover, individual states may have differing criteria for determining when a particular 
security threat "has terminated." 
With respect to mining during armed conflict, NWP 9 states: 
9.2.3   Mining During Armed Conflict.   Naval mines may be lawfully 
employed by parties to an armed conflict subject to the following restrictions: 
1. International notification of the location of emplaced armed mines 
must be made as soon as military exigencies permit. 
2. Mines may not be emplaced by belligerent in neutral waters. 
3. Anchored mines must become harmless as soon as they have 
broken their moorings. 
4. Unanchored mines not actually affixed or embedded in the bottom 
must become harmless within one hour after loss of control over them. 
5. The location of minefields must be carefully recorded to ensure 
accurate notification and to facilitate subsequent removal and/or deactivation. 
6. Naval mines may be employed to channelize neutral shipping, but 
not in a manner to impede the transit passage of international straits or 
archipelagic sea lanes. 
7. Naval mines may not be emplaced off the coasts and ports of the 
enemy with the sole objective of intercepting commercial shipping, but may 
otherwise be employed in the strategic blockade of enemy ports, coasts and 
waterways. 
8. Mining of areas of indefinite extent in international waters is 
prohibited. Reasonably limited barred areas may be established by naval 
mines, provided neutral shipping retains alternative routes around or through 
such an area with reasonable assurance of safety. 
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The provisions contained in this paragraph closely parallel the general principles   of 
law embodied in the 1907 Hague Convention (VIII).    Consequently, many of the 
shortcomings of Hague (VIII) addressed earlier in the chapter apply to current NATO and 
US policy relating to the employment of naval mines during periods of armed conflict. 
G. MINE WARFARE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The expansion of the territorial sea to 12 nautical miles, coupled with the advent of 
the 200 nautical mile EEZ, has served to sharpen the appetite for ocean territory and to 
legitimize efforts to establish sovereign control over natural resources in disputed waters. As 
a result, many coastal states have taken intransigent legal positions concerning ocean 
boundary demarcations on issues ranging from the exploitation of natural resources to 
fishery interests. These contentious issues present potential problems relating to the 
peacetime emplacement of both armed and controlled mines. For instance, the accepted 
rules for mining outlined in NWP 9 could allow the emplacement of controlled minefields as 
"robot policemen" in EEZ's extending out to 200 nautical miles to enforce fishing rights, 
combat criminal elements, or to defend national claims on and access to vital natural 
resources contained therein. Along similar lines, the rationale used to establish the various 
zones of control outlined in UNCLOS III could also serve as justification, however 
distorted, for the planting of armed minefields in disputed territorial waters under the 
pretext of self proclaimed national security concerns.127 Finally, the international acceptance 
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of the US mine blockade of Haiphong Harbor has established a legal precedent for maritime 
blockades comprised solely of minefields.128 Thus, the international community may have 
difficulty challenging a future Chinese mine blockade of Taiwan's territorial waters in the 
event of bilateral conflict between the two nations. 
With rare exceptions, the historical track record of compliance among nations with 
the aforementioned international conventions and treaties relative to sea mines has been 
poor. The intermingling of various regimes governing the use of the seas in peace as well 
as war has created a legal nightmare that challenges even noted scholars of international 
maritime law, and has created identifiable "gray areas" which can be used by rogue states as 
justification for potentially destabilizing mining activity. Finally, substate actors such as 
terrorist organizations and insurgent groups have rarely adhered to customary or 
conventional international law. There is little evidence to suggest that they will honor 
international laws concerning the uses of sea mines if and when they employ these weapons 
in support of their political, economic, or ideological aims. 
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter has summarized existing international laws which govern the use of sea 
mines in times of peace and during periods of armed conflict, and analyzed current 
deficiencies contained therein. Although customary laws of the sea have been codified in such 
universally accepted conventions as Hague No. VIII and UNCLOS III, many potential 
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loopholes and differing interpretations remain with respect to the lawful uses of sea mines, 
particularly during time of war. 
The relative inability of the international community to formulate restrictive regimes 
specifically aimed at limiting the use of sea mines may suggest an underlying reluctance to 
restrict the political as well as military uses of the "weapon that waits." This lack of 
international consensus has resulted in continued reliance on the outdated and ambiguous 
Hague (VIII) Convention as the model for existing wartime ROE relative to mine warfare. 
Consequently, as was the case during the Gulf War, NATO's maritime navies will 
undoubtedly face future adversaries who fail to adhere to even the limited provisions set forth 
in Hague (VIII). Finally, the recent ratification of the UNCLOS III opens new and 
potentially destabilizing avenues for the peacetime employment of sea mines in the expanded 
and often contentious territorial and archipelagic waters within several strategic maritime 
regions of the world. The inevitable collision between the rights of the sovereign state and 
the international right of innocent passage in contested waters such as the South China Sea, 
may soon require an international MCM effort involving NATO assets to ensure the 
continued freedom of the seas. 
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V.   MINE WARFARE PROLIFERATION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL THREAT 
A   INTRODUCTION 
The dynamics of the Cold War balance of power served to curb the proliferation of 
state-of-the-art mine technology and hardware from the advanced military powers to their 
respective Third World client states. As a result, mostly antiquated or "second tier" mines 
were routinely sold or transferred outside the "two-bloc" alliance system. Nonetheless, 
recent history has shown that even when deployed haphazardly, these older mines can still 
produce devastating effects against modern warships and merchant vessels. Fortunately, 
successful coalition MCM operations following the Gulf War demonstrated that with 
adequate intelligence, time, and capable MCM assets, these mines remain susceptible to 
current mine hunting and sweeping systems and techniques. 
This is not necessarily the case with current generation high-tech mines like the 
Swedish GL-100 Rockan and the Intelligent Self-burying Mine (ISBHM). These state-of-the- 
art mines and others like them possess the latest in counter-countermeasure technology that 
makes them virtually impervious to present MCM techniques. The emergence of such 
advanced mines on the international arms market following the end of the Cold War has 
significantly altered the dimensions of the global mine threat and directly impacts 
international maritime security. Moreover, mine weapon systems which may be arrayed 
against NATO's naval forces in the next century will, in all likelihood, be developed and 
manufactured within the defense establishments of fellow Alliance members. Iraq's use of 
foreign produced mines against coalition forces during the Gulf War and the subsequent 
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damage suffered by the USS Princeton as the direct result of an   Italian-made Manta 
detonation only serve to highlight this trend. 
This chapter provides an overview of the current proliferation of highly 
sophisticated mine warfare hardware and technology to the developing Third World, and 
examines the implications of this new threat. The availability of "smart" mines, 
incorporating the latest sensor and stealth technologies, to emerging Third World states - 
many of which are mired in potential regional disputes - adds an additional element of 
instability to many strategic littoral regions. Moreover, the concurrent proliferation of 
advanced diesel-electric submarines to these same states further compounds the potential 
impact of mine warfare in the littoral areas of the world. Finally, the growing availability 
of these weapons on the gray and black markets to stateless actors such as terrorist groups, 
criminal organizations, and insurgent movements, creates a potentially new dimension to an 
old problem among vulnerable maritime nations. 
B. PROLIFERATION AND   MINE WARFARE 
1. Overview 
The end of the Cold War has led most governments within the NATO Alliance and 
former Warsaw Pact to undertake substantial cuts in defense spending. In this era of shrinking 
defense budgets and increasingly competitive defense markets, transnational arms sales and 
transfers are regarded by many governments and defense firms as essential to preserving 
national defense industrial and technological bases.129 Consequently, indigenous armaments 
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industries within these countries have sought to expand into lucrative foreign markets in the 
Third World. As a result, proliferation in the post-Cold War environment has become 
largely a function of dynamic interactions between corporate and governmental actors 
participating in highly competitive technology markets.130 An added dimension in the 
evolution of arms proliferation involves the growing trend among many nations and regional 
trading blocs toward collaborative development of military hardware and technology. This 
globalization of arms production and increased proliferation of conventional weaponry 
following the end of the Cold War has been called the "quiet revolution" in the arms 
industry.131 
2. The International Arms Market 
Since 1989, the advanced military powers in both the West and East, no longer 
saddled with Cold War security concerns or ideological conflict, have sought to expand into 
the highly competitive foreign arms market, creating a glut of military hardware available 
to security conscience nations of the developing Third World. As a result, exporting 
nations have become more willing to offer front line equipment, including current generation 
sea mines, at affordable prices. 
In the West, relations among European and North American military allies are no 
longer governed by the mutual threat posed by the Soviet Union. Instead, economic 
competition   has come to dominate bilateral and multilateral relations among the advanced 
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Western nations. Consequently, the old Cold War consensus of countering technology and 
arms proliferation through the implementation of export controls has given way to the 
economic realities of the "new world order."132 These capitalist market forces have in effect 
opened a "pandoras' box" of previously controlled export markets for American and European 
military technologies and hardware transfers. 
In the East, the countries of the former Soviet Bloc, facing mounting domestic 
economic unrest, rising international debt, and foreign capital shortfalls, have relied on 
sales of advanced weapons inventories to obtain crucial hard currency reserves required for 
economic revitalization programs. In effect, these countries have become reliant on military 
arms sales and transfers as a key "cash crop." 
The trend toward foreign arms sales and transfers, primarily from Western and 
Russian sources, has been particularly evident among the more advanced nations of the 
developing world, most notably the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of Southeast Asia 
and the wealthy oil states of the Middle East. Furthermore, states hoping to establish or 
expand regional hegemony, such as Iran, India and China, have actively pursued 
modernization programs for their respective navies and, in some cases, have developed 
indigenous armaments industries for both domestic defense purposes and export. Most 
notable among these nations is China which has become an active exporter of military 
hardware and   technology to such nations as North Korea, Iran, and Rump Yugoslavia. 
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Finally, other emerging states such as Israel and Brazil, have themselves become arms 
exporters, thus injecting a new variable into efforts to control or account for the spread of 
conventional weaponry.133 
C. THE GLOBAL MINE THREAT 
This section discusses the growing global mine threat and the problems encountered 
in estimating the size and scope of the current proliferation of mine warfare hardware and 
technology to the various geographic regions of the world. While these sales and transfers 
still primarily involve older vintage mines, they also include some of the most sophisticated 
mines incorporating state-of-the-art microprocessors, sensor packages, non-metallic 
construction materials, and counter-countermeasure technologies.134 
There are three primary areas of concern with respect to advanced mine warfare 
technology proliferation. The first is the introduction onto the world market of modular 
Target Detection Devices (TDD) upgrade kits. The second is the inability of international 
organizations and intelligence services to accurately track the extent of current mine 
warfare-related sales and transfers on the world market. The third area is an off-shoot of 
the second and involves the growing potential for black or gray market transfers of advanced 
mines to stateless terrorist cells, criminal organizations, or nationalist insurgent groups. 
Since little mention is made of mine warfare-related transfers in present arms control 
literature, a further analysis of these three areas will hopefully shed light on this aspect of 
conventional weapons proliferation. 
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1. TDD Proliferation 
Many smaller nations are finding that the introduction of TDD modular upgrade kits 
which can be retrofitted into older mines offers an inexpensive method of modernizing 
existing mine inventories. These kits replace a mine's firing circuits with modern 
microprocessors, thereby turning relatively antiquated mines into multi-sensor "smart" 
weapons.135 The growing popularity and sophistication of these kits pose severe problems 
and may present major implications for future MCM operations for several reasons. First, 
TDD upgraded mines may invalidate known intelligence on foreign mine orders of battle, 
actuation parameters, and sweep techniques, thereby rendering present countermeasure 
systems and strategies unreliable at best and obsolete at worst. Second, external 
identification of the mine, often required in mine hunting, is no longer a valid indicator of the 
mines true capability.136 This in turn places MCM vessels at greater risk when conducting 
mine hunting operations. For instance, a mine countermeasure vessel (MCMV) prosecuting 
what appears to be a simple moored contact mine may in fact be dealing with a more 
dangerous upgraded influence mine requiring a much larger safe stand-off distance. Third, 
TDD sensors have dual-use applications making it difficult to gauge whether their acquisition 
is intended for purely civilian or military purposes. Finally, TDD upgrade kits may negate 
the potential intelligence gleaned from ongoing Western efforts to obtain   parent mines 
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from exporting countries.1" For example, should the Belgians or Dutch exploit a mine 
acquired on the open arms market, there is little evidence to suggest that MCM tactics 
developed to counter that particular mine would necessarily be effective, for instance, against 
a similar Iraqi mine upgraded with an TDD kit 
The availability of TDD upgrade kits on the international market offers cash-strapped 
Third World nations a variety of options in upgrading their ability to deny sea control to 
NATO's maritime forces. Moreover, TDD kits further complicate the already arduous task 
of clearing mine fields and may expose MCMV's to additional risks. 
2. Accountability 
The legal and illegal transfer of advanced mine warfare systems and technology has 
become a large, if hidden part of the international arms trade. For instance, like many other 
smaller weapons systems, mines may initially be sold legitimately from one nation to another 
and subsequently be passed on to a third state.138 Furthermore, the accurate reporting and 
tracking of mine warfare related sales or transfers is difficult to quantify. Unlike larger 
military systems such as naval combatants, artillery, and fighter aircraft, mine transfers 
between nations or even multinational corporations (MNCs) are easily concealed from 
international monitors for several reasons. First, mines do not pose the same magnitude of 
137 The U.S. Navy's Mine Warfare Plan states " One positive aspect [of mine warfare 
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risk as other weapons, most notably weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These higher 
priority threats justifiably consume the bulk of scrutiny among the various international non- 
governmental organizations (INGOs) and regimes concerned with weapons proliferation 
issues.139 Secondly, these proliferation regimes require the cooperation of the signatories to 
ensure proper accountability. Unfortunately, many countries simply do not adhere to 
voluntary disclosures of foreign arms sales or transfers. Hence, the global arms activities of 
countries such as Israel or China-considered to be at the forefront of the covert arms trade-are 
often not captured in reviews of data.140 Third, the mine inventories of some nations, most 
notably Russia, are so immense and the size of most of the weapons so small that the 
"misappropriation" of even a relatively large number of weapons may not be noticed under 
most circumstances. Finally, since mines are not included in most nations' arms inventories, 
mine transfers between various states or to third party organizations such as terrorist groups 
or criminal elements are easily hidden.141 
3. Mine Proliferation and Stateless Actors 
The alarming growth of gray and black arms markets over the past decade has 
created an avenue for the proliferation of advanced mines to various stateless actors including 
terrorist groups, organized crime syndicates, and nationalist insurgent movements. Noted 
proliferation expert, Aaron Karp, states that "[T]he significance of the  black market is 
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greatest for international renegades, be they terrorist cells, ethnic insurgents, or states fenced 
off by UN embargoes. . .[ The black market's] greatest power is felt in the small scale arming 
of [these] sub-state actors and the efforts of pariah states to obtain weapons."142 State- 
sponsored gray markets are much larger than black markets and potentially more destablizing 
in that larger volumes of armaments can be transferred. Furthermore, gray market transfers 
allow specific nations to cultivate relationships and influence with sub-state actors while 
minimizing embarrassment or danger.143 These covert, clandestine transfers either with 
(gray) or without (black) the knowledge or involvement by supplier state governments are 
an attractive source of advanced weapons, including mines. 
The mine is well suited for black market transactions for a variety of reasons. Mines 
do not suffer from many of the obstacles or drawbacks that befall black market transfers 
involving larger armaments. For example, mines are relatively inexpensive and thus remain 
affordable even at black market prices, which may run from three to ten times the equivalent 
open market value.144 Furthermore, as previously discussed, the relatively small size of most 
mines enables them to be easily smuggled in and out of foreign port facilities, particularly 
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ports with reputations as permissive trans-shipment centers. Recent measures designed to 
curtail the growing international black market arms trade through such ports including the 
introduction of End User Certificates (EUC's) have been marginally successful. Still, many 
holes remain in the net, as evidenced by North Korea's recent black market acquisition of 
eighty-seven American-made helicopters.'45 
With some notable exceptions, mines have yet to play a major role in terrorist or 
insurgent activities.146 Nevertheless, the potential uses of sea mines as an instrument of 
terror or extortion is seemingly limitless. The growing availability of mines on both the open 
and, undoubtedly, black markets may facilitate their use against highly vulnerable maritime 
shipping and inshore installations in future criminal, terrorist, or insurgent campaigns. The 
implications and ramifications of this potential threat are discussed further in Chapter VI. 
Based on the foregoing discussion of the current mine-related proliferation concerns, 
the size and scope of global mine warfare proliferation is difficult if not impossible to 
ascertain. Nevertheless, the US Navy's Mine Warfare Plan states that "[Cjurrently, 48 world 
navies are estimated to have some degree of mine warfare capability, 27 countries have a 
mine manufacturing capability and 20 are known exporters of naval mines."147 Moreover, 
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45 navies count some type of submarine in their inventories.148 Most if not all these 
submarines have the capability to covertly lay mines or conduct mine related operations. The 
question that must be asked is: what are the potential ramifications for the world's maritime 
nations in view of the known and estimated proliferation of advanced mine warfare hardware 
and technology to virtually every region of the world. The remainder of the chapter explores 
the current mine warfare capabilities of the world's major exporters and analyzes the 
possible implications of the globalization of mine warfare-related production and proliferation. 
D THE MARKET 
This section presents a brief overview of the export trends among the principal 
traders in the global mine warfare arms field and provides a general description of the known 
available inventory of sophisticated mines which may be currently on the export market. 
1. Land Mines Versus Sea Mines 
The United States government has joined the growing international movement to 
forge an international agreement to restrict the production, export and use of anti-personnel 
land mines.149 While the measure faces criticism from various quarters, including poorer 
countries, the growing list of nations urging the enactment of a regime for the control of land 
mine proliferation bodes well for the eventual imposition of an international moratorium on 
land mine export. Such is not the case with respect to sea mines. While land mines are 
widely viewed as inhumane and deadly to civilian populations, the sea mine is considered by 
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most states to be a useful tool for achieving operational or even strategic national maritime 
objectives. Consequently, the export potential of and demand for sea mines is both secure 
and growth oriented, particularly given the growing numbers of potential regional 
confrontations in and around littoral seas. 
2. Mine Producers 
Currently, Western Europe and Russia are the technological leaders in the design, 
development, and production of advanced sea mines.150 Not surprisingly, these countries also 
represent the nucleus of the current exporters of mine warfare hardware and technology.151 
Asian nations, such as China and North Korea, also produce less sophisticated indigenous 
mines for export. Furthermore, the rapidly developing capitalist nations of the Asian-Pacific 
region could emerge as major producers and exporters of advanced mines early in the next 
century. The following discussion analyzes the key exporting nations of mine-related 
hardware on the global market and the ramifications of the growing globalization of mine 
production and technology transfer. Finally, based on the growing evidence that proliferation 
is primarily a function of corporate and not government activity, the major companies 
involved in the development of current generation mine warfare technology are also profiled. 
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a.   Russia 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have had a 
devastating effect on the former state-owned defense industries in Russia and the CIS. In 
grappling with Russia's economic crisis, the government has reduced spending for defense 
procurement dramatically. According to Russia's Finance Ministry, only 20 percent of the 
annual defense budget for 1996 has been allocated funding while the "prospects for adequate 
funding of production programs this year are bleak."152 To offset the dramatic decline in 
domestic arms procurement, Russia has pursued an aggressive marketing strategy in the 
foreign arms export arena.153 Russian government officials reportedly claim that arms 
exports are a means for Russia to regain its "independence from the humiliation of Western 
aid."154 Furthermore, Eduard Makisimov, former deputy director of Oboronexport, one of 
the predecessors of Russia's current arms exporter, Rosvooruzhenie, recently stated "/A]rms 
trade is not only an effective source of revenue, it also is a means to conduct foreign 
policy."155 Russia's recent willingness to use arms exports in pursuit of both these stated 
policy objectives was recently demonstrated in its decision to proceed with the sale of three 
Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines to Iran over the objections of Western and Gulf 
State nations. 
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Russia's mine warfare capability continues to rank among the most advanced 
in the world and boasts an inventory which may include as many as half a million mines by 
some western estimates.156 Furthermore, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was among 
the world leaders in the sale and export of mines to numerous Third World nations and 
revolutionary groups. The fall of the communist Soviet state has not curbed the flow of 
former Soviet and Russian mines on the global arms market. To the contrary, Russia has 
recently advertised the availability of its most advanced mine inventory, including anti- 
submarine mines never before offered on the export market.157 
In Russia, the development and refinement of mine warfare weapon systems 
continue to be the responsibility of the Central Research Institute Gidropribor, which has 
been at the forefront of an aggressive international marketing campaign for Russian mine 
warfare-related hardware. Rosvooruzhenie, the new unified Russian arms export agency, is 
the main conduit for the foreign sales and export of Russian military hardware, including 
mine warfare technology. According to a recent advertisement placed by Rosvooruzhenie 
in Military Parade Magazine, Russia is actively marketing a large assortment of its vast mine 
inventory, ranging from the World War I vintage M08 moored contact mine, which severely 
damaged the USS Samuel B. Roberts, to highly sophisticated self-propelled SMDM bottom 
mines, and PMK-1 and MSHM anti-submarine rising mines.158 These three advanced mines 
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incorporate the latest acoustic influence technology in terms of both sensor packaging and 
counter-countermeasure characteristics. Furthermore, all three of these mines can be laid 
covertly by submarines, with the PMK-1 and MSHM capable of targeting either submarines 
or surface vessels in water depths exceeding 300 meters.159 
The competitive nature of the international arms market, combined with the 
abundance of available Russian mines, has resulted in bargain basement prices for interested 
buyers. Recent transactions involving Russian mines have involved such nations as Iraq, Iran, 
India, and North Korea.160 Furthermore, the proliferation of Soviet and Russian designed 
mines has spawned indigenous "copy-cat" mines from less advanced states which are subtly 
different in key aspects from the original model. These indigenously produced clones have 
been marketed by the former Yugoslavia, and were used by Iraq during the Gulf War. 
Moreover, North Korea is believed to have supplied domestic versions of mines obtained 
from the Soviet Union to a number of regimes, including Iran.161 
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b.    Western Europe 
Western European defense firms currently boast the world's premier mine 
warfare technology in terms of research, development and production. These firms, 
specializing in undersea warfare in general and mine warfare in particular, have applied cutting 
edge technology to the latest generation of "smart mines." Many of these mines have been 
marketed almost exclusively abroad. Among the latest technology incorporated into 
European mines are intelligent hunter mines with a "home-on -ping" capability that targets 
the sonar frequencies of mine hunting sonars on MCM vessels.162 Furthermore, European 
manufacturers have developed mines that incorporate stealth technology and still others that 
are capable of self-burial. These revolutionary advances in mine technology have created a 
new generation of mines that are virtually impervious to conventional mine hunting or 
sweeping techniques. Finally, many of these newer mines are the product of collaborative 
development efforts among various European nations. The security considerations 
surrounding this growing trend among Western European governments and their 
interlinked defense firms must be considered.163 
The emergence of an increasingly transnational European defense technology 
and industrial base presents certain security concerns regarding illegal transfers of military 
technology and raises the possibility of increased diffusion of advanced mine technology to 
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the developing nations of the Third World. According to noted defense analyst Richard B. 
Bitzinger, the growth of international arms collaboration, involving the permanent shareout 
of resources, skills, and technology has become so highly pilferable that it is more 
destabilizing than outright arms sales. He further states that technology transfers and licensed 
production agreements have enabled some Third World countries to build up their indigenous 
defense industries to the point where they become exporters of arms to other developing 
nations.164 Consequently, agreements between the various European governments and 
defense industries that are intended to limit or control the export of advanced European mines 
to the developing world could make little difference if technology transfers permit these 
countries to produce by themselves their own sophisticated mine inventories. In the final 
analysis, Europe must weigh the economic benefits derived from continued collaborative 
development, production, and marketing of advanced mine technology against the increased 
vulnerability to industrial espionage and possible compromise of its technological superiority 
in this domain. 
The following country studies briefly analyze the leading European producers 
and exporters of current generation mines and their respective capabilities. While this study 
is hardly exhaustive, it does provide a basis for better understanding the magnitude and 
capability of Western Europe's present mine technology which if it has not already, may 
soon become available on the global export market. 
(1) United Kingdom.    The United Kingdom has long been at the forefront 
of mine research and development. Recently, the UK has actively pursued the export of its 
164 Ibid, p. 190. 
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Stonefish and Sea Urchin family of modular bottom mines with a variety of multi-sensor 
arrays and programmable electronic packages. These mines, developed by GEC-Marconi 
Naval Systems and British Aerospace respectively, can be adapted to target specific ships, and 
are known to have been exported to Pakistan, Finland, and Australia, among others.165 
Another mine that has been developed in the UK and other European countries is the 
revolutionary Intelligent Self-burying Hunter Mine (ISBHM). Its three key features include: 
self-burial to a predetermined depth in the sea bottom, programmable microprocessor sensor 
logic, and a target-homing torpedo warhead. This mine represents the height of current mine 
technology and is virtually undetectable by any current minehunting sonar.166 
(2) Germany. One of the German Navy's primary Cold War responsibilities 
involved the rapid mining of the Baltic approaches to bottle up the Soviet Baltic Fleet's 
access into the Atlantic. Consequently, Germany has developed an impressive array of 
sophisticated influence mines which may now be available for export. Krup Atlas Elektroik 
(KAE) is the prime contractor for the development of German mine warfare technology. 
Among the various German mines, the SMG2 is specifically designed for blocking shipping 
lanes and for defensive coastal barrier defenses.167 These mines would provide a formidable 
capability if offered on the foreign market. 
(3) Denmark. Denmark has been the leader in the development and 
production ofRVM type mines that target MCMV's. The Danish firm NEA Lindberg has 
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developed a mine which counters MCMVs by firing an encapsulated torpedo that homes in 
on the distinct high frequency sonar emissions of mine hunting sonars.168 Furthermore, 
Denmark has entered into collaborative development projects with Germany on a number of 
other mine programs. 
(4) Italy. Italy has rapidly emerged as a leading producer and exporter of 
sophisticated mines. The principal Italian export firm is Whitehead (formerly Misar of 
Brescia), which has exported its products to various countries and has developed, in 
collaboration with the Italian Navy, an export version of the MP-80 bottom mine, called the 
MRP.169 This weapon employs a triple influence activation device that using microprocessors; 
it is highly resistant to countermeasures. Perhaps the most well known Italian export mine 
is \he Marita anti-invasion bottom influence mine that heavily damaged the USS Princeton. 
The truncated geometric design of this dual sensor mine makes it difficult to detect with most 
minehunting sonars. The demonstrated effectiveness of this mine during the Gulf War has 
made it one of the most sought after mines among third world countries.170 
(5) France and Spain. As a world leader in foreign arms sales, France has 
not neglected the growing mine warfare export market. France's leader in mine warfare 
technology, Thomson Sintra ASM, has had its MCC-23C bottom influence mine widely 
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exported. This mine has also been manufactured under license in Spain as the MAE-10.171 
Additionally, Spain's SAES has entered the mine market, and the country recently completed 
initial delivery of the MO-90, a new multi-influence moored mine that incorporates the latest 
in mine technology, including GRP construction and microprocessor based controlled 
software functions.172 
(6) Sweden and Norway. Sweden and Norway have long exploited the 
defensive concept of underwater warfare to its fullest extent and lead the world in the 
development of mine warfare technology.173 Sweden's Bofors Underwater Systems is 
arguably the world's premier producer of advanced mine technology. The GM1 100 Rockan 
and the Bunny anti-invasion ground influence mines are among latest generation of Swedish 
mines that may be offered for export. Both mines incorporate revolutionary geometric 
design and sophisticated logic and sensor units. Furthermore, the Bunny was developed to 
complement the new generation of diesel-electric submarines and is carried in a "girdle" 
attached to the outer hull. This design feature will most certainly place this mine in high 
demand among Third World navies that operate these types of diesel-electric submarines. 
The Royal Norwegian Navy has recently placed a contract with several of 
Norway's defense firms for the development of a next generation rising mine as part of its 
New Independent Mine Programme that is designed to upgrade Norway's existing inventory 
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of coast-defense mines.174 
c.   Asia 
The enormous economic growth of the Asian- Pacific Rim, in conjunction 
with the end of the Cold War, has dramatically altered the geo-strategic composition of the 
region. The rapid emergence of Asia's economic "Tigers" has resulted in the availability of 
excess capital which has benefited the modernization of regional naval capabilities. 
Moreover, the emergence of an apparent naval arms race among some Asian countries 
coincides with the rising hegemonic aspirations of several Pacific nations, most notably, 
China. Consequently, the proliferation of mine warfare-related hardware is a major concern 
among Asia's vulnerable maritime nations.175 Within the region, the primary exporters of 
mines are China and North Korea. 
(1) China. While most of the world' s major powers have reduced their 
defense budgets, China is increasing its military allocations. Since 1989, China has increased 
defense related spending by at least 10 percent annually; this growth rate is expected to 
continue at the same pace over the next several years.176 In an effort to raise supplemental 
funds to support its military build up, China has become a major arms dealer on the 
international market.   As a result, the country   has emerged as a leading proliferator of both 
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advanced and older version mine technologies and hardware to various Third World regimes. 
Of particular concern is China's marketing of its indigenously produced EM-52 rocket- 
propelled rising vertical mine, which can be deployed against both submarines and surface 
ships. Iran is reported to have purchased an unknown number of these mines, possibly to 
bolster its ability to block shipping through the Straits of Hormuz. 177 
In the Pacific region, China has been North Korea's primary supplier of mine 
warfare related technology and hardware. Based on the historical relationship between the 
two countries, it must be assumed that China has also provided EM 52s and other 
sophisticated mines. 
(2) North Korea. Little is known about North Korean mine production 
or its level of sophistication, though it is generally considered to be substantially below that 
of the advanced military powers. It is unlikely however that a nation that places such faith 
in mine warfare has neglected means to produce a formidable indigenous production 
capability. Moreover, it is generally acknowledged that North Korea has and probably 
continues to export indigenous equivalents to older Soviet and Chinese style mines.178 
3. Assumptions 
The foregoing overview of the formidable capability of the world's leading mine 
warfare exporters is hardly exhaustive or complete. The main purpose is to demonstrate the 
size of the potential market in mine warfare related technology currently available among 
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Russian, Western European and, to a lesser extent, Asian defense firms. The actual 
quantities and specific types of mines currently available for export from among these 
countries is not fully known. Nonetheless, one must assume that some, if not all, of these 
advanced mines have found their way- whether by legal or illicit means- into the inventories 
of various developing and Third World nations. Furthermore, the transfer of mine 
technology is highly fungible and difficult to control, particularly as it applies to collaborative 
multinational ventures. Therefore, one must also assume that even the most highly classified 
technology will eventually be "bootlegged" by rapidly developing Third World states and 
incorporated into indigenous defense industries. 
E. THE SUBMARINE MENACE 
The marriage of "smart" mines such as the MSHM and SMDM with Third World 
submarine delivery platforms represents a significant escalation in the potential uses of mine 
warfare against regional adversaries or Western naval forces. From a Third World 
perspective, the ability to conduct future mining campaigns - particularly offensively 
oriented ones - will ultimately hinge on possessing a capability to deliver the weapons 
accurately, covertly, and in some instances, anonymously. The submarine, more than any 
other mine delivery platform, maintains the initiative and freedom of action necessary to meet 
these requirements. Recent advances in diesel submarine technology development, such as 
the air-independent propulsion systems (AIPs), enable some of today's diesel-electric 
submarines (SSKs)   to remain submerged for several weeks at a time.179 Other modern 
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innovations have significantly reduced tell-tale acoustic signatures often used by ASW forces 
to track submarines. These advances have greatly enhanced the SSK's operational 
capabilities, especially in the littoral environment where shallow waters and sharp 
thermolayers aggravate the inherent difficulties of ASW operations. Moreover, the SSK's 
relatively small size makes it well suited for mining operations in the world's coastal regions 
and maritime chokepoints. The increasing sophistication and lethality of modern diesel-electric 
submarines, combined with their relative cost-effectiveness, have made them the apparent 
platform of choice among developing nations heading into the twenty-first century. This 
section evaluates the potential mine warfare related implications of these platforms and the 
grave threat they represent to continued international maritime freedom of navigation. 
Today, approximately 425 diesel-electric submarines are in service with 45 
navies.180 Furthermore, in contrast with reductions in surface warship inventories, the 
number of navies operating submarines continues to increase, as does the number of nations 
capable of constructing them for export. Regionally, diesel-electric submarines are present 
in large numbers. In the Mediterranean, 40 modernized or newly built diesel-electric 
submarines are operated by 11 countries including Israel, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and 
Libya.181 In the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, Iran, India, Pakistan and Indonesia all possess 
modern diesel-electric submarine assets.   In the Asia/Pacific region, 130 diesel-electric 
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submarines are operated by China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan.182 The 
navies of South America operate arguably the most uniformly modern diesel-electric 
submarine fleets in the world. 183 Brazil builds its own Type 209 class boats, while Peru, 
Argentina, and Chile all have very capable diesel-electrics of their own. For example, the 
Argentine Type 209, San Luis, stifled British ASW efforts during the Falklands War in 1982. 
For the purpose of precision and covert minelaying, the diesel-electric submarine is 
the preferred delivery platform. Its stealth and stand-off capabilities allow the diesel- 
electric submarine to plant minefields in constricted or well-defended locations, such as ports 
and harbors, or in the shallow waters associated with littoral environments. Furthermore, 
the submarine's ability to operate clandestinely hinders pro-active, offensively oriented MCM 
operations designed to prevent the laying of minefields in the first place. This covert 
capability has become particularly relevant given NATO's apparent shift toward a more 
offensive-minded MCM philosophy following the Gulf War.184 
The historical weakness of submarines as minelayers has been their relatively small 
payload and the requirement to substitute torpedoes for mines, usually on a one for two basis. 
These disadvantages have been overcome to some extent with the development of "strap-on" 
external "girdles" or minebelts which allow larger numbers of mines to be carried in addition 
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to, rather than in place of torpedoes. Currently Sweden, Germany, Russia, and Australia have 
developed this capability for their own submarine fleets as well as export models.185 
As with mines, Europe and Russia lead the world in both the design and development 
of diesel-electric submarines, as well as their export to the Third World. Most of the 
attention of late surrounding the proliferation of diesel-electric submarines has centered on 
the sale of three Russian Kilo-class submarines to Iran. Yet a total of 37 Kilos are operated 
in seven navies including India, Algeria, and Syria among others.186 Moreover, other navies, 
e.g., Libya, North Korea, and China, continue to operate older Russian submarines such 
as the Foxtrot, Romeo and Whiskey-classes. China alone boasts a fleet of over 84 
submarines.187 Many of these submarines could be transferred to lesser developed states of 
the Third World in the coming years as emerging NIC states seek to modernize their own 
fleets.188 
European exporters of diesel-electric submarines include France, the United Kingdom, 
The Netherlands, Germany, and possibly Sweden. Of these countries, Germany is clearly 
the leading producer of diesel-electric submarines for the export market. The German Type 
209 is the most widely operated modern SSK among foreign nations, with 50 boats in service 
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in 13 navies.189 France has exported four Daphne-class to Pakistan and is planning to 
transfer or sell its remaining Daphne and more modern Agosta-class SSK's between 2000- 
2005. Britain is currently marketing four Upholder- class SSK's and the Netherlands has 
been approached by Taiwan on the availability of two of their Sea Dragon-class boats.190 
The sophistication, flexibility, and affordability of diesel-electric submarines, combined with 
the willingness of producing nations to export them, means that the proliferation of these 
boats will almost certainly continue. The high demand for these platforms among the worlds 
emerging regional naval powers, coupled with the proliferation of sophisticated mines, 
represents a significant potential to jeopardize regional stability, particularly in the Arabian 
Gulf. For instance, Iran's concurrent acquisition of three Kilo diesel-electric submarines and 
advanced Chinese EM-52 rocket propelled mines is a cornerstone toward building its ability 
to block shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Vice Admiral Katz, the former commander 
of US Naval forces Central Command, recently stated, "[T]he biggest threat to the [Persian] 
Gulf is mines. They are the fastest way to clog up the Strait of Hormuz, which would have 
a major impact on the world [oil] supplies."191 The emergence of an Iranian diesel-electric 
submarine threat in the Arabian Gulf and with it an offensive mining capability, have altered 
the naval balance of power vis-a-vis its Arab neighbors and fueled long felt suspicions 
concerning Iran's hegemonic geo-political aims within this volatile region. 
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The foregoing discussion highlights the fact that submarines, particularly when armed 
with mines, are overtly offensive in nature. Few, if any, nations require submarines to 
covertly plant protective minefields. Conversely, the inherent mine-laying capability of 
advanced diesel-electric submarines is optimized to covertly or anonymously cut off the 
passage of naval combatants or merchant shipping through the world's maritime chokepoints 
and vital commerce ports. Therefore, prudence dictates that the growing availability of 
both advanced mines and modern subsurface delivery platforms among rival regional naval 
powers and Third World states can only signal an intent to project or deny sea control and 
freedom of innocent passage in both territorial and non-territorial bodies of water. Chapter 
VI addresses the implications of this new threat with regard to NATO's naval forces. 
F. IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL MINE WARFARE PROLIFERATION 
1. Maritime Geopolitics 
The political and economic collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving in its wake a vast 
surplus of sophisticated weaponry and arms production capabilities in both East and West, 
has created a strategic vacuum in many of the world's unstable yet strategic littoral 
subregions. The resulting Balkanization in much of the world has aggravated a number of 
endemic maritime problems. As a result, growing regional threats permeate throughout 
Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. For example, there are at least 50 outstanding 
maritime-related sovereignty claims currently in dispute worldwide.192 The growing 
problem associated with the demarcation of expanded and often overlapping EEZ boundaries 
between adjacent states-especially when precious economic resources are involved- is but one 
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source of future potential conflict. These growing regional tensions in combination with 
recent foreign mining successes, have encouraged the improvement of Third World mining 
and mine countermeasure capabilities. Following the Gulf War experience, these countries 
have come to appreciate the inherent capability to exercise littoral sea control or denial 
associated with the acquisition of even   rudimentary mine warfare capabilities. 
2. Mine Warfare and the Littoral 
The shallow seas of the littoral is mine country. In these waters, a lesser navy's ability 
to employ defensive minefields and inflict unacceptable losses or damage quotients on even 
the most powerful navies can create indecision within civilian and military leadership, limit the 
range of military options, and quite possibly forestall military intervention altogether. 
Offensively, larger developing navies can effectively blockade or otherwise neutralize the 
naval potential of adversaries simply by mining vital ports, harbors, straits, and inland 
waterways. Consequently, mines have been among the most sought after weapons in the 
ongoing global arms proliferation.193 
This growing mine threat poses a serious long term challenge to the free flow of 
commerce and freedom of navigation through some of the key strategic SLOC's of the world 
for commercial and naval vessels alike. Heightening the potential importance of the 
ongoing mine proliferation to global maritime affairs is Third World geography. No fewer 
than 25 of the world's principal straits are located in waters which are either exclusively or 
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partly controlled by Third World countries.194 Moreover, other regional powers consider 
themselves threatened by these developments and have taken measures to protect their access 
to the vital arteries of international commerce. 
3   Third World MCM: A Non-Player 
The resurgence in the procurement of MCM platforms and technology among the 
world's navies can be attributed largely to the growing global mine threat following the 
dramatic increases in the availability of advanced mine warfare technology and hardware to 
the Third World and most probably terrorist and criminal organizations.195 Unfortunately, 
the procurement of MCM vessels and equipment among the navies of the developing world 
has not matched the quantity or quality of its mine acquisitions. Even those states that have 
acquired MCM vessels have generally neglected to amass the level of capacity commensurate 
with the potential task at hand. As a rule, three to four MCMV's are required to keep open 
a port.196 With this yardstick in mind, and according to a recent survey conducted by the 
editors of Navy International, few, if any, Third World countries, including emerging 
regional naval powers, possess an adequate MCM force when measured against the growing 
international proliferation of mines and mine delivery assets.197 An inspection of the Third 
194
 Some of the more important include the Straits of Hormuz, Gibraltar, and Malacca. 
Daniel Todd, "Mine Warfare in the Third World: Increasing Threats and Capabilities," Navy 
International, May/June 1994, p. 108. 
195
 See "The Commander's Respond," US Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1994, pp. 
34-43 and Anthony Preston, "Minehunters and Minehunting," Asian Defence Journal, 9/93, pp. 
84-88. 
196
 Todd, p. 110. 
197
 "Mine Countermeasures Forces," Naval Forces, July/ August 1994, pp. 279-284. 
112 
World's naval order of battle contained in the most recent edition of Janes Fighting Ship's 
further supports these findings.198 Additionally, even those Third World countries possessing 
some form of MCM capability are lacking properly trained and experienced personnel to 
operate the high-tech MCM platforms and equipment.199 Only the navies of Western 
Europe, Japan, and latterly the United States possess effective MCM forces both in terms of 
assets and expertise to effectively counter the growing menace presented by the global 
proliferation of sophisticated mines. Consequently, the task of countering future mine 
threats - whether under the aegis of a UN peace keeping mandate, as members of an ad-hoc 
regional coalition, or even unilaterally - will likely fall in varying degrees upon US, NATO 
orWEU MCM forces. 
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G. SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided an overview of the current global threat associated with the 
proliferation of advanced mine warfare technology, and has addressed some implications for 
the global security environment. Certainly the sale and transfer of mine warfare hardware and 
technology is not a new phenomenon. What is alarming, however, is the apparent willingness 
of militarily advanced Western and Eastern states to market previously unavailable state-of- 
the-art mines on the current international market. These modern weapons, many of which 
are virtually impossible to detect or sweep, have the potential to severely affect regional if not 
global maritime access to vital SLOC's and commerce ports. Furthermore, the ease by 
which mine warfare technology and hardware can be transferred, coupled with relatively 
few monitoring agencies, makes the task of accounting for mine sales and transfers between 
states and organizations next to impossible. Western intelligence agencies, preoccupied with 
higher priority concerns such as nuclear proliferation, simply do not have the resources to 
rigorously monitor ongoing mine proliferation activity. Consequently, the mine orders of 
battle and delivery capabilities of most Third World states and NIC's remain purely 
speculative. Compounding the problem is the concurrent proliferation of modern SSK 
diesel-electric submarines. These silent platforms offer the ultimate means of covertly 
delivering mines capable of sinking the largest ships, and even other submarines, in constricted 
geographic environments. 
What must be assumed is that many of the advanced Russian and European mine 
technology discussed in this chapter have found their way into the inventories of Third World 
states and most certainly, those developing states with aspirations of regional dominance. 
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Furthermore, the abysmal MCM capabilities of most Third World's navies to counter even 
rudimentary mine threats further highlights the potential problems associated with the 
advent of sophisticated mine proliferation. Bearing this in mind, it is but a matter of time 
before NATO's MCM forces will again be called upon to counter a more lethal variety of 
mines threatening maritime freedom of navigation. 
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VI.    THE ROLE OF MCM IN NATO's POST-COLD WAR NAVIES 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
The demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact Treaty 
Organization have resulted in a fundamental shift in NATO's defense perspectives away from 
the conventional and nuclear defense of Europe toward out-of-area crisis management and 
peace-keeping/peace-enforcing missions. Two Gulf wars and current international 
instability have awakened many Europeans to the risk of resource and trade interruptions 
originating outside NATO's traditional Euro-centric boundary area. As a result, several 
NATO members have followed the lead of the US Navy's strategic vision codified in 
Forward... From the Sea, and reoriented the focus of their respective naval services toward 
expeditionary operations and the development of a robust power projection capability.200 
This new security orientation will likely mean an even greater role for NATO's naval forces 
in out-of-area contingency operations in littoral waters. In such conditions, the mine will 
always pose a potential threat, not only to Alliance and coalition partners but also to the 
effectiveness of maritime deterrence in today's unstable international setting. 
This chapter analyzes the present and future roles of MCM within NATO and the 
requirement for continued emphasis in this warfare area. The primary focus is on the role of 
MCM within NATO's evolving maritime strategy, its current prospects under the Alliance's 
new Strategic Concept, and finally, its future in the evolution of the Western European Union 
(WEU) and the development of a genuine European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). 
200
   See French, British, German 1994 White Papers and the US Navy-Marine Corps 
White Paper, Forward. . .From the Sea. 
117 
Three central conclusions are drawn. First, that the diversified role of MCM naval forces 
remains a critical element of NATO and Europe's present and future security posture. 
Second, that Europe's integrated MCM establishment is well suited to serve as a successful 
model of the collaborative European defense structure envisioned under ESDI. Finally, the 
US Navy must promote continued American cooperation and integration with European 
MCM partners to help ensure the success of future combined MCM operations either under 
the auspices of NATO, or as the core element of a larger UN-mandated multinational 
coalition. 
B     NATO's RELEVANCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR 
The demise of the Soviet Union and the lack of a credible near-term threat to the 
region have resulted in a reevaluation of NATO's core missions in post -Cold War Europe. 
Except for revanchist Russian neo-imperialism, Western Europe has little to fear as direct 
threats to its security. Under these conditions, NATO is evolving from a defensive alliance 
designed to protect the territories of member states from attack, to an alliance for the 
projection of force - a different mission with a vastly different set of political and military 
risks and obligations.201 Effectively, NATO has converted from an institution designed 
primarily to achieve clear and limited security objectives in a relatively stable Cold War 
environment into a nebulous crisis-management organization in a highly unstable post-Cold 
War setting. 
In the political arena, NATO's continued viability in the post-Cold War is presently 
under intense scrutiny on both sides of the Atlantic for differing reasons.    The growing 
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movement within Europe toward the development of a European defence identity, and with 
it the establishment of an independent out-of-area crisis response force under the cognizance 
of the WEU, or later perhaps, the European Union (EU), presents a challenge to NATO's 
long-held position as the preeminent security institution within Europe.202 The issue of 
multinational out-of-area missions - including naval operations - involving NATO and non- 
NATO member nations has been a particular sticking point among European states since the 
1987 Gulf War. Today, many European nations require a legal UN mandate or at the very 
least, WEU involvement, before committing military forces to out-of-area operations.203 
The current debate within Europe over the appropriate security mechanism for future 
out-of-area operations has created a rift between Atlanticist and Europeanist members of the 
EU. Not surprisingly, France favors the extreme Europeanist viewpoint. The reactivation 
of the WEU in 1984 and the subsequent drive for an independent European defense force 
have been largely French initiatives, and have remained a vehicle for France to challenge US 
dominance of European security within NATO.204 Further, France favors maximum 
distinction between NATO and the WEU, and supports the development of a European naval 
force under the WEU/EC flag.205 The positions of Spain,   Belgium and to a lesser extent, 
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Germany, resemble that of France. On the other extreme is the United Kingdom which 
prefers the WEU as strictly subordinate to NATO and resists any EU overtures that might 
weaken American commitment to Europe's security. The Netherlands, Portugal, and Italy, 
appear closer to the British view as do non-WEU members Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. 
Within the United States, there are serious uncertainties among the public concerning 
continued American involvement in NATO, particularly in increasingly unpopular out-of- 
area operations such as Bosnia. Moreover, declining European defense budgets and readiness 
levels have led many members of the US Congress to openly question the relevance of 
further American funding for Europe's defense. Growing congressional displeasure with 
perceived European "free-riding" was recently highlighted with proposed legislation calling 
for significantly increased European contributions to the cost of maintaining US forces in 
Europe.206 Even NATO's strongest supporters have voiced clear interest in a new, 
regionally-oriented charter for NATO in today's evolving international environment. For 
example. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) has flatly stated that the Alliance "must go out 
of area" or "it will go out of business."207 Former President Richard Nixon echoed these 
sentiments stating, "While the European defense must remain NATO's core mission, so-called 
'out-of-area' security cooperation must become its cutting edge. "208 
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Faced with mounting challenges to its continued relevancy, NATO has addressed its 
future roles and missions during recent summits. Major steps toward reorienting NATO's 
core missions were undertaken at its Council meetings in Oslo and Brussels in June and 
December 1992, respectively, when all 16 member countries accepted a de facto Alliance 
mandate to support peacekeeping activities on behalf of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the UN.209 NATO's mandate for out-of-area missions 
and affirmation of ESDI was further clarified at the Brussels's Summit of January 1994. The 
endorsement of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept following the Summit 
"which will provide separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed 
by NATO or WEU," has provided an apparently suitable solution to the WEU/NATO 
primacy issue concerning out-of-area operations, at least for the moment. 
The CJTF concept involves the development of multinational, deployable elements 
from among NATO's existing command chain, but adapted where necessary to incorporate 
elements from other nations who are not currently within NATO's integrated force 
structure.210 In short, the CJTF concept allows states such as France and Spain - countries 
outside NATO's integrated command structure- as well as non-NATO countries (e.g., Eastern 
Europe), to actively participate in specific NATO operations without acquiescing to NATO 
security commitments in other areas. Moreover, if NATO elects not to take action in a 
given situation, the CJTF may respond under the auspices of the WEU. In such a scenario, 
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some of NATO's command and control assets would be made available to the WEU force 
commander. Not surprisingly, many questions surrounding the implementation of the CJTF 
concept remain to be answered. For instance, the US and French governments are currently 
split over how much autonomy the WEU should have over the use of NATO assets for future 
European-led military operations.211 Nevertheless, as long as the WEU's security policy 
remains compatible with that of the NATO Alliance, this arrangement should not pose 
serious problems, particularly as it apphes to future multinational mine countermeasure 
operations. 
C. THE EVOLVING EXPEDITIONARY ROLE OF EUROPE'S NAVIES 
Irrespective of its composition or political nomenclature, NATO's future appears to 
lie within the sphere of multinational military cooperation in out-of-area operations either 
under the aegis of UN-mandated peace-keeping/policing functions, or regionally, in a strictly 
Alliance or CJTF orchestrated operation. In the maritime realm, NATO's naval forces are 
poised to assume a primary role within the CJTF concept for two main reasons. First, the 
international nature of naval operations confers greater freedom of military and political 
maneuver in comparison to land and air forces. Second, the historically close interaction 
between European navies and their North American partners has resulted in a larger degree 
of interoperability than is found in other services. 
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Not surprisingly, seven of the nine commanders of NATO/WEU navies recently 
listed out-of-area crisis management as a primary mission of their post-Cold War navies.212 
The pervading view  of naval commanders representing the larger European navies was 
summarized by Admiral Sir Benjamin Bathurst of the British Royal Navy who stated: 
[N]ew patterns of international tension imply a requirement to project power, 
often at short notice and over great distances. . . . [Military forces which are 
deployed in response to a crisis may be called upon in turn to exercise 
deterrence, coercion, and-finally - intervention. ... Maritime forces, therefore 
are highly relevant to the new strategic environment. . . . [T]heir broad range 
of capabilities mean that, throughout a crisis, they can be employed as distant 
and precise instruments of a government's diplomatic will. 
NATO's ongoing involvement in the former Yugoslavia is a prominent example of the 
types of multinational operations that underlie the current uses of its naval forces. NATO 
has achieved many firsts during its maritime arms embargo against rump Yugoslavia (Sharp 
Guard). It has engaged in actual combat operations, operated out-of-area, participated in 
joint UN/NATO planning and operations, and taken part in joint WEU/NATO operations. 
Moreover, during these operations, France has operated under NATO's integrated command 
structure.213 
Although the global security environment is increasingly complex, defense resources 
have been subject to severe reductions in most Western European countries. Given the more 
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enduring nature of maritime security and the many peacetime missions for which navies are 
useful, European navies appear to be faring better than other services in the defense funding 
arena.214 Recent naval appropriations and ship construction programs among many NATO 
and WEU navies reflect an identifiable shift in Western Europe's maritime philosophy and 
structure toward expeditionary naval warfare. For example, Europe's major maritime 
nations - France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom - are all 
continuing to modernize - and in some cases expand - their naval power projection 
capabilities, even at a time when there is considerable austerity elsewhere in their defense 
budgets. 
France's defense white paper emphasizes strengthening the Navy's supply, transport 
and logistics capability while enhancing the projection capabilities of naval air power.215 
Accordingly, the French Navy has recently announced the formation of the Force d'Action 
Novak, which will comprise an aircraft carrier battle force and serve as the nation's rapid 
reaction force. Additionally, the French Navy will buy two new amphibious troop ships 
and is awaiting funding decisions for a second nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.216 Perhaps 
the most telling example of France's shifting strategic orientation is in its increased funding 
for conventional programs at the expense of nuclear programs.    France's 1995 funding for 
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nuclear programs dropped from 23 percent in 1994 to 21 percent while conventional 
programs increased form 39 percent in 1995 to 44 percent.217 
The United Kingdom is similarly investing in a more robust expeditionary capability 
with the formation of its own rapid-deployment force centered around its two Invincible- 
class carriers and the new amphibious helicopter carrier (LPH) HMS Ocean scheduled for 
commissioning in 1997. Further, the Ministry of Defence has funded replacements for the 
aging LPH assault ships HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid, and is currently backing 
construction of new fleet replenishment ships and advanced assault hovercraft as part of its 
amphibious modernization program.218 
Similar procurement programs for new amphibious transport and replenishment ships 
are underway in at least five other NATO countries: Spain, Italy, Germany, Turkey, and the 
Netherlands.219 Yet, obscured by the more glamorous expeditionary naval programs among 
various European states, has been a concerted modernization and development program in 
MCM as well. The remaining sections of this chapter will analyze the current status of 
Europe's maritime MCM forces and discuss evolving missions of NATO's MCM forces 
against today's diverse and advanced mine threat. 
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D    THE CURRENT STATE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN MCM 
The elimination of the Soviet threat to Western Europe has resulted in force level 
drawdowns and severe budget cuts in many Western European navies. Britain projects a 15 
percent reduction in naval strength by 1995, while France is undertaking a more modest 4.5 
percent reduction.220 The decision of the Belgian and Dutch governments to reduce their 
military forces by almost one half by the end of the year, and the announcement in July 1993, 
that the German government will cut back its defense structure even further, all serve to 
illustrate the downward trend in defense spending and force structure downsizing among 
European nations.221 On the whole, Europe's MCM forces have fared better in this regard 
than their colleagues in other warfare areas. With the exception of Belgium, which plans to 
reduce its fleet of frontline Tripartite minehunters by 30 percent, NATO's overall MCM 
capabilities have actually improved significantly as older vessels are being replaced by a 
smaller number of more capable ones.222 
During the past decade, virtually every European maritime nation - Britain, Italy, 
Denmark, Norway, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and even Germany - have modernized 
their respective MCM fleets with ships incorporating state-of-the-art glass reinforced plastic 
(GRP) hulls and advanced mine-hunting sonar technology. Further, European defense firms 
are working on venture development   projects   in the new fields of Semi-Autonomous 
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Unmanned Vehicles (SAUVs), Buried Mine Detection technology, and Propelled Variable 
Depth Sonars (PVDS). These revolutionary systems are increasingly seen within NATO as 
the future of MCM heading into the next century.223 
1. European MCM Capabilities 
The following is a brief synopsis of current MCM capabilities among the major 
European navies. 
a.  United Kingdom. 
The United Kingdom has recently completed orders for seven additional 
Sandown advanced mine-hunting ships to join the five already in service.224 With the addition 
of the 12 new Sandowns to the existing fleet of 13 battle-tested Hunt-dass multi-role 
MCMVs, the UK will maintain arguably the world's most formidable surface MCM capability. 
The UK has also been active in research and development of SAUV vehicles and low 
frequency sonars capable of detecting buried mines.225 
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b. France, Belgium, and The Netherlands. 
The French, Dutch, and Belgian navies are undertaking a $160 million sonar, 
ROV, and data processing Capability Upgrade program which will adopt PVDS for the 32 
Tripartite mine hunters which were developed jointly between the three countries.226 The 
remarkable success of this collaborative program, which incorporates French hull design, 
Belgian electronics, and Dutch propulsion systems, has become the model for current 
European joint development programs for other major ships. 
c. Denmark 
A modern MCM capability is being developed in Denmark based on the 
STANFLEX 300 multi-role design. The 14 Ftyvefisken-cfass GRP patrol boats incorporate 
modular "plug-in" systems which allow them to be rapidly reconfigured to perform a variety 
of different missions including MCM. This revolutionary multi-role ship may foreshadow the 
wave of the future in naval ship design, in view of current funding shortages among 
European navies. 
d Spain 
Spain is rapidly emerging as a major player in mine warfare within NATO. The 
Spanish navy is committing significant resources to modernizing its MCM forces, having 
ordered four GRP MCMVs based on the Royal Navy's Sandown design.227 Current plans are 
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to build eight more, some configured as minesweepers.228 
e. Germany 
The German defense ministry is radically revising its mine countermeasures 
plans and has presented its basic MCM concepts in a document entitled Mine 
( huntermeasures Systems 2000. Despite funding problems in other areas, the German navy 
has recently completed an impressive MCM modernization program including the 
introduction of ten Type-332 Frankenthal mine hunters, the last of which should be 
delivered this year.229 These ships, when added to the over 50 MCMVs currently in service, 
makes Germany's MCM fleet NATO's largest. Moreover, the recent ruling of the Federal 
Constitutional Court on the deployment of the German armed forces has resulted in a 
reorientation of Germany's naval focus outside its traditional Baltic region toward a more 
robust expeditionary capability.230 The precedent for German out-of-area naval deployment 
was established during Desert Storm when German MCM vessels participated in multinational 
mine clearance operations in the Arabian Gulf. 
/ italy 
Italy is rapidly becoming a world leader in the field of MCM ship construction 
and associated warfare system technology. A major Italian MCM modernization program 
is nearly complete with the construction of eight Gaeta-dass mine hunters to complement 
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its fleet of four Lerici-cfoss vessels.231 Moreover, Italy has emerged as a leader in the design 
of ROV mine neutralization systems which can operate at a considerable distance from the 
MCMV.232 
2. MCM Areas of Concern 
Collectively, NATO's MCM force structure is more than adequate to meet even the 
most ambitious enemy mining campaign directed against the security interests of the Alliance. 
Nevertheless, two areas of concern relative to NATO's long term MCM capability must be 
addressed: complacency, as evidenced by recent budget-related cancellations of several 
follow-on MCM programs, and current over-reliance on minehunting system development 
at the expense of influence sweep capabilities. 
a. MCM Funding for Future Systems 
One of the key areas of concern is the growing trend within some European 
navies of eliminating or scaling back next generation MCM ship programs and reducing funds 
for research and development in follow-on MCM mission systems. For example, France 
recently announced the cancellation of its new class of ocean going minehunter, the Batiment 
Anti-Mines Oceanique (BAMO) while the Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal have also 
abandoned plans to build a new class of inshore minesweeper (MSI).233 This trend is 
particularly disappointing in view of the enormous advances in MCM technology that have 
occurred during the past decade. For the first time, MCM appears to be in the ascendancy 
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in the technological contest between the two branches of minewarfare. However the new 
sophisticated mine hunting sonars, remotely-operated submersible mine hunting vehicles 
(ROVs), precision GPS navigation systems, and revolutionary MCM ship design that worked 
wonders in the Arabian Gulf have not come cheaply.234 Furthermore, the recent advances 
in MCM have spurred new research and development in mine design technology toward 
returning the advantage to the miner. Paradoxically, Europe has led the resurgence in this 
area as well. Stealth-oriented design has been incorporated in the Swedish Rockan and the 
Italian Manta influence ground mines that defeat the minehunting sonar, while the ISBHM 
is impervious to minehunting and can also be actuated by minehunting sonars.235 The 
dangers posed by creeping complacency regarding the capabilities of current MCM 
technologies to effectively counter tomorrow's sophisticated mine threat is a dangerous 
precedent. At a minimum, for every dollar spent on mine research and production, two 
should be spent on developing appropriate countermeasure systems. In the never-ending 
mine warfare game of cat-and-mouse, MCM must not be allowed to continually play the 
role of the mouse, as so often has been the case in the past. 
b. Minesweeping Deficiencies 
Another disturbing MCM trend within NATO is its flagging interest in 
developing more advanced influence sweep systems. Although most of the emphasis on 
current MCM research and development is focused on minehunting, it should not be inferred 
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that influence sweeping no longer has a role to play in MCM. On the contrary, mine warfare 
advances such as Intelligent Self-burying Hunter Mines and other similar innovations in 
sea mine technology may soon render most, if not all, minehunting systems obsolete, 
requiring a shift in the focus of NATO's MCM doctrine away from minehunting and back 
to minesweeptng.236 This requirement for capable mine sweeping systems certainly applies 
when one considers the types of rapid "in stride" mine clearance operations required in 
advance of amphibious operations.237 In these scenarios, the limited window allotted for 
preparatory MCM does not allow adequate time for slow, tedious minehunting operations. 
Consequently, further support is required to develop the advanced sweep systems necessary 
to counter the new generation of "invisible" mines. Unfortunately, the predilection of some 
European governments and navies to maintain the status quo in the area of mine sweeping 
capabilities while concurrently funding the development of new and increasingly more lethal 
"stealth" mines, often for export, is indeed a dangerous precedent within NATO - which may 
one day find itself tasked with clearing these very same mines. 
E.   MCM IN NATO's NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT 
NATO's new Strategic Concept adopted at the London and Rome Summits outlines 
three essential missions of the maritime forces: ensure sea control to safeguard Allied sea 
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lanes of communication; support land and amphibious operations; and protect the 
deployment of the Alliance's sea-based nuclear deterrent.238 NATO's MCM forces will be 
called upon to perform several new fiinctions beyond their more traditional roles in support 
of this shift away from Cold War naval doctrine. Furthermore, NATO's involvement in the 
former Yugoslavia and the decisions of its Council at meetings in Oslo and Brussels in June 
and December of 1992 accepting a mandate supporting peacekeeping missions directed by 
the UN, foreshadow future operations outside of NATO's traditional boundaries. Against this 
backdrop, NATO's MCM forces can perform five basic missions: ensure North Atlantic 
waters are free from the threat of sporadic terrorist or insurgent mining activities; defend 
against Europe's economic vulnerability to mining from latent regional hegemons - including 
Russia; support Alliance, WEU, and/or UN-mandated peace-keeping/peace-making 
operations worldwide; support NATO's Immediate Rapid Deployment standing naval forces; 
and finally, reduce the potential threat posed by mines to NATO's ballistic and attack 
submarine forces. Common to many of these duties will be the requirement to provide an 
effective shallow water MCM capability during NATO or ad-hoc coalition operations in the 
littoral regions of the world.239 The nature and rationale for these missions bear further 
examination from an Alliance and national perspective. 
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1.   North Atlantic Responsibilities 
The threat of large-scale offensive mining of Western Europe by Soviet and Warsaw- 
bloc forces no longer exists, although Russia remains the largest navy in Europe and 
continues to maintain a sizable mining capability. Nonetheless, the breakup of the Soviet 
Union has not entirely diminished the threat of mining to Western Europe. To the contrary, 
the proliferation of advanced European and former Soviet mines to Third World countries and 
stateless organizations is a major concern for European navies.240 Mines, even those from 
Western sources, can be easily bought on the international arms market. They are economical 
and anonymous, making them an attractive weapon for Third World countries or stateless 
organizations. Libya's suspected mining of the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez in 1984 is an 
example of state-sponsored terrorism that cannot be discounted in today's unstable 
international climate. Moreover, recent history has shown that the mere threat of mining is 
sufficient to close an important domestic port or waterway, and to require an extensive MCM 
effort before safe passage can be assured.241 Finally, the use of mines as a weapon for 
economic extortion is always a possibility. 
The proliferation of mines, coupled with the growing number of potential 
perpetrators, must be measured against Europe's economic vulnerability to mining and its 
dependence on seaborne trade in peace as well as war. The specific nature of Europe's 
economic dependence on maritime commerce has already been addressed in Chapter III. The 
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question that must be answered is from where does the threat emanate? The following 
discussion attempts to answer this question. 
a. Terrorism 
Maritime terrorism involves attacks on ships or maritime installations by non- 
governmental groupings for reasons other than financial gain.242 With today's terrorist 
organizations constantly seeking new and more vulnerable targets and, given their growing 
technical proficiency and willingness to use destructive weapons indiscriminately, it may be 
a matter of time before sea mines join the repertoire of more traditional terrorist weapons. 
The list of terrorist states and organization with the means and motivation to conduct mining 
operations is well known. Given the capability of these terrorist groups to obtain 
sophisticated weaponry, the use of sea mines to block the access to ports and even 
international straits for a limited time may prove to be a relatively safe and effective means 
of gaining an international forum and achieving political or ideological objectives. 
Seaborne commerce accounts for over 80 percent of trade among nations.243 
Yet, by their nature, maritime zones vital to seaborne commerce, such as ports, harbors and 
inland waterways, are extremely difficult to protect and thus provide an ideal means of 
threatening the vital interests of a nation. These dubious attributes make coastal waters and 
the associated economic infrastructure contained therein attractive terrorist targets. 
Terrorist mining campaigns have the capacity to interrupt the free flow of commerce, restrict 
naval vessels from leaving or entering port, create environmental catastrophes, or threaten 
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the economic infrastructure (e.g., oil terminals) of a target nation. Moreover, the abundance 
of principal ports, harbors, and even straits susceptible to temporary closure after even 
modest mining campaigns may well be irresistible to terrorist groups disaffected with the 
actions of Western nations or oil-producing states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
Western Europe, which experiences about 40 percent of all international terrorist incidents 
annually, is especially susceptible to the threat of terrorist attack against maritime targets, 
given the openness of its societies and the ease of movement across and within its borders.244 
Many European as well as other terrorist organizations have resorted to 
maritime terrorism in the past-a point that has not been lost on Europe's maritime nations.245 
For example, Britain has long feared an IRA sponsored mining of one or more of its ports246 
and Spain's recent commitment to modernizing its MCM forces is due in part to the threat 
of mining posed by Basque terrorists.247 Finally, France, currently besieged by a wave of 
terrorist bombings linked to Algerian Islamic terrorist cells, cannot discount a mining threat 
against one or more of its commerce ports. Further, although the threat posed by the self- 
styled alliance of European leftist terrorist groups which proliferated during the 1980's has 
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receded, their place may be taken by equally dangerous xenophobic right-wing cells emerging 
throughout Europe, particularly in Germany. Finally, escalating ethnic nationalism and 
religious fanaticism emanating from Western Europe's "near abroad" have replaced political 
ideology as the primary engines of modern terrorism that may threaten European maritime 
interests in the future. 24S 
On the state level, many regimes frequently sponsor, support, and utilize 
terrorism as a foreign policy tool. The maritime environment is a favored medium for state- 
sponsored terrorism given the relative ease in which states may carry out subnational activities 
- either directly or through surrogates - in such a way as to minimize publicity or maximize 
their ability to deny overt involvement. Iran, Libya, and Iraq all have a recent history of 
state-sponsored mining operations of neighboring countries and in international waters. 
While these states may pose little direct threat to North Atlantic waters, they do have the 
capacity to threaten Western economic interests, such as access to oil and other raw materials 
through the closure of strategic narrows in other locations around the world. For instance, 
information regarding the extent of Iraqi mining in the Arabian Gulf and the danger it 
presented, caused shipping insurance rates to skyrocket and brought Gulf commerce to a 
virtual halt. At one point, 117 ships were anchored at Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, 
unwilling to sail further in the Gulf due to concern about mines.249 Similar state-sponsored 
mining campaigns in other vital maritime areas of the world could have a similar impact on 
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commercial shipping given probable increases in insurance premiums and the dangers of 
material or environmental damage resulting from potential mine strikes . 
b. Other Stateless Threats 
Insurgent movements also pose a distinct threat as potential minelayers. 
These organizations, which tend to be larger and better financed than most terrorist groups, 
have the resources to conduct mining campaigns on a much larger scale. Moreover, many 
insurgent movements may obtain advanced sea mines from sympathetic countries or ethno- 
political groups. The CIA-backed mining of Nicaraguan ports by so-called Contra insurgents 
in 1984 is a perfect case in point. 
Early in 1984, the CIA supplied the Contras with as many as 500 mines as 
part of its campaign to assist insurgents seeking to topple the Sandinista regime.250 Thirty- 
nine of these mines were eventually placed in Nicaragua's three principal harbors and ports 
as part an insurgent operation aimed at crippling the Sandinista government economically. 
This insurgent mining campaign proved highly successful, as the 39 mines accounted for 
the damage (and in one case sinking) of 19 ships, and the closure of Nicaragua's three main 
port facilities for several months at an economic cost of $200 million.251 Moreover, the 
Sandinista govemment-totally bereft of even a rudimentary MCM force - was forced to rely 
on fishing boats - taken up from trade and enlisted for mine sweeping duties - to counter the 
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threat.252 Predictably, the few mines located by these "mine sweepers" were usually at the 
cost of the vessels themselves. 
The foregoing example highlights the potential use of sea mines by insurgent 
groups - especially when backed by a state-sponsor - to attack or harass a nation's vital 
commercial and military ports, harbors, inland waterways, and even SLOCs with virtual 
impunity.253 Although this example highlights a situation where a US-sponsored insurgent 
group conducted the minelaying campaign, a similar scenario could evolve in the future 
which may threaten the maritime security of a NATO member state or ally.254 Perhaps the 
most visible example of NATO's potential susceptibility to an insurgent mining campaign 
is the vulnerability of the Turkish Straits to mining by Kurdish insurgents in that country. 
Such an act would shut down a vital strategic chokepoint and require NATO MCM forces 
to deal with the threat. 
2. Russia as a Dormant Threat 
Despite the disintegration of Russia's capability to project significant naval power 
outside its near abroad, Russia's mine warfare capabilities remain formidable and still must 
be considered a threat to European security in view of the uncertain political situation in 
252
 Ibid, p. 115. 
253
 The Contra mining campaign was accomplished using very modest Q-boat platforms. 
254
 The recent sinking of a German passenger ship on the Danube River inside 
Yugoslavia by a suspected   home-made Croatian-Serb mine is a chilling reminder of the 
destructive potential of insurgent mining even within Europe. Ernest Fortin, "Those Damn 
Mines", US Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1992, p. 30. 
139 
Moscow.255 Recent gains by the ultra-nationalist "Liberal-Democratic Party" and the former 
Communists in recent legislative elections, and Russia's recalcitrant position regarding 
NATO's eastward expansion point to a potential rift between NATO and Russian foreign 
policy objectives in the future. 
As part of its shift away from "Atlanticism," the Russian government has revised its 
attitudes towards NATO. Recent public statements emanating from Moscow have 
characterized the Alliance as "wedded to the stereotype of bloc thinking," and "meddling in 
Russia's internal affairs."256 Moreover, Russian intelligence services still consider NATO 
as a threat to Russia's national security, depicting it as "the biggest military grouping in the 
world that possesses an enormous offensive potential."257 Diplomatically, Russian political 
leaders- faced with mounting political discontent at home - have increased their anti-Western 
rhetoric in recent months, particularly regarding NATO. An angry President Yeltzin recently 
stated that expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance onto Russia's western frontier "will mean 
a conflagration of war throughout Europe."258 He went on to threaten a return to Cold War 
relations between Russia and the West if NATO were expanded to include Eastern Europe.259 
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Yeltsin's comments concerning the eastward expansion of NATO were the strongest 
denunciation yet to originate from Moscow and reflect Russia's growing sense of international 
isolation. Finally, Russian politicians and military officers are wary of NATO member 
Turkey, suspecting that Istanbul is attempting to gain influence in the unstable Caucasus at 
the expense of Russia.260 While most of Russia's current bravado may be dismissed as empty 
rhetoric, the apparent wedge between Western security interests and traditional Russian geo- 
strategic fears relating to its near abroad appear to be widening. 
Although Russia does not pose a threat to Western Europe in the foreseeable future, 
its prospect for continued democratic reform is marginal at best. Consequently, Russian 
geopolitical considerations discussed above should continue to figure prominently in NATO's 
traditional boundary area and beyond despite the end of the Cold War. Given Russia's 
continuing mine warfare capability, prudence dictates the maintenance of a robust MCM 
capability until such time as political developments in Russia stabilize. 
3. MCM Within NATO's Naval Rapid Reaction Forces 
The current instability presented by the spread of extreme ethno-nationalism, religious 
fundamentalism, weapons of mass destruction, territorial disputes (which could spill across 
international borders) and the collapse of governmental authority in Western Europe's "near 
abroad" signal a growing requirement for crisis management. Should a crisis emerge that 
threatens NATO's interests, Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) are now available to respond 
either as a self-sustained force, or as a NATO-organized contribution to a larger UN out- 
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of-area operation.261 NATO's naval Reaction Forces (RF) have been designed using a 
building block approach that calls for the formation of a multinational naval force from 
Alliance resources.262 The size and configuration of the force is dictated by the nature and 
location of the crisis. These forces consist of two primary Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF)- 
Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) and Standing Naval Force 
Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED)- which serve as the core elements around which naval 
RF forces may be built. Alliance vessels from STANAVFORMED currently form the basis 
for the NATO/WEU naval force conducting SHARP GUARD operations in the Adriatic, 
relieved from time to time by STANVFORLANT. A lesser known though no less important 
"junior member" of NATO's three Standing Naval Forces is the Standing Naval Mine 
Countermeasures Force (STANAVMINFOR). This force, comprised solely of mine 
countermeasures vessels from various NATO member states, currently serves as NATO's 
rapid reaction mine warfare "fire brigade." 
a. Standing Naval Force Mine Countermeasures 
Europe's vulnerability to potential Soviet mining led to the establishment of 
a standing naval multinational MCM alert force - Standing Naval Force Channel - composed 
solely of MCM vessels from various NATO member nations. Redesignated 
STANAVMINFOR in July of 1994, this flotilla has emerged as a prime example of NATO's 
new Strategic Concept.    STANAVMINFOR   units conduct year-around training and 
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exercises under alternating national commands. Once limited primarily to the narrow seas 
surrounding the UK and northwest Europe, STANAVMINFOR now routinely operates in 
various geographic locations within NATO's traditional boundary area, including the 
Mediterranean. The high levels of interoperability and tactical commonality cultivated 
between the various European MCM forces participating in this multinational MCM task 
force paid handsome dividends during post-Desert Storm WEU MCM operations. 
STANAVMINFOR will undoubtedly be called upon to perform similar functions should 
mine warfare-related security threats arise in the future. 
b.   Current RF MCM Deficiencies 
The most likely theater of operations requiring NATO's MCM forces is 
undoubtedly the Arabian Gulf. The difficulties encountered in dispatching rapid response 
naval MCM forces to this area and others like it is highlighted when one considers the 
lengthy transit times involved for MCMV's when compared to other naval combatants.263 For 
example, MCMVs from CONUS require over 35 days transit time to the Arabian Gulf at 
an enormous cost in terms of wear and tear.264 Transit times from Europe are substantially 
shorter, especially from the Mediterranean. Still, whatever their point of origin, MCM vessels 
are incapable of transiting with the primary naval task force due to their significantly slower 
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speeds and requirement for constant replenishment. This deficiency with respect to surface 
MCM forces was highlighted during the Falklands campaign in 1982 when British Hunt-class 
MCMVs were unable to accompany the primary task force. As a result, British 
expeditionary naval forces were woefully unprepared to meet the threat posed by 20 or so 
Argentine mines planted in the approaches to Port Stanley.265 While no ships were lost, the 
very existence of the minefield complicated British plans for amphibious operations and 
compelled the Royal Navy to employ its smaller combatants as "guinea pig" sweepers.266 
The importance of deploying MCM assets alongside other naval combatants in any crisis 
situation requiring naval forces was further demonstrated during the Iran-Iraq Tanker War 
between 1987 and 1988. During this crisis, American and European naval vessels conducting 
escort operations were put at risk by Iranian mining of the Arabian Gulf and later in the Gulf 
of Oman. Faced with the probable disruption or even loss of vital maritime oil supplies from 
the region due to the unforeseen mine threat, the United States, Britain, France, Italy, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands hastily dispatched MCM flotillas to assist in mine clearance 
operations. 
One possible solution to this problem is to have an alternating NATO MCM 
ready force consisting of three or four ships forces forward deployed to the Gulf region.267 
Homeporting the force in Bahrain would be the most likely choice given the existing 
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infrastructure already in place to support MCM operations. While this proposal makes good 
military sense and is strategically prudent given the Gulfs past mine warfare track record, 
overriding political and budgetary concerns probably make its implementation unlikely, at 
least in the near term. Another option is transporting MCMVs onboard heavy-lift ships, as 
was done during the Desert Shield deployment of US forces to the Gulf region. NATO, 
however, does not possess organic heavy-lift assets and must rely on commercially leased 
ships to meet its heavy-lift requirements.268 Furthermore, only 19 international merchant 
heavy-lift ships are available for MCMV transport, and political problems or scheduling 
conflicts could make some of them unavailable on short notice.269 A final point that must 
be considered is that, while the availability of these ships reduces transit wear and tear on the 
MCMVs, the time required to load and off-load the MCMVs and the relatively slow transit 
speeds of the heavy-lift vessels themselves preclude their ability to transit in company with 
the primary task force. 
The only practical solution to this significant problem appears to be the 
deployment of Airborne MCM helicopter assets as part of a NATO-coordinated 
expeditionary task force to areas where probable mining is expected or has already taken 
place. AMCM assets embarked aboard the new MCM Command Ship, USS Inchon, or other 
air-capable amphibious ships can provide the battle force with organic MCM forces capable 
of executing a variety of MCM operations in conjunction with embarked or in theater EOD 
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units. If no air-capable ships are available for the transit due to overriding priorities, AMCM 
squadrons can quickly deploy in theater by way of strategic airlift and be ready to conduct 
shore-based operations within a very short period- probably before the arrival of the 
expeditionary task force.    These units could execute initial  exploratory and  clearance 
operations in preparation of the arrival of surface MCM forces from Europe and the United 
States. 
The important contribution of AMCM to NATO's rapid deployment MCM 
capability has not been lost on America's Alliance partners.   Admiral Klaus Rehder, FGN, 
former commander of Naval Forces Baltic Approaches, recently observed: 
AMCM has added a new dimension to the conventional [surface] 
MCM and is extremely valuable. . . From an alliance point of view, it would 
hurt less if [the US Navy] decides to reduce [surface] MCM rather than 
AMCM. We would otherwise lose a full dimension of operational capabilities 
which only the US Navy can provide.270 
If NATO's Rapid Response MCM forces are truly to be an "enabling asset" 
for the Alliance's expeditionary naval forces, then provisions must be made to ensure, at a 
minimum, their concurrent arrival on station with the main task force, if not before. 
Failing this, the enormous threat posed by prepared mine fields may derail or postpone the 
projection of naval expeditionary power from the sea. Clearly, the MCM adage "where the 
fleet goes, we've been," can hardly apply given the aforementioned deficiency in MCM rapid 
deployment capability without the availability of dedicated AMCM assets. 
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4.   Peace-keeping/Peace-Enforcement Operations 
Following the Cold War, the United Nations has attained considerable influence in 
formulating and directing global policy, and the world now views the UN as a legitimate 
arbiter in the conduct of international events, notwithstanding its troubles in the former 
Yugoslavia. Barring the unlikely creation of a "UN standing naval force," only NATO 
maintains the range and depth of naval capabilities necessary for the successful execution 
of maritime peace-keeping/peace-making operations, particularly in the area of mine 
warfare.271 Consequently, NATO's growing role as a military enforcement arm of UN- 
mandated international resolutions and sanctions has generated an additional, if not entirely 
new, role for NATO's naval forces.272 Many of these missions will have or require some 
type of mine warfare component in which MCM will play an important role. 
Although the historical use of naval forces in peace-keeping has been relatively rare, 
recent maritime developments, including the ratification of the UNCLOS III, have opened 
new areas for future involvement. Moreover, political leaders are slowly recognizing the 
advantages of maritime forces in the execution of politically sensitive peace-keeping/ 
enforcement operations in today's international setting. Unlike land-based peace-keeping 
operations, UN maritime operations do not require the consent of the parties to the conflict - 
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be they belligerent governments, insurgent movements, or ethnic/religious groups. Naval 
vessels have the ability to operate unhindered in international waters and, under Article 
105 of the UN Charter, may also operate within the Territorial Seas of member states when 
fulfilling UN-endorsed operations.273 Herein lies the fundamental value of maritime forces for 
UN peace-keeping/enforcement operations. 
Based on the greater degree of mobility and flexibility inherent in maritime forces, 
naval operations under UN auspices are more likely to involve more dangerous peace- 
enforcement, rather than peace-keeping duties. In today's political climate, the level of 
acceptable risk in these scenarios is very low. The loss of a single asset or life from 
unforeseen mining could have debilitating consequences to the success of the operation. 
Consequently, any maritime operation in potentially hostile waters will require an MCM 
component to establish the presence or absence of a mine threat or reduce the danger to 
major combatants and merchant shipping should mines be discovered. 
Today, there are several  out-of-area peace-keeping/making maritime missions that 
might involve NATO's MCM forces under UN cognizance. These missions include post- 
conflict mine clearance operations, maritime blockade operations,   EEZ patrols,   naval 
support to peace-keeping forces ashore, and non-combatant evacuation operations. 
a. Post-conflict MCM Operations 
As discussed in Chapter V, the proliferation of sophisticated mines to the 
Third World, coupled with increasing intra-regional instability in many areas of the world, 
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enhances the likelihood of future armed conflicts involving the employment of mines. In 
view of the nonexistent MCM capabilities among most Third World countries, the likelihood 
that any of the belligerent states will have the capacity to conduct required mine clearance 
operations of territorial and international waters following the cessation of hostilities is 
exceedingly low. Recent history has provided poignant examples to support this presumption. 
For instance, US, French, and British MCM forces were required to conduct lengthy and 
costly clearance operations of Egyptian mines in the Gulf of Suez and Red Sea following 
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.274 During the Iran-Iraq War, European and American MCM 
forces were again required to clear mines laid in international waters by both belligerents. 
Future regional peace accords mediated by the UN will doubtless require the 
commitment of naval forces as part of ensuing peace-keeping operations. In many cases, 
MCM forces will be required to clear remaining mines that continue to pose a threat to 
maritime freedom of the seas. Only NATO can provide the required MCM expertise and 
capability necessary to successfully conduct extensive UN-mandated mine clearance 
operations against today's complex mines. 
b. Maritime Sanctions, Embargoes, and Blockades 
In recent years, maritime blockades and embargoes have reemerged as a 
favored means of enforcing UN sanctions or exercising international pressure, and have 
become the raison d' etre of sorts for NATO and WEU conventional naval forces. 
Currently, two UN-mandated international blockades (Rump Yugoslavia in the Adriatic and 
Iraq in the Arabian Gulf) remain  in force, and a third (Haiti) has  recently terminated. 
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Although historical evidence suggests that few peacetime naval blockades or embargoes 
have fully achieved their desired objective, they still fill a significant role as tangible 
manifestations of international political resolve.275 Moreover, naval blockades and 
embargoes offer convenient political cover for statesmen wishing to contribute to an 
international coalition effort without exposing national military forces to high levels of risk. 
The extension of the Territorial Sea out to 12 nautical miles has expanded 
the area to be covered in enforcing a blockade if no infringement of national sovereignty is 
to take place. The enlargement has also opened a far greater and potentially lethal area of 
water available for protective or defensive mining operations on the part of a sanctioned 
nation. Blockading naval forces may be extremely vulnerable to minelaying if political 
circumstances prohibit attack or other measures designed to prevent the laying of mines 
through offensive means. For example, protective minefields barriers could be laid in such 
a manner as to allow friendly vessels to pass while blocking pursuing coalition naval forces. 
In extreme cases, isolated states may simply elect to release drifting mines in an attempt to 
harass blockading forces. At the very least, such a mine threat could render the blockade 
ineffective or cause the withdrawal of lesser committed nations; in the worst case this could 
result in severe damage to (or loss of) a blockading vessel with resulting loss of life. Clearly, 
ships participating in future blockade operations must be capable of operating in a multi-threat 
environment that includes sea mines.   The presence of MCM assets, however, could nullify 
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the potential mine threat and help ensure at a minimum, the continued appearance of an 
effective and unified blockade. 
c. EEZ Patrols 
Since EEZ's have been expanded out to 200 miles from the boundaries of the 
Territorial Sea, these formerly international waters have assumed great significance to 
states exercising resource sovereignty rights therein. International quarrels over 
jurisdictional demarcation boundaries, exploitation of resource-rich seabeds, and fishing 
rights, exist in a number of strategic and not so strategic areas of the world. These 
politically charged disputes have the potential to flare into open hostilities, and may require 
international intervention in order to assure continued freedom of the seas within the 
contested waters. As discussed in Chapter IV, mines may be employed in the future by 
various states as a means of protecting or otherwise enforcing national sovereignty claims 
within contested EEZs. Under international law, NATO's MCM forces may be tasked to 
conduct clearance operations in order to maintain maritime security of the seas. Such MCM 
operations would presumably fall under the auspices of the UN. Nevertheless, minefields that 
clearly violate recognized international law or pose a direct threat to the West's economic 
security may facilitate a purely Alliance-driven MCM response. 
d. Maritime Support for Peacekeeping Forces Ashore 
NATO's naval forces may be called upon to support UN operations on land 
in many ways, including command and control, logistics, surveillance, and fire support. 
Recent examples of these types of naval missions include UN operations in Somalia, Haiti, 
and current UN operations in the former Yugoslavia. In many instances, naval forces off 
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shore may provide the only lifeline for logistic supply, strike support, or avenue of 
evacuation to highly vulnerable peacekeepers ashore. This is particularly true in areas 
lacking modern air facilities, roadways systems, and communication networks, areas most 
likely to require UN peacekeeping missions in the first place. The potential threat generated 
by mines could cut off sea-based support to ground forces. In such situations, the availability 
of MCM forces can ensure the continued security and maneuverability of coalition naval 
assets, and help maintain the vital link between sea-based and land-based forces. 
e.   Non-combatant evacuation operations 
NATO's naval forces may be called upon to assist in the evacuation of non- 
combatants from Third World countries undergoing internal upheaval. While larger nations 
may conduct these operations on a strictly national basis, smaller countries without such a 
naval capability may appeal to the UN for assistance.276 Regardless of the coordinating 
institution, only NATO's naval forces possess the projection capability necessary to conduct 
these types of short notice operations. In these types of hostile and often anarchic 
environments, the threat of sea-mines in the near shore staging areas cannot be discounted. 
In such a scenario, MCM forces may be required to protect friendly evacuation forces from 
the threat of mines. 
/   Surveillance 
MCM forces can perform other useful peacekeeping roles outside their 
traditional role. For instance MCM vessels, although military, are lightly armed and thus 
non-provocative and non-offensive. They are not perceived as a threat. Therefore, forward 
276
 Allison, p. 25 
152 
surveillance in benign peace-keeping operations could become a new role for MCM vessels 
as part of a larger naval force.277 
In summary, although MCM forces will not be required for all types of peace- 
keeping missions, they will continue to play a large role in guaranteeing unimpeded maritime 
freedom of the sea to naval peacekeeping forces, Rapid Reaction forces, and commercial 
shipping during times of crisis. 
5. Protection of Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent 
One of the major roles of MCM within NATO has changed relatively little since the 
end of the Cold War: the protection of the sea-based nuclear deterrent force of SSBN 
submarines. The specific nature of this mission is beyond the classification level of this thesis. 
Nonetheless, some basic presumptions are obvious. Mines, particularly deep moored self- 
propelled rising vertical mines (RVM) and self-propelled bottom mines (SMDM) present a 
significant threat to NATO's submarine fleet. Until recently, these relatively sophisticated 
mines were limited to the arsenals of the major superpowers. However, 
ROSVOOROIJZHENIE, The State Corporation on Export and Import of Russia's Arms and 
Military Equipment has recently begun offering these and other sophisticated mines for 
export in numerous military journals and trade publications.278 The significance of the 
proliferation of these mines to potentially hostile Third World countries or sophisticated 
terrorist cells, and the correlating threat to Alliance submarines, including SSBNs, is self- 
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evident. Consequently, NATO must maintain a capability to counter this threat should the 
need arise. NATO's MCM forces will continue to fill this requirement. Finally, British and 
French MCM forces are assigned national responsibilities to ensure the safe passage of their 
respective SSBN forces to and from their bases at Faslane and Brest. It is for this reason that 
each countries' MCM forces and headquarters are co-located at these same bases. 
F. LITTORAL WARFARE 
NATO's new Strategic Concept has embraced the concept of littoral warfare as the 
most likely type of naval conflict in the post-Cold War environment.279 Consequently, the 
support of amphibious warfare operations as outlined in the US Navy-Marine Corps white 
paper, Forward. . . From the Sea, has become a top priority within the various NATO 
commands.280 The worlds' littoral regions encompass some 122 countries and close to 70 
percent of the world population.281 These areas are characterized by confined, shallow 
waters, and congested airspace occupied by friends, enemies and neutrals. In this 
environment, mines become an even more lethal threat to both ships and landing craft. The 
ability or inability to deal with mines within this area could spell the difference between 
success and failure of expeditionary or amphibious-type naval operations, particularly in areas 
with a shallow or gently sloping sea bottom gradient. Paramount to the success of maritime 
littoral operations in the attainment of air, surface and sub-surface superiority over the enemy. 
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In essence, littoral warfare is about the ability to dominate the waters and airspace of another 
country in order to facilitate amphibious landings or other forms of naval power projection 
from the sea. The operating environment of the littorals favors the opponent, because they 
have the defensive advantage, the shortest logistic trail, and greater knowledge of the 
operating area. Under these circumstances, the unknown threat posed by mines can negate 
the inherent naval advantage of agility, surprise, and maneuver critical to US and Alliance 
military doctrine and strategy. Clausewitz warns of postponing action in time and space to 
a point where further waiting brings disadvantage.282 One can appreciate the tremendous 
difficulties that would be encountered if enemy forces are allowed to fortify and reinforce 
beachheads while Alliance amphibious forces remain bogged down, clearing and navigating 
mined waters. 
The ease with which Iraqi mines blocked coalition efforts to achieve maritime 
battlespace dominance in the littoral seas of the northern Arabian Gulf spurred increased 
awareness and development of MCM systems and tactics on both sides of the Atlantic. The 
capability of naval forces to adequately clear mines ahead of an amphibious assault without 
impeding the speed of advance, commonly called "sweep in stride," is currently a top 
priority of the US Naval Service and particularly within the Marine Corps.283 If and when 
the need arises, NATO MCM forces may play a critical role in conjunction with other allies, 
clearing landing approach lanes to the beach for American, British and Dutch Marines in the 
event of full scale NATO amphibious operations in the future.  To achieve success in this 
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endeavor, Alliance MCM forces must overcome the challenges posed by MCM operations 
in the shallow water and beach zones. The US Navy defines the shallow water zone as 
ranging from a depth of 200 feet in to the high water mark (HWM). Contained within the 
shallow water zone are the very shallow water (VSW) zone (depth of 40 feet to 10 feet) and 
the surf zone (10 feet to the HWM).284 
This relatively new form of very shallow water (VSW) MCM poses the most severe 
challenge for NATO's MCM forces. First, VSW MCM is unfamiliar and relatively 
unpopular with most European MCM officers who have trained for years in port breakout 
and Q-Route clearance operations against the Soviet mine threat.285 VSW MCM operations 
require surface MCM vessels to operate in shallow water depths outside the generally 
accepted "safe envelope." Consequently, European and American surface MCM forces may 
require precursor sweep operations by US Airborne Mine Countermeasures Helicopters 
before conducting many types VSW operations. Nevertheless, recent NATO MCM training 
exercises, including BLUE HARRIER 94, have altered scenarios to emphasize tactical 
development in the nuances of VSW MCM operations among the European MCM naval 
forces. 
Another area of concern relative to future NATO VSW MCM operations is the 
probable reluctance among some Alliance members to authorize the use of national assets 
in such a high risk threat environment.    Iraq's ability to foil planned coalition amphibious 
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operations with rudimentary mine fields during the Gulf War highlights the importance of 
abundant MCM forces to successful amphibious operations. In the case of Desert Storm, 
insufficient MCM forces prevented the timely clearance of the mine threat to acceptable 
levels.286 This shortfall in MCM assets was due largely to the unwillingness of European 
MCM forces, with the exception of the United Kingdom, to enter the Gulf until after the 
cessation of hostilities. Consequently, American and British MCM forces were left short- 
handed to clear the required invasion routes and Battleship Fire Support Areas (FSA). The 
vital lessons learned from this experience need to be implemented in NATO's littoral 
warfare doctrine in which continental European MCM forces must figure more prominently. 
G. REGIONAL THREAT CASE STUDY: SOUTHEAST ASIA 
With the end of the Cold War and the resulting demise of the bipolar balance of 
power, traditional regional rivalries in Europe, Asia and the Middle East are all poised to 
reassert themselves. Potential conflicts can be found throughout virtually every regional 
littoral: along the Mediterranean, Adriatic, and Black Seas, in the Persian Gulf, throughout 
the Indian Ocean, and in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Common to all these regions is the 
geographic vulnerability to mining, and the existence of large, modern mine inventories and 
mine delivery   platforms among the various potential adversaries. 
Clearly, current instability in the Middle East presents the most obvious latent threat 
to maritime peace and freedom of navigation. Both the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War 
demonstrate the nature and extent of the threat in this economically vital region, particularly 
in the area of mine warfare.   Nevertheless, the geo-strategic situation within the Middle East 
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is a topic on which much has already been written. Consequently, this section examines 
Southeast Asia instead, and analyzes two scenarios in which the employment of mines is 
a distinct possibility and where NATO's MCM forces may be called into action in some 
manner. While the scenarios are purely conjectural, the historical basis and strategic logic 
behind them are certainly plausible. 
L Southeast Asia 
The abrupt end of the Cold War coupled with the area's enormous economic 
growth has dramatically altered its geo-strategic landscape of the Asian-Pacific region. 
Despite increasing economic interdependence among the various regional actors, there also 
exists the possibility of increasing friction, especially in the maritime arena. Mounting 
regional insecurities, combined with the rapid emergence of Asia's economic Tigers, has 
resulted in the availability of excess capital earmarked for the modernization of various Asian 
naval forces. Arms sales in the region are rising dramatically at a time when the global 
market for military weaponry is declining. For example, between 1985 and 1993, Asian 
Pacific defense expenditures soared 68 percent while US and European defense 
expenditures declined by 9 percent over the same period.287 
The emergence of an apparent naval arms race among many Asian countries coincides 
with the rising hegemonic aspirations of several Pacific nations, most notably, China.288 
Furthermore, growing economic competition and the contentious issue of overlapping EEZs 
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have generated competing claims over various resource-rich maritime areas. This is hardly 
surprising since the ocean has become the prime source of income for many Pacific nations 
and the main focus of their plans for economic development.289 From a mine warfare 
perspective, the presence of well-equipped naval forces and economically driven territorial 
disputes raise the spectrum of future conflict between the various regional maritime states. 
Two potentially volatile areas particularly susceptible to mining operations are the South 
China Sea and the Formosa Strait. 
2. South China Sea 
Among the various territorial disagreements within the region, the contested Spratly 
and Paracel Island groups in the South China Sea represent East Asia's most dangerous and 
contentious multilateral dispute. Seven states - Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam - have competing claims to the islands.290 Beijing, 
however, claims the entire sea as Chinese territory and reserves the right to use force to 
prevent free passage of foreign vessels through it.291 The relatively new interest in these 
islands dates from the late 1%0's and centers primarily on the expectation that vast deposits 
of oil and natural gas lie beneath the seabed floor adjacent to these islands. The potential for 
economic exploitation of resources lying within the waters surrounding the Spratly Islands 
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has led to mounting regional tensions and, in some cases, armed conflict among the 
protagonists. For instance, open hostilities between China and Vietnam over sovereignty 
erupted in armed hostilities in March of 1988, resulting in the sinking of three Vietnamese 
vessels sunk and the deaths of 72 personnel. More recently, Sino-Philippine relations have 
soured over China's occupation of a small atoll lying well within the Philippine's 200 mile 
EEZ.292 
Beijing's strong declaratory position regarding its territorial claims in the South China 
Sea has provoked a measure of anxiety within the region, particularly in light of China's 
growing naval power projection capability.293 In order to assert their claim, the Chinese have 
constructed numerous military facilities within the Spratly Island group. Further 
complicating the Spratly dispute are the island's proximity to the major SLOC through the 
South China Sea. It is not inconceivable that China may one day employ minefields to 
safeguard the integrity of what it perceives to be its legitimate territorial waters. China's 
minelaying capacity is considerable, and it could deny the entire area to foreign vessels 
including tankers.294 Any significant mining campaign in the South China Sea would pose 
a severe threat to international commerce given the importance of the maritime navigational 
routes which pass through this strategic body of water. This factor, coupled with the lack of 
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Strategie cohesion within the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASIAN) could lead 
to the requirement for an ad-hoc coalition MCM effort possibly involving NATO MCM 
forces. 
3. Formosa Strait 
The growing friction between Taiwan and the China over the issue of sovereignty is 
potentially the most disruptive problem in southeast Asia. China's leadership already judges 
that US political, military, and economic support of Taiwan - which it considers a renegade 
province- have fostered the increasingly independence-minded fervor that permeates the 
island today.295 The recent visit of Taiwan's president to the United States set off an angry 
response from China which recalled its ambassador to the United States for consultations. 
Militarily, China has recently displayed an increasingly hostile posture toward Taiwan, 
including numerous military exercises off the Taiwanese coast. Moreover, Taiwanese fears 
of a Chinese attack were heightened recently when China tested guided missiles off northern 
Taiwan.296 
In December 1992 the Associated press and the Xinhua News Agency reported that 
Beijing officials threatened the use of military force if Taiwan moved toward independence 
or if China's sovereignty or territory were threatened. 297 If China were compelled to use 
force against Taiwan, a blockade would be more likely than a actual assault. Beijing could 
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justify a blockade internationally on the grounds that Taiwan is part of China and thus subject 
to its control like any of its other internal provinces.298 Such a blockade would undoubtedly 
employ the use of mines as perhaps the key element or at the very least as a force multiplier. 
In such a scenario and in view of Taiwan's nonexistent MCM capability, coalition MCM 
forces would be required to counter the Chinese minefields either during or following the 
termination of the blockade. 
4. Does NATO Have A Role In Asia? 
In the absence of a viable Asian alliance resembling NATO, future conflicts involving 
Asian states will probably require UN intervention in order to mediate a peace settlement. 
Under most conditions, the resultant peace accord will require the presence of foreign naval 
forces representing disinterested parties. While these parties may be comprised of Asian 
nations, the deep-seated mistrust inherent within the region makes this solution appear 
unlikely. Most probably, any peacekeeping naval presence will require the participation of 
American and European assets, particularly former colonial powers, such as the United 
Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands. The precedent for post-World War II European naval 
involvement in Asia under UN auspices was established during the Korean War where ten 
nations, including several NATO member states, served in Task Force 95, the "United 
Nations Blockading and Escort Force."299 Finally, Asia's generally poor MCM capability 
further supports the premise that any large scale MCM operations in Asian waters will have 
to be carried out by combined forces of the United States, Europe and possibly Japan. 
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The foregoing case studies serve as examples of the types of UN-mandated or even 
unilateral MCM operations which NATO's MCM forces may be called upon to perform in the 
future. Similar scenarios can be developed for other regional areas including the Indian 
Ocean, the Mediterranean, Korea, and most notably, the Middle East. The intent of this 
section is not to provide an assessment of the world's potential geo-strategic "hotspots." 
It is solely an avenue by which the possible scenarios necessitating the employment of 
NATO's MCM forces discussed earlier in this chapter may come to pass in today's 
increasingly uncertain and unstable strategic climate. 
H.   MCM IN EUROPE'S EMERGING DEFENSE IDENTITY 
Western Europe's gradual movement over the past four years away from dependence 
on US security guarantees and toward deeper integration within the European Union have 
driven the evolution of a new security strategy and motivated the debate over the need for, 
and role of, a European defense identity.300 Some European nations, most notably Britain 
and the Netherlands argue that this defense identity should primarily evolve within the 
framework of the NATO Alliance. Other nations, most notably France, are examining the 
possible role of the WEU in contributing to European security and the development of an 
independent defense structure outside of NATO. Still other nations favor some combination 
of both concepts that allow the EC to act as a single political entity within the Alliance 
without geographical or functional limits on its charter.301 
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Whatever the eventual form of the European defense identity, three major elements 
will be required to ensure its success. First, the WEU must emerge as an institutional 
framework for defense collaboration, and play a more active role in coordinating its member's 
future activities outside of NATO. Second, any future defense identity must involve closer 
cooperation in defense procurement to shepherd scarce resources, avoid duplicity of effort, 
and promote commonality in weapons systems. Third, it must maintain the health of 
Europe's defense industries and research and development programs. European MCM as a 
warfare area has been in the forefront at all three of these levels in the shaping of Europe's 
security identity. This assertion may appear at first to be somewhat of an overestimation of 
the contribution of MCM in this area. Therefore, a more detailed analysis is warranted. 
1. MCM and the WEU 
The WEU is currently being developed simultaneously as the defense component of 
the EU and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the NATO Alliance.302 As 
such, it is now the most visible embodiment of ESDI. Europe's MCM forces have been 
closely associated with the reemergence of the WEU since its reactivation following the Rome 
Declaration in 1984. MCM first served as a conduit in the revitalization of the WEU 
following Iranian mining in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman in 1988. This crisis 
demonstrated that Europe did indeed have requirements for naval defense outside of NATO 
which did not necessarily coincide with those of the United States. In this case, the various 
European states wished to maintain their own national policy nuances, both toward the Gulf 
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states and the United States.303 Following a special meeting of senior officials of the defense 
and foreign ministries of the WEU states, France Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands took 
their national decisions to send MCM forces to the Gulf. It was within this framework that 
European MCM forces conducted the first-ever concerted naval action outside Europe under 
the cognizance of the WEU. 
Since 1988, the WEU has gradually expanded its activities both operationally 
(participation in the Gulf War and former Yugoslavia) and politically (moving its 
headquarters to Brussels). The growing role of the WEU in coordinating European MCM 
operations occurred most recently during post-Desert Storm mine clearance operations in 
the Arabian Gulf. This highly successful operation accounted for over 1,300 Iraqi mines, 
and involved MCM flotillas from France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Germany, and Italy. Germany's participation in the MCM operation was significant in that 
it represented the Bundeswehr's first participation in such an out-of-area operation 
coordinated by the WEU. During the operation, European MCM forces once again operated 
in conjunction with but independently of US MCM forces outside the NATO framework. 
The precedents set and the lessons garnered from these collaborative MCM 
operations laid the groundwork for the conduct of WEU coordinated out-of-area naval 
operations which are being implemented today in the Adriatic. Finally, if recent history is 
any indication, Europe's MCM forces may soon find themselves again operating jointly 
under WEU auspices in support of European security interests in the Adriatic, the Middle 
East, or elsewhere. 
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2.   Weapon System Procurement 
Economic realities - such as declining defense budgets and the growing need to share 
the costs and risks of developing and manufacturing new generation weapon systems - are 
increasingly driving European arms production. Moreover, increased armaments cooperation 
within Europe is seen as a means toward achieving increased levels of standardization and 
interoperability among its military forces.304 To date, the aerospace and electronics defense 
sectors have led the Europeanization of previously nationalized armament industries. Some 
of the most prominent examples include the Euromissile in the 1970s, the Tornado fighter 
in the 1980's, and more recently, the Eurocopter program. Somewhat surprisingly, European 
integration in the design and production of combat ships have lagged behind other defense 
sectors and are still primarily structured along national lines.305 Nevertheless, European 
collaboration in successful joint development projects involving MCM ship design and 
construction as well as associated countermeasures systems has set the stage for increased 
numbers of collaborative ventures in other naval warfare areas.306 
Currently, several collaborative MCM efforts are in progress or under consideration 
among various EC members. France and Britain are entering preliminary discussions on the 
joint development of a new oceangoing minesweeper as are the Dutch and the Belgians. In 
the electronics field, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands are developing a 
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parametric buried-mine detection sonar under the tri-national Experimental Parametric Mine 
Detection Sonar (EPMDS) Joint Naval Committee.307 Finally, several European nations 
recently collaborated in the funding, development, and production of a first of its kind mine 
warfare simulator located at Eguermin - NATO's only warfare school run jointly by two 
allied navies.308 This simulator can reproduce environmental conditions in any region of the 
world and simulate MCM vessels and mine hunting systems of every NATO member country. 
The simulator will serve a two-fold purpose. First, it will save precious defense funds by 
allowing ships to train without the requirement of costly underway time at sea. Second, it will 
allow MCM crews to train in operational scenarios that are not possible to encounter in 
European waters or would otherwise be too dangerous to perform under actual training 
conditions. The European Union has explicitly promoted intra-European arms collaboration 
as part of its quest for a common defense identity.309 A recent European Parliament 
resolution in support of a European Defense Agency that would eventually centralize all 
European arms purchases is rapidly gaining support in many European capitals.310 Although 
the concept of multinational naval arms procurement, such as the forthcoming trilateral 
Horizon air-defense frigate, is relatively new, such is not the case within Europe's MCM 
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establishment which has been at the vanguard of joint European development programs for 
many years. 
3. Defense Technology 
Europe currently leads the world in the area of MCM ship design and construction, 
sweep system development, and mine technology. Furthermore, MCM is one of the few 
defense industries where Europe holds comparative advantage vis-a-vis its international 
competitors in the overseas export market.311 The growth of the MCM export industry 
following the Gulf War has been a bonanza for many leading European shipbuilding nations. 
The effectiveness of Iraq's mine campaign during combat operations in the Persian Gulf, and 
the potential escalation of mine terrorism is compelling many Third World countries and 
NICs to acquire MCM vessels for protection of their naval bases, ports, shipping lanes and 
popular tourist routes.312 Since 1988, West European shipbuilders have built and exported 
over 60 MCM vessels to various NIC, Third World, and Middle Eastern countries with more 
on order.313 
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Europe's near global monopoly of MCM ship design and construction is likely to 
continue well into the next century. Most shipyards outside Europe remain wary of venturing 
into the MCMV market because of their reluctance to invest in sophisticated and costly GRP 
construction facilities or train the highly skilled labor force required for GRP ship molding.314 
Moreover, research and development costs associated with entry into the electronic- 
intensive field of MCM systems and equipment such as sonars, ROVs and SAUVs are 
prohibitive given the increasingly complex nature of today's mines. For these reasons 
emerging NICs - which have aggressively pursued the development of indigenous armaments 
programs in other sectors - have been content to purchase MCM vessels and systems from 
European suppliers rather than pursuing domestic production. Even the United States has 
found it necessary to procure European-designed non-magnetic engines for its Avenger-class 
MCMVs and has incorporated Italian GRP hull design for the Osprey-cl&ss coastal mine 
hunter315 
As Europe consolidates its defense programs, MCM should continue to hold its 
position of importance within the European defense industry in view of the growing 
recognition of mine warfare as a first-class threat among the world's maritime nations, and 
Europe's unchallenged industry leadership in mine warfare technology development and 
export production. 
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4. MCM as a Model for ESDI 
From a US perspective, it is entirely in the its interest for European countries to 
assume greater responsibility for their own defense in view of the present relative stability on 
the continent.316 A unified European defense structure allows the US to safely scale down 
the magnitude and expense of its Cold War commitment to Europe while still remaining 
engaged. Moreover, like-minded nations, including NATO states, may not always agree on 
which regional crisis deserve attention. Consequently, a strong ESDI allows Western Europe 
the necessary latitude to intervene militarily in certain regional crisis where the United States 
may wish to abstain from direct involvement or may simply not be invited to participate. 
If Western European navies wish to develop a capability for crisis response outside 
the region independent of the United States, however, they must integrate forces and develop 
joint command arrangements that go well beyond current plans. Europe's MCM forces 
should continue to figure prominently in this aspect of the evolving ESDI. The proven 
interoperability within Europe's MCM forces and the near universal support of and 
identification with MCM among the various EC nations makes it an obvious foundation on 
which to pursue the more controversial issues relating to military integration within Europe. 
I. SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided an overview of the present and future role of MCM in 
NATO's post-Cold War navies. The demise of the Soviet Union and with it the threat of a 
large-scale European general war has not diminished the importance of this role in today's 
unstable global environment.  The growing proliferation of advanced mines to potentially 
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hostile Third World nations and stateless organizations has only increased Europe's 
vulnerability to the economically debilitating effects of mining both at home and abroad. 
Europe's continued dependence on imported oil from the Middle East is but one example. 
Furthermore, the growing propensity for NATO involvement in out-of-area international 
crisis management, including UN-mandated peace-keeping operations, requires the continued 
maintenance of a credible MCM capability to ensure the safety of national and coalition 
assets and to ensure continued international freedom of the seas. 
Historically, the mine has provided smaller naval powers the capability of countering 
the superior navies of their enemies or denying them unhindered command of the seas. 
Recent conflicts such as Desert Storm have only served to reinforce this axiom. 
Consequently, despite ongoing reductions in defense spending, European nations must 
continue to invest in the research and development of new MCM systems capable of 
countering the rapid innovations in mine technology. This does not necessarily mean more 
money, but rather better management of resources and closer cooperation in all phases of 
procurement among the various nations. For its part, the United States must better integrate 
its own MCM assets, and particularly its AMCM forces, with its European partners through 
regularly scheduled transatlantic deployments and active participation within 
STANAVMINFOR. 
Finally, as a warfare specialty, MCM should continue to be a standard-setter in the 
ongoing evolution of ESDI. Its proven track record of successful interoperability between 
respective forces, commonality of weapons systems, and world leadership in technological 
innovation offers a strong foundation on which Europe can build. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
More than 200 hundred years after David Bushneil first cabled together a double line 
of contact "torpedoes" to attack the British frigate Cerberus, modern descendants of these 
primitive mines still pose a significant risk to maritime freedom of the seas and the ability of 
naval forces to project power from the sea. In the age of "information warfare" and the so- 
called "new revolution in military affairs," Western navies must still grapple for methods 
to counter World War I vintage mines laid by vessels "designed at the time of Christ." As 
post-Cold War naval doctrine moves beyond the classic sea power theories of Captain Alfred 
Thayer Mahan toward regionally oriented littoral power projection, the sea mine will emerge 
as a major impediment to naval operations and the free-flow of maritime commerce in inshore 
waters and the narrow seas. This thesis has analyzed the implications of the global 
proliferation of advanced mine warfare hardware and technology in today's unstable 
international environment, and examined NATO's role in countering this threat not only in 
North Atlantic waters, but globally if necessary. Today's mine threat is unique in one 
key respect - although a growing litany of Third World nations possess or have access to the 
poison (mines) only NATO's maritime nations are capable of administering the antidote 
(MCM). Paradoxically, NATO's continuing predilection toward developing new and more 
sophisticated sea mines, places at risk its ability to adequately counter these very same 
mines should the need arise in the future. 
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B. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
Today's international mine threat must be analyzed from both military and economic 
viewpoints. Militarily, mines pose a significant threat to sea control and battlespace 
dominance critical to littoral naval operations. In this environment, the unknown threat 
posed by mines can negate the inherent advantages of strategic agility, surprise, and 
maneuver, vital to US and Allied military doctrine and strategy. Clausewitz warns of 
postponing action in time and space to a point where further waiting brings disadvantage.317 
One can appreciate the potential difficulties involved if enemy forces are allowed to fortify 
and reinforce beachheads while Alliance amphibious forces remain bogged down, clearing 
and navigating mined waters. Moreover, success in a major regional contingency is 
dependent largely on the unhindered seaborne delivery of heavy equipment and sustained 
logistical resupply. The closure of strategic SLOCs by enemy mining could significantly delay 
the arrival of prepositioned and surge sealift assets critical to the sustainment of Alliance or 
coalition military operations. Consequently, future naval expeditionary operations, regardless 
of the pretext, will require readily available MCM forces capable of countering, or at the very 
least, reducing the threat posed by unforeseen enemy mining. 
Economically, we live in an increasingly interdependent world in which transoceanic 
trade accounts for 90 percent of international commerce.318 The mining and subsequent 
closure of strategic maritime trade routes and key commerce ports will not only disrupt 
the economies of adjacent states, but also resource dependent Western nations as well.   In 
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today's unstable international setting, potential conflicts can be found throughout virtually 
every regional littoral: along the Mediterranean, Adriatic, and Black Seas, in the Arabian 
Gulf, throughout the Indian Ocean, and in Northeast and Southwest Asia. While these 
conflicts may not involve NATO member states directly, the global impact of intraregional 
mining campaigns may compel NATO to intervene unilaterally in areas where its security 
interests are at risk, or as a contributing element to UN peace-keeping missions or 
humanitarian operations. Finally, the economic threat posed by today's advanced mines 
is no longer limited to individual nation-states. The availability of these mines to subnational 
organizations means that enterprising terrorist cells, insurgent groups, or criminal 
organizations may soon take advantage of the enormous psychological impact presented 
by the mining of vulnerable maritime terminals or tourist locales. 
Recent events in the Arabian Gulf have highlighted Western economic and military 
vulnerability to even haphazard mining operations, and the inability of the US Navy alone to 
provide an adequate MCM capability. The complexity and cost of the MCM platforms and 
systems required to effectively prosecute advanced modern mines has progressed to the 
point where few, if any, nations can afford to have enough MCM assets to meet its security 
needs unilaterally. Now more than ever, international mining contingencies require the 
collaborative efforts of multinational MCM forces to adequately counter today's 
sophisticated mine threat. From a US perspective, collaborative MCM operations under the 
cognizance of NATO or the UN lend legitimacy to US interests and also reduce the burden 
of undertaking overseas naval action unilaterally.   However, if the United States Navy is 
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to orchestrate coordinated Alliance MCM operations in the future, it must first assume the 
same leadership role in mine warfare that it has in other naval disciplines. 
C.   SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Specific findings and conclusions of the thesis are these: 
1. Mine Warfare Strategic Culture 
In the past, Western Europe has placed a greater premium on maintaining an adequate 
MCM capability than has the United States. The divergence between the two sides of the 
Atlantic in their perceptions of mine warfare's relative importance in national security affairs 
can be traced to each region's differing interpretation of its historical, strategic, and economic 
vulnerability to mining. Europe's focus on their perceived mine warfare vulnerability has 
resulted in continued emphasis on MCM programs to adequately protect their national 
interests. Conversely, America's Cold War maritime strategy centered primarily on open 
ocean confrontation with the Soviet Union. As a result, the Navy assessed the development 
of only minimal MCM as less risky than limiting other warfare areas. 
2. Mine Warfare Proliferation 
Unmonitored global proliferation of advanced sea mines to the developing Third 
World, and, indirectly, to subnational organizations, increases the potential threat to 
continued freedom of the seas and the national security of NATO's maritime nations. The 
concurrent proliferation of diesel- electric submarines worldwide further compounds the 
problem. Moreover, while the Third World's mine warfare capability is formidable its mine 
countermeasure capability is nonexistent. 
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3. Terrorism 
Mines may soon become the new weapon of choice for today's increasingly 
sophisticated terrorist cells and insurgent groups worldwide. These stateless actors have 
rarely adhered to customary or conventional international law. There is little evidence to 
suggest that they will honor international laws concerning the use of sea mines if and when 
they employ these weapons in support of their political, economic, or ideological aims. 
4. International Law 
International law does not adequately address the legal implications of mine warfare 
in time of peace or during periods of armed conflict. Current deficiencies in the various 
internationally recognized treaties and conventions which codify customary international laws 
of the sea governing the use of sea mines continue to challenge even noted scholars of 
maritime law, and have created notable "gray areas" which can be exploited by states seeking 
justification for potentially destablizing mining activities. These inconsistencies will continue 
to lead to a wide range of differing legal interpretations with respect to the uses of sea 
mines among the world's maritime community until a more comprehensive convention is 
developed. 
5. Current Mine Warfare Realities 
When analyzing the likely occurrence of maritime mining on the global stage, it is 
important to consider the enormous disparity between those nations possessing the capability 
to plant offensive, defensive, or protective minefields and those nations with the ability or 
inclination of clearing them either during or following the cessation of hostilities. With the 
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exception of Japan, only NATO possesses the capability to adequately counter worldwide 
maritime mining threats. Moreover, NATO is the only institution capable of conducting 
extensive MCM operations globally. 
6. Expeditionary Warfare 
NATO can expect future adversaries to exploit mine warfare weaknesses exposed 
during the Gulf War. The recent successes of the Iranian and Iraqi mining campaigns have 
not been lost on other potential adversaries. NATO will doubtless face the threat of sea 
mines during future military operations in support of Western or international security 
interests in today's unstable international environment. Ships such as the Samuel B. Roberts 
and Princeton continue to serve as cogent reminders of the potential destruction meted out 
by the "weapon that waits." 
7. MCM in NATO's Post-Cold War Navies 
Changes in Europe's strategic environment have brought about a fundamental 
reorientation of NATO's larger navies toward the development of a robust expeditionary 
capability. Despite the development of a more autonomous and self-reliant WEU, NATO 
remains the only alliance capable of exercising sustained naval power projection or 
conducting peace-keeping/enforcing missions globally. As such, the Alliance will remain as 
the primary organizing mechanism for out-of-area naval collaboration in the foreseeable 
future. 
Against this backdrop, NATO's MCM forces can perform five primary missions: 
ensure North Atlantic waters are free from the threat of sporadic terrorist or insurgent mining 
activities;  defend against Europe's economic vulnerability to mining from latent regional 
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hegemons-including Russia; support NATO's Immediate Reaction standing naval forces; 
contribute to Alliance, or UN-mandated peace-keeping/enforcing missions or expeditionary 
operations worldwide; and finally, reduce the potential threat posed by mines to NATO's 
nuclear submarine forces. Common to many of these duties will be the requirement to 
provide an effective shallow water MCM capability during NATO or ad-hoc coalition 
operations in the littoral regions of the world. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations deal with mine warfare issues specific to the US 
Navy as well as to NATO. Implementation of these recommendations will enhance US and 
Alliance rapid deployment MCM capabilities should the need arise in the future. 
1. United States Naval Strategic Culture 
a. Mine Warfare Expertise 
During the Cold War, senior US naval officers could afford to be less than 
proficient in the art of mine warfare. However, in abdicating MCM responsibilities to 
European allies, American naval leadership also squandered its mine warfare expertise and 
corporate memory. This lack of flag-level mine warfare experience was evident during the 
Gulf War. In theater command level knowledge of MCM was virtually nonexistent and 
resulted in mismanagement and poor command and control of the US MCM forces. As the 
US Navy tailors its future force structure and doctrine toward littoral operations, improved 
mine warfare expertise at the flag level becomes imperative if the United States is to assume 
a position of leadership in future Alliance or coalition MCM operations. 
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b. Mine Warfare Training 
The US Navy's failure to foresee the emerging role of mine warfare in regional 
contingency operations and the requirements for an MCM force structure to meet this 
challenge clouded its threat perceptions and therefore its training priorities. Historically, 
participation by MCM units in fleet exercises has been rare due to funding constraints and 
extended transit distances. Future fleet exercises must physically integrate MCM into 
operational scenarios. Al! too often, exercise mine threats are simulated and subsequently 
removed when they pose an excessive problem or delay "more pressing" training objectives. 
It is highly unlikely, however, that future adversaries will be as accommodating when their 
minefields stymie US or Alliance naval operations. In real life, mines do not simply "go 
away" when they become a nuisance. We must train like we will fight. 
c. Mine Warfare Funding 
The US Navy's new strategic vision is codified in.. . From the Sea and its 
follow on companion. Forward... From the Sea. Yet to effectively carry out the missions 
outlined in these documents entails a shift away from the practices of blue water naval 
operations toward providing our naval forces with the equipment and training necessary to 
execute the new littoral strategy. Unfortunately, our recapitalization strategy continues to 
focus on improving the areas where we presently have an overwhelming dominance (power 
projection) while neglecting areas in which we are potentially vulnerable (sea control and 
battlespace dominance).319 Although the US Navy has committed increased resources toward 
rectifying acknowledged shortcomings in its MCM program, current outlays ($320 million) 
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still account for less than one half of one percent of the Navy's total budget. Future funding 
levels for MCM must demand a level of priority befitting the mine's emergence as a world- 
class threat to Western security. Moreover, funding decisions for MCM programs should be 
coordinated through the operational commander, COMINEWARCOM, rather than strictly 
in the Washington arena. 
2. Transatlantic MCM Cooperation Within NATO 
a. Intelligence 
The mining of the USS Tripoli and later the USS Princeton, in waters 
believed to be free of mines was largely attributable to inadequate intelligence on the size and 
location of the Iraqi minefields. These events highlight the requirement for increased 
intelligence on and surveillance of international mine warfare capabilities by NATO's 
intelligence-gathering community. Moreover, Alliance members must share mine warfare 
intelligence, particularly concerning mine exploitation data and human source intelligence 
on Third World mine warfare capabilities, inventories, and storage locations. 
b. MCM Doctrine Within NATO 
NATO must shed outdated Cold War doctrine and update MCM exercise 
scenarios that continue to focus on large scale enemy mining campaigns directed against 
Western European waters. Collectively, NATO must understand that MCM is now 
primarily an enabling element for expeditionary sea control, power projection, and 
peacekeeping/enforcing operations. Consequently, greater emphasis must be placed on 
developing rapidly deployable MCM flotillas capable of conducting out-of-area MCM 
operations on short notice. Tactically, NATO should improve its present influence sweep 
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capability to complement recent advances in minehunting technology. 
c.   Multinational MCM Cooperation 
US MCM forces must integrate into Western Europe's established mine 
warfare community in order to facilitate multinational out-of-area MCM operations in the 
future. This is especially true with respect to US AMCM forces, which rarely train with 
European MCM units. Closer cooperation with European allies in MCM exercises 
emphasizing both benign and hostile littoral operations will increase tactical proficiency and 
establish a foundation for professional familiarity crucial to success in future real world 
contingency operations. Furthermore, NATO's MCM forces must also conduct out-of-area 
exercises in the regions where they are likely to be employed in the future, such as the 
Arabian Gulf. In other words, they must train where they will fight. 
3. Bottom Line 
Many of the foregoing recommendations require increased political as well as 
military commitments on both sides of the Atlantic at a time of acknowledged military 
drawdowns and dwindling defense resources. Nevertheless, success in today's regionally 
oriented security environment depends largely on the capability and credibility of NATO's 
collective MCM forces to deal with the ever-increasing global mine threat. Increased 
transatlantic MCM cooperation will foster improved levels of coordination, 
interoperability, and readiness among the respective European and North American MCM 
forces necessary to meet these challenges into the next century. As the acknowledged leader 
within NATO, the inited States must assume the lead in prioritizing mine warfare as a 
critical warfare area not only within the US Navy, but also within the Alliance as well. 
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